Technical efficiency and technical progress in the Colombian metal-mechanical sector, 1977 and 1986 by Currea, Dora P
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN THE COLOMBIAN
METAL-MECHANICAL SECTOR: 1977 AND 1986
by
Dora P. Currea
MCRP, Harvard University
(1980)
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
URBAN STUDIES AND PLANNING
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
March, 1991
© Dora P. Currea, 1991. All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
Department of Urlban Studies and Planning
March, 1991
Certified by
Accepted by
Karen R. Polenske
Mfessor of Regional Pflt'cal Economy and Planning
/Thes' pervisor
Lawrence usskind, Chair
Ph.D. Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
V IL ~) *om
W A~L~
- 11 -
ABSTRACT
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN THE COLOMBIAN
METAL-MECHANICAL SECTOR: 1977 AND 1986
by
Dora P. Currea
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
URBAN STUDIES AND PLANNING
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
ABSTRACT
The focus of this research was to examine and quantify as accurately as possible the
changes in productivity in two metal-mechanical industries. Through these changes in
productivity we traced the changes in the relative efficiency of firms, and by comparing the
movements of those firms defining best-practice production techniques we traced technical
progress. The purpose of this study of efficiency and technical change was, first, to be
able to evaluate firm economic performance, and second, to uncover what firm strategies
made for success or failure in difficult market circumstances.
Using the tools of efficiency measurement, specifically the deterministic production
frontier, we examined patterns of firm efficiency to test hypotheses regarding the relative
efficiency of firms in developing countries with long histories of import substitution.
While we found substantial scope for efficiency improvement in 1977 and 1986, we found
no systematic relationship between technical efficiency nor technical progress and firm size.
Only in the case of very small firms did we find evidence of capital indivisibilities given the
number and variety of metalworking machines required by the production technology in the
sector.
We found a range of plant scales consistent with technical efficiency and that within a given
technology (what is referred to as the ex-ante choice) there was flexibility allowing a range
of factor proportions (ex-post) and types of plant organization. Our firm sample did not
support the popular myth of small labor-intensive firms or large capital-intensive ones.
Small firm entrepreneurs were able to maximize the use of their capital by subcontracting
work to their employees, large firm entrepreneurs accomplished the same by diversifying
their product line.
By 1986 with the maturing of both industries and the trial by fire represented by the
recession, the general level of managerial know-how had increased, and more specific
production-related capabilities and efforts became important. Most important, however,
were the difficulties in obtaining material inputs in the second survey year. Import
restrictions resulted in firm stockpiling. This practice imposed real efficiency losses on all
firms regardless of size or factor proportions and took Colombian firms further away from
the ideal of the flexible specialization model and its reliance on just-in-time inventories.
Another obstacle to achieving this ideal was the firms' survival strategy based on cutting
labor costs. The recession provided firms an opportunity to reduce employment as well as
labor's share without complementary efforts to increase labor productivity
These trends are particularly worrisome because productivity gains across survey years
were strongly associated with firms' relative technical efficiency in the initial survey year.
This suggests that static efficiency in one period strongly affects dynamic productivity
gains in the future. We would expect, therefore, that a continued preoccupation with cost-
cutting to the exclusion of real technological efforts will slow productivity gains in
industries still delaying investment in both capital and labor
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The problem of how to foster technological development is a new one and not
wholeheartedly recognized. For a long time it has been considered a corollary of economic
growth in developed countries whose wealth sustained the innovative process. Solow
(1957) and Denison (1962, 1974) quantified the contribution of technology to economic
growth and today their results, which attribute 40% to 90% of the growth in gross output
to technological change, are the primary evidence for arguments supporting loan packages
for science and technology in developing countries.
Such arguments reflect a change in thinking about technology. Technological
progress is no longer a by-product of economic growth but a necessary condition; it is no
longer a simple matter of importing capital goods embodying state-of-the-art technologies.
Decades of development efforts have shown the difficulties of initiating self-sustaining
growth in which capital-deepening brings embodied technological progress and unleashes
its disembodied equivalent--jointly, improved machinery and labor bring about productivity
benefits greater than the sum of their individual contributions. From the traditional view of
technological change as an exogenous shock to a steady state, it has become a phenomenon
endogenous to the production process.
This new focus on technology reflects the achievements of semi-industrialized Less
Developed Countries (LDCs) who have built an industrial infrastructure in which the easier
initial gains of import substitution in light industry have been exploited. Now these
countries face the problem of industrial deepening and few have internal markets large
enough to support the costs of import substitution strategies. Even in the largest
developing countries, the inward-oriented development model appears to have outlasted its
usefulness. In Latin America the 1980s has been popularly labelled the lost decade. The
globalization of capital brought home the pressures of world supply and demand. Most of
these countries still are trying to recover from the repercussions of the oil crises in the
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1970s and the global recession and debt crises in the early 1980s . The Keynesian tools of
government intervention proved ineffective against stagflation and mounting fiscal and
balance-of-payments deficits. Instead, for solutions to external sector problems, we now
look to the example of the export-led development model of the Asian Newly Industrialized
Countries (NICs). For solutions to internal sector problems, increasingly we look to the
market and the private sector to allocate resources efficiently. Where the development
economist saw market failure arising from institutional deficiencies, externalities, or market
myopia, now he/she discovers price distortions.
In the late 1970s, development agencies like the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank began to examine the claims of those espousing the need to
foster capital goods production in LDCs (Stewart, 1976 and 1979; Mitra, 1979; Pack,
1980; Research Program in Science and Technology, Economic Commission on Latin
American/ United Nations Development Program/ Inter-American Development Bank).
These claims held that an indigenous technology would avoid the inefficiencies of
inappropriate imported technologies often associated with import-substitution development
strategies. These analysts examined the requirements for successful promotion of infant
industries, particularly capital goods. In trying to evaluate and quantify successful infant
industry promotion, they focused increasingly on firm efficiency and the patterns of
productivity change.
Although developing country planners continued to debate selective promotion of
capital goods, the world recession shifted their attention towards the more immediate
problem of making existing industries more efficient. The move to trade liberalization, a
central feature of structural adjustment programs and a condition of further concessionary
credit, added more pressure in this direction. Accordingly, Dahlman and Westphal (1982,
p. 106) of the World Bank coined the phrase "technological mastery" defined as the
continuing efforts of firms to assimilate, adapt, and/or create technology. The old
paradigm of technological transfer focusing on capital imports has been replaced. Instead
-3-
of a passive transfer, the current paradigm centers on active efforts to assimilate and adapt
existing technologies. Instead of focusing on major innovations, this view traces the
incremental and cumulative improvements in efficiency that make up the bulk of
productivity gains. The first order of business has become the measurement of efficiency
and productivity.
If we could identify the types and potential causes of firm inefficiency, this
information would guide the formulation of policies to correct it. This exercise would be
important not only in the static context of a given time period, but also in the dynamic
context of productivity changes through time. A study of the same firms under different
conditions would suggest how firms adapt and evolve, helping us to sort out the complex
set of technical, human, and structural factors at the micro and macro levels which impinge
upon the process of technological development.
In the following chapters, we examine the economic performance of a group of
Colombian metal-mechanical firms producing agricultural and industrial kitchen equipment.
The 1977 firm survey by Cortes, Berry and Ishaq (1985) provided the base year data to our
follow-up survey of these same firms in 1986. The first year coincided with a period of
strong economic growth, while the latter represented a period of recovery from a long-
lasting recession. These differing macroeconomic conditions allow us to examine how
entrepreneurs make decisions about ways to improve efficiency and initiate technological
efforts in the unstable macroeconomic context, which characterizes present day Latin
American economies. We examine how firms, representing a nascent capital-goods sector,
respond to fluctuating demand in an environment where they are unevenly shielded from
competition and the threat of a rapidly advancing technological frontier. We study how
they trade-off technological efforts with austerity measures geared toward simple survival.
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ACHIEVING TECHNOLOGICAL MASTERY: EFFICIENCY AND TECHNOLOGICAL
PROGRESS
This new preoccupation with efficiency has allowed a more meaningful approach to
the problem of technological development. The accelerating pace of the technological
frontier has forced the industrial restructuring of industries in both center and periphery,
laying aside the orderly stepwise progression envisioned by product life-cycle strategists.
Westphal, Rhee, Kim, and Amsden (1984) have shown the possibilities for LDCs to
achieve competitiveness even in capital goods exports. This example emphasizes efficiency
in production as the primary prerequisite for participation in a demanding international
market. However, efficiency has taken on a dynamic dimension in the race to incorporate
the latest productivity-enhancing technologies.
Increasingly as more LDCs try to move out of the 1980s recession and cope with
greater protectionism in traditional export markets, they are looking away from policies
oriented toward exploiting their comparative advantage in low-wage labor and toward those
fostering technological mastery. This mastery is sought by means of selectively carving
out a market niche where domestic value added may receive favorable terms of trade. This
broad policy guideline is yet to be worked out in detail and implemented through concrete
changes in trade regimes and industrial development strategies. Although the terminology
and rhetoric are different, the objective remains the same--to be able to exploit comparative
advantage and realize the gains from participation in international trade, that is, access to a
wide variety of efficiently produced goods and services.
Notwithstanding the current liberalization prescription, this policy calls for a
delicate balance involving the mix, timing, and targeting of import-substitution and export-
promotion incentives. Studies of the Asian export economies by authors such as Yusuf
and Peters (1985), Westphal (1982), Westphal et al. (1984), and Dahlman et al. (1985)
provide evidence of the need for this calibration all along the development process.
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Although the Asian NICs are used as examples to show the folly of maintaining import
substitution policies, their experience confirms the potential gains from the old paradigm
based on government dirigisme. Their success in state planning demonstrate the
possibilities of economic management and rapid capital accumulation. In contrast, most
Latin American countries including Colombia which we focus on later, have clung to
import substitution strategies thereby preserving a structure of protection no longer
consistent with their evolving industrial structure.
Achieving technological mastery in a particular production process at a given point
in time is no longer sufficient in a dynamic context of constantly changing technologies and
global financial markets. LDCs aiming to become a low-wage production platform for
developed countries are warned that such a strategy provides only static gains and at best
represents a first step towards moving up the hierarchy of a shifting international division
of labor. In the case of semi-industrialized LDCs the problem is seldom the lack of skilled
labor (though in certain newer fields there are shortages), but rather the efficient use of this
labor domestically. LDCs will have to master the technologies to produce new and/or
better products in specific market niches in order to stay ahead of protectionist measures
adopted to counteract the adjustment to structural change in a global economy and to create
high value added activities that will help to sustain a higher standard of living.
Policy makers' attention to technology issues reflects a greater optimism in the
international context. Technological change in process engineering (i.e., improvements in
the efficiency of the production process) can breathe new life into older segmented markets
by reducing barriers to entry and introducing greater competitive discipline in the various
markets. Technological change in product engineering in the form of new products can
similarly resuscitate demand and reverse market saturation. Certainly, these potential
opportunities arise from a perception of technological progress at a small scale. A specific
case in point is the recent popularity of flexible technologies and manufacturing systems
designed to defy the rigidities of traditional mass production systems and their associated
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bureaucratic corporate structures (Piore and Sable, 1984). New technologies embodied in
programmable machinery promise to pave the way for an industrial organization where
small-scale firms can be competitive. Competitiveness is becoming increasingly associated
with firms' flexibility and adaptability to changing market conditions.
There are also internal pressures to promote technological development. Not unlike
the situation in developed countries, LDC industrialists are also split between waving the
banner for greater competitiveness, which requires efforts in adapting and creating new
technologies, and putting up trade barriers to insulate the internal market from the creative
destruction enveloping international markets. For LDCs, this battle among constituencies
is particularly difficult, considering a long history of inward-looking development
strategies. In most countries affected by the early 1980s recession, industrial restructuring
has centered on reducing wages to regain competitiveness. Strategies based mainly on
wage reduction, however, are short-term palliatives that cannot replace active and
continuing efforts to improve total not just capital or labor productivity.
When analysts such as Merhav (1969), first examined the issue of technology in
LDCs, they translated Schumpeter's notion of creative destruction into a vicious cycle of
technological dependency. The innovative entrepreneur, whose inventiveness was fueled
by the profits to be derived from being first in the market, was stifled by the monopoly of
technology creators and providers in developed countries. Still, there are no data to
provide evidence of innovation in LDCs. It is no wonder that Schumpeterian approaches,
such as those by Kamien and Schwartz (1982), focus exclusively on developed countries.
Using the methods of optimal control theory these authors model the competitive conditions
most likely to induce firms to innovate. They use R&D expenditures as a proxy to measure
technological efforts and the tendency is to focus on larger firms for which data on patents
and other indicators of innovation are available. Nevertheless, even these analysts
recognize that these indicators of innovation and technological effort may represent only
imperfect proxies of the phenomena they are trying to measure.
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CASE STUDY FOCUS: THE COLOMBIAN METAL-MECHANICAL SECTOR
The metal-mechanical sector in Colombia is the focus for this case study. This
sector is the precursor and foundation for a capital-goods sector, whose role is to embody
and diffuse that technology best reflecting the nation's relative factor proportions. In the
short and medium term, competitiveness in the international market will depend upon
LDCs' capacity to master, assimilate, and adapt imported technology. Without some
domestic production, however, it is argued, even adaptation of foreign machinery is limited
to repair work. In the long term, domestic capital-goods production is necessary to
internalize within the economy the little understood, but much desired, process of continual
generation of productivity enhancing improvements and innovations. If Colombian
producers of capital goods can achieve technological mastery, the promise of even greater
productivity gains from user industries bodes well for the country's future economic and
technological development.
Rosenberg (1976) provides a dramatic example of the metalworking sector's
potential role in economic and technological development. Citing the historical evolution of
metalworking industries in the 19th century, he traces their role in generating, embodying,
and diffusing technological knowledge. Responding to user specifications, metalworking
firms embodied productivity-enhancing innovations in machinery and equipment. In
addition, through their own product and process innovations, they produced more cost-
effective machinery, which enlarged the user market, promoted specialization, imparted
capital savings, and diffused technological improvements throughout the economy.
Furthermore, the lumpiness or indivisibilities associated with capital equipment forced a
change of scale in user industries, thereby creating economies of scale. As both input and
output to a variety of production activities, product and process innovations in
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metalworking industries set off a cumulative chain of technological improvements through
backward and forward linkages.
Considering the potential benefits of domestic capital-goods production, it is no
wonder that this sector is considered a target for selective infant industry protection. Also,
the sector's industrial organization requirements offer promise to semi-industrialized LDCs.
The industrial structure of this sector in developed countries is characterized by small and
medium-scale firms linked through a complex system of specialization (Rosenberg, 1976).
Although this places great demands upon interindustry transactions in terms of the
availability, variety, and quality of inputs, it also presents an opportunity to increase the
roundaboutness of production and stimulate greater integration of the industrial structure.
As a result, along with capital-goods production, LDCs such as Colombia and Brazil are
experimenting with subcontracting banks or exchanges to bring together producers of
linked industries (Teubal, 1987).
Moreover, in the case of capital goods, location is particularly important. For LDC
firms in these industries, a significant portion of their production is targeted toward
custom-made orders that reflect the economic base of their region and its industrial
specialization. Not withstanding the globalization of production, there is broad scope for
national and regional specialization in a high-value added market niche for capital goods
(Chudnovsky and Nagao, 1983).
Early in the 1970s Colombia began to turn to an outward-looking development
model by providing export incentives, reducing quantitative restrictions, and lowering tariff
levels. According to neoclassical interpretations espoused in World Bank reports
(1983,1984), this led to the high rates of growth later in the decade, but others such as
Adda (1986) argue it also led to greater exposure in the international recession of the early
1980s. Since then, Colombia, like other LDCs in Latin America, has been recuperating
from this long-lasting recession and forging industrial development plans based on
competitiveness, productivity, and technology.
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Colombia may be considered typical of middle-income semi-industrialized
countries. Its economic performance does not stand out as exemplary, but neither does its
debt or unemployment situation stand out as a particularly acute problem in comparison to
other LDCs. As such, it is a good country to use to trace the impacts of austerity, shifting
trade and industrial incentives, and changing policies toward fostering technological
mastery. In addition, Colombia's macroeconomic policy has been similarly influenced by
the current demands of international lenders toward structural adjustment and market
liberalization. Like other LDCs, it continues to entertain what may be competing policies
based on the implicit belief in the ability of government to direct and foster technological
development.
MEASURING EFFICIENCY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS
In our attempts to measure efficiency and technical progress we concentrate initially
on Solow's (1957) total factor productivity (TFP) model, which quantifies this complex
phenomenon by focusing on productivity change. The TFP is derived as a residual and
represents the changes in productivity unaccounted for by changes in factors. We also
describe how analysts have improved TFP methods by looking into the problems of
aggregation, the measurement of capital, and disequilibrium conditions. In addition to
these improvements, we introduce the methods of efficiency measurement to account for
yet another source of potential bias to TFP--errors in optimization. Together these
measurement techniques lay the theoretical foundation for our empirical work based on
firm-level survey data from Colombian producers of agricultural and industrial kitchen
equipment.
Nadiri (1970), Stiglitz (1979), Katz (1980), Moore (1983), Rosenberg and
Frischtak (1985), and Fransman (1986) have criticized TFP methods for underestimating
the complexity of the technological processes underlying productivity change. They argue
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that the conceptualization of these processes as a mechanical and exogenous shift of the
production function is an extreme simplification. These methods, claim critics, are part of
the old view of technology, which excludes its endogenous dimension and the impact of
the production environment in inducing technical change under different forms of
competition. The forces affecting this environment include those external and internal to
the firm.
Externally, there is a host of policies that shape the production environment of firms
by affecting the availability and cost of inputs as well as the market for outputs. From this
vantage point focusing on economy-wide and sectoral trends, the World Bank has been
examining the impact on productivity of inward versus outward development strategies
(e.g., Krueger and Truncer, 1980; Nishimizu and Robinson, 1984). Nishimizu and Page,
(1987; ongoing World Bank research project on Economic Policies and Productivity
Change in Industry) have found TFP measures useful in sorting out the evidence with
respect to infant industries. These authors suggest that TFP change should be interpreted
broadly as movements toward technological mastery. They recognize that TFP measures
also reflect industrial and plant organization, technical and managerial know-how, as well
as changes in capacity utilization from short-term disruptions in the production process.
Internally, the firm's environment is regulated by its management which decides
how to respond to external forces. Management sets the pace of technological mastery
through its organization of production--decisions regarding the training of workers, the
choice of technique, the replacement of capital. We would except that managerial ability is
a key variable determining the efficiency and productivity of the firm.
Our empirical work examines these micro-level dynamics of technological mastery
so often confined to a "black box." Our approach is based on neoclassical production
theory, but complemented with TFP refinements and the techniques of efficiency
measurement. TFP refinements guide us in the proper: (1) aggregation and measurement
of inputs and outputs, particularly the peculiarities of capital, and (2) adjustment for
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violations of the TFP long-run equilibrium assumptions which are relevant in the case of
LDCs. Efficiency measures recognize firms may not be operating on the production
surface where output is maximized nor located on the cost-minimization point.
The firm's distance from the production surface, which denotes the input
combinations maximizing output, give us a measure of the firm's technical efficiency. The
distance from the cost-minimizing point, which denotes the appropriate input combination
with respect to the relative prices of factors, gives us a measure of allocative or price
efficiency. Scale efficiency refers to the appropriateness of the scale of operations of the
firm given the structure and technological requirements of the industry of which it is part.
In contrast to the firm-specific measures for technical and allocative efficiency, in the case
of scale efficiency, when data are available, measurement usually follows the traditional
production function analyses of returns to scale based on factor elasticities.
In our empirical work based on a limited but rich firm-level data set, we
complement firm-specific efficiency measures, which focus on technical inefficiency, with
information on firm size and factor proportions to examine the related problems of scale
and allocative inefficiency. The industrial structure erected after decades of import
substitution is often characterized by a few large and many small producers (Roberts,
1989). This bimodal size distribution of firms has fueled controversy regarding the
efficiency of large versus small firms.
A priori arguments focus on why large or small firms should be the more efficient.
Large firm proponents focus on economies of scale and failure of small firms to operate at
the minimum efficient scale. They claim that these small firms survive, in spite of their
scale inefficiency, because of limited import competition. Small firm proponents argue that
because they save on scarce capital and make use of abundant LDC labor supplies, small
fuims are allocatively efficient. Their factor proportions reflect the relative scarcities in
developing economies. In contrast, large firms who are the main beneficiaries of
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protectionist policies can be neither allocatively nor scale efficient--they are too capital-
intensive and their scale of operations is too large for the domestic LDC market.
Both large and small firms are subject to technical inefficiency, but for different
reasons. Without the incentives of competition, large firm managers fail to exert
themselves sufficiently to produce the maximum with given inputs. Small firm managers
have the motivation, but lack the training; even if they purchase inputs in the correct
proportions, they fail to use them optimally. The literature on flexible specialization points
to another aspect of managerial capability. Given the instability of markets, some claim
small firm managers are more flexible or adaptable because they are unencumbered by
internal bureaucracies and rigid labor contracts. On the other hand, large firm managers
can draw upon greater resources with which to adapt to changing market conditions.
These arguments can be extrapolated to a dynamic context. Simply because of their
numbers, small firms are motivated by greater competition and are more likely to respond
to customer needs. These efforts lead to product improvements and innovations. In the
case of large firms, these efforts are more likely to be stifled by non-competitive behavior
and the requirements of high-volume production. Once again, however, if the focus is on
resources and not motivation, large firms can bring to bear the latest-vintage capital and
greater R&D expenditure. More importantly, given the inefficiency implied by the skewed
firm size distribution, potential productivity gains are likely to be lower in LDCs, thereby
compromising their prospects for achieving technological mastery.
Our attention to both TFP and efficiency measurement is not a new. Our
contribution lies in their application at the micro level. Most analyses of efficiency
measurement rely either on limited time-series of single firms (most often utilities or simple
production processes) or on cross-sectional firm data. Our model examines both the
changes in time as well as across firms. However, unlike sectoral TFP analyses relying on
census or other panel data not specifically acquired for these purposes, our survey contains
qualitative and quantitative information that enables us to implement and test various
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measures of efficiency and productivity. Moreover, we place our micro efficiency results
in the context of Colombian macro productivity trends in order to provide as complete a
picture as possible of the internal and external forces affecting technological mastery.
Following this introduction, Chapters 2 and 3 provide the theoretical framework for
our empirical work by describing the models and techniques of TFP and efficiency
measurement, respectively. In Chapter 4, we highlight the opportunities and limitations
faced by firms in the Colombian metal-mechanical sector during the time period covered by
our 1977 and 1986 surveys. The results from our application of a deterministic frontier
production function to a sample of firms in the sector is the subject of Chapter 5. Finally,
in Chapter 6, we offer conclusions about firm decisions to improve efficiency and
technology and suggest policy implications for promoting technological mastery.
CHAPTER 2
NEOCLASSICAL MODELS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
Most of growth theory has historically ignored technological change, stressing
instead the process of capital accumulation. After an introductory overview of the historical
roots of this apparent neglect, we examine models that attempt to quantify the relative
contribution of technological change to output growth. The first is Solow's classic model
of disembodied technical change measured as an unexplained or TFP residual. More recent
models further refined TFP measures by analyzing the problems of aggregation and
functional form, the measurement of capital, and disequilibrium conditions. These
improvements help rid the TFP of the various measurement biases and problems.
These improvements are particularly appropriate in the LDC context. Here, as
Chenery (1983, p. 854) notes, the process of development and its central feature of
"structural transformation" are characterized by adjustment lags and persistent differences
in factor returns--conditions that violate the assumptions of long-run equilibrium
underlying Solow's TFP. As we will explain, these conditions require the analyst to
somehow take into account the divergence between observed prices and the real value of
resources they represent. For this purpose as well as apply improved TFP measurement
techniques, analysts have turned to working with micro data at the establishment level,
even if the focus of study are changes in industry structure and organization.
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGY THEORIES
Capital accumulation has been seen as the engine of growth since the time of the
classical economists. Its central place derives from the assumption of a positive time
preference preventing consumption of all capital today without saving for consumption
tomorrow and from the recognition that there is a time lag between capital formation and the
increased supply of consumer goods that it makes possible (Blaug, 1985, p. 519).
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Although the variables that determine capital accumulation and the mechanisms by which it
affects the growth rate, level, and composition of output differ among economic schools, it
plays a critical role in economic development.
For example, in the neoclassical system, capital accumulation along with
macroeconomic equilibrium--the equality of desired savings to planned investment--is
determined by household preferences. As Marglin (1984) notes, the exogenous forces of
tastes, biology and technology drive the neoclassical model. In the Keynesian system
investment demand, a highly subjective parameter dependent upon the state of confidence
of business, is the driving force. Rather than investment adjusting to desired savings,
savings through the mechanism of the multiplier adjust to satisfy an autonomous level of
investment demand.1 The distribution of the product is determined not by the technical
conditions of production but by the priorities assumed in the competition between
capitalists and workers, given their respective savings propensities. In the Marxist system,
this competition turned into a class conflict is the force that propels the economic system.
Technological change, on the other hand, has enjoyed less sustained attention.
Marx gives some special consideration to technology; it is not endogenous to production
but works through the mechanism of capital accumulation to lend the capitalist subsystem
its unbridled production capacity. After initial theorizing by Adam Smith with respect to
specialization, the division of labor, and productivity, technology as a part of the
production process was set aside. Instead, the focus turned to the neoclassical question of
resource allocation and the intertemporal distribution of consumption. The technology
issues surviving from the classicals were those of Ricardo and his examination of the
impact of labor-saving technical change, thereby beginning a long tradition of the study of
factor bias and the choice of technique.
1 Blaug (1986) and Marglin (1984) identify two other important departures from neoclassical thinking
introduced by Keynes: (1) the equality of saving and investment brought about by variations in quantities
i.e., output/income rather than the prices such as the rate of interest, and (2) an equilibrium level of income
equating saving to investment not usually coincident with full employment.
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Rooted in the problems of resource allocation, the orthodox approach defines
technology as an external disturbance to the economic system. Technological progress is
dependent upon the state of scientific knowledge and autonomously supplied inventions.
Since John Stuart Mill's perception of the stationary state, technical change has been
viewed as creating a temporary disturbance that brings the system to another equilibrium
point as variables adjust, each one in proportion to the other under perfect competition.
This requirement of proportional growth defies the historical record as modern industrial
economies have become more capital intensive and more productive as a result of both
technological progress and increasing returns to scale (Solow, 1970).2
In the remainder of this chapter we trace analytical efforts to model technological
change and increasingly incorporate the complexities associated with it. Together with
models described in Chapter 3, this literature review will show how conventional thinking
about technological change has shifted from a view of such change as an exogenous shock
to the economy to one endogenous to production units.
DISEMBODIED TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTION
FUNCTION
The importance of technology to the growth process was dramatically brought to
the forefront by the sources-of-growth model, a supply-side version of the traditional
demand-oriented neoclassical growth model. This model became the basis of a wealth of
econometric work as it extrapolated into the macro setting the assumed behavior and
relations of micro units postulated in production theory.
The classic work in this respect is Solow's (1957) attempt to account for the
sources of growth in the United States economy from 1909 to 1940. He found that 90% of
2 The work of Teubal (1987) along with Rosenberg's historical analyses (1976, 1982) provides a useful
guide for planners willing to complement neoclassical analyses with more eclectic alternative models that
can account for some of the non-linearities and disproportionalities of technology.
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the growth in output per capita was attributable to technical change that is assumed to be
disembodied, i.e., neutral in terms of its relative impact on factors, and exogenous. The
key assumptions are borrowed from growth theory. The model assumes there is a single
homogeneous good used for both consumption and as perfectly malleable capital stock.
This allows the production function to include a measurable capital input (a stock)
measured in the same units as output (a flow).
The model is defined by the aggregate production function which includes a shift
factor (A(t)), also known as the efficiency parameter. It measures the displacement of the
constant returns to scale (CRS) production function caused by Hicks-neutral technical
change
Q = A(t)f(K,L)
where Q = output
K = capital stock
L = labor units
The productivity or efficiency improvements modelled by the shift factor are a function of
time, such that these correspond to a pure learning-by-doing effect where both labor and
capital grow more productive with experience. In short, Hicks' neutral technical change is
equally labor- and capital-augmenting, such that it leaves the ratio of marginal products
unaffected. As shown in Appendix A, by differentiating with respect to time, equating
factor shares with factor elasticities, and rearranging terms, we get the familiar equation in
which the rate of growth in output is decomposed into the rate of disembodied technical
change A' and the rate of growth of the factors.
Q'= A' + 6K K'+ L L'
where the prime notation denotes rate of growth, i.e., A'=(dAldt)A
X = dQ/dX(X/Q) = output elasticity offactor X=K,L
The A' captures the shift in the production function, while the remaining terms capture
movements along the production function with the 6 's as weights for the aggregation of
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inputs. This expression highlights the fact that TFP change is a residual after accounting
for the growth in output due to changes in the quantity of factor inputs as well as for cost
minimizing use of input combinations over time in response to shifts in factor prices.
Solving for A', this expression also yields the familiar formula for the Divisia index of TFP
change, discussed in the next section.
Applying Euler's theorem, given that CRS assumesf is linear and homogeneous, if
factors are paid their marginal products, their shares in Q exhaust the product (0K = -
6L). Rearranging in per capita terms
q'= A' + 6K k'
where q'= Q'- L' and k'= K'- L'
or in discrete approximation
Aq/q = AA/A + 0K Ak/k
Solow uses this equation to estimate the relative contributions of capital-deepening
(k') and the shift factor (A'), using annual series of real private non-farm GNP per person-
hour, the capital share (a composite of assumptions), and capital stock per head (excluding
government, agricultural, and consumer durables and adjusted for capacity utilization by
the percent of labor unemployed). Given the key assumption of neutrality, and beginning
with an initial level of A, Solow treats the data points described by his model as belonging
to an underlying production function shifting upwards (Harcourt, 1972, p. 50).3 After
plotting the estimated A against the capital-labor ratio, Solow concludes neutrality on
average since there is no apparent relationship. Similarly "presumptive evidence of
neutrality" derived from empirical findings in the 1940s suggesting the long-run stability of
3 To capture the changes in production relations over time captured by A, it is introduced into the
production function as a variable with an initial level of A*:
log Qt=log A* + log At +P log Kt + ylog Lt + ut
However, since we assume a proportional (neutral) shift in the production function we can set log At=1 and
then fit
(log Qt- log At) =log A* +fp log Kt + ylog Lt + ut
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the aggregate capital-labor ratio had led to the widespread assumption of neutrality (Blaug,
1985, p. 479). This assumption glosses over the fact that only strongly biased technical
progress is picked up by the aggregate capital-labor ratio. The latter also reflects the
influences of savings, investment allocation across industries, expectations about future
technical change, and past patterns of growth in output.4
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on how to measure neutrality and the
weakness of the evidence cited, it is equally difficult to accept the notion of a persistent bias
in innovation toward capital-saving or labor-saving technology. A persistent bias in
innovations would be corrected by the market mechanism. Furthermore, considering the
theory of the competitive firm, the goal is to reduce total costs not those associated with a
particular factor. This discussion points out that it is by no means simple to distinguish,
either in theoretical or empirical terms, the effects of bias and technical change as
movements along and shifts of the production function.
The ingenious simplicity of Solow's work belies the theoretical and measurement
problems associated with Solow's production function models. Reviewing the model,
Nadiri (1970, pp. 1141-1143) emphasized that the shift factor is dependent upon: (a) the
functional form of the production function determining the marginal products, (b) the
appropriate measurement of factors, and (c) the impact of omitted variables. With respect
to the form of the production function, Brown (1966, p. 104) and Solow (1970, p. 34)
consider the assumption of constant returns to scale as the most restrictive. The problems
of measurement involve proper aggregation to distinguish those commodity differences
related to productivity differences. The issue of incomplete specification of the function
relates to omission of a third factor, such as land or public goods, or variables, such as
4 Later, Solow noted that the capital-labor ratio can change in a way that, despite no evidence of
proportional changes in the function, there may still be non-neutral technical change (Brown, 1966, p.
104).
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entrepreneurial ability. These problems are further complicated by the interdependence
between the technical characteristics of production and the movement of relative prices.
The technical characteristics refer to efficiency, bias, elasticity, scale, and
homotheticity. The first three are related to shifts in the unit isoquant; technical change can
increase efficiency by reducing the unit costs of all factors (parallel shifts towards the
origin) or biasing them towards one factor (non-parallel shifts towards one axis), or can
affect the substitutability between factors (changes in curvature). The scale effects reflect
the efficiency increases from different levels of output, while homotheticity would reflect
the bias associated with scale changes. For example, in the case of a nonhomothetic
production technology, the substitutability between factors is a function of output scale
such that isoquants for different output levels may intersect.
These technical characteristics are interdependent and not easily distinguishable
from the effects on productivity of movements in relative prices. If there is scope for
substitution ( i.e., elasticity of substitution > 0), such movements will impact on factor
productivity as factor proportions adjust to new factor prices. In principle, the price effects
can be disentangled from changes in scale and factor proportions using both quantity and
price input/output data at the micro level. In practice, the measurement and estimation
problems can be overwhelming even when relying on the so-called flexible production
functions to examine the validity of our restrictions upon the production technology.
Moreover, even after having disentangled price effects from technical characteristics of
production, the possibility of errors in optimization remains as a further source of bias to
TFP estimates.
In addition to these empirical problems, the changes over time and across
productive units of the technical characteristics of production may pose serious problems
for the integrity of the production function. Particularly in the aggregate, these problems
may undermine the stability of the economy-wide production function as a basis for long-
- 21 -
run growth theory. Brown (1966, p. 105) charged that at this level of aggregation, Solow
confused changes in the composition of output with changes in the production function he
intended to measure. It is no wonder that later work abandoned the economy-wide
production function in favor of sectoral disaggregation, pioneered by Salter (1966,
originally published in 1960) in his seminal work on technical change in individual
industries (see Appendix A). However, even sector-level TFP results require careful
interpretation. Reviewing TFP analyses based on sectorally aggregated data, Tybout
(1989) charged that these TFP estimates confounded the various technical characteristics of
production. Indeed, recent studies such as Tybout, Corbo and de Melo (1988), Roberts
(1988) and Caves and Barton (1990) have used plant-level census data to study
productivity changes. At the micro level, the TFP measurement improvements we describe
below are far easier to implement.
TFP IMPROVEMENTS
This section outlines three important refinements that analysts have made to the
measurement of total factor productivity. The first focuses on the application of index
number theory to problems of aggregation. The index number approach is an extension of
growth accounting in which the production function is used as an accounting format rather
than an estimation framework as seen in Solow's TFP model above. The choice of an
index number formula implies a given production or aggregator function; therefore, the
choice of functional form, in turn, implies an appropriate index number (Caves,
Christensen, and Diewert, 1982).
The second involves improvements in the measurement of capital by explicitly
accounting for its vintage so that capital of differing vintages may reflect differing
productivities. The third refinement deals with the adjustment for capacity utilization.
Analysts such as Nishimizu and Page (1987) imply that fluctuations in capacity utilization
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are short to medium-term phenomena, which need not contaminate long-run TFP
measures. Nevertheless, we find a growing literature purporting adjustments in order to
isolate the symptom of capital underutilization from other forces acting on TFP.
Index Numbers: Aggregation and Functional Form
Aggregation at any level is premised on the perfect substitutability of units within
the aggregate. Given a competitive market and perfect foresight, aggregation across
different types of units is accomplished by weighting quantities with relative factor rewards
reflecting relative marginal productivities. This weighting is a shortcut for fulfilling the
requirement of perfect substitution between different units in the aggregate--the organizing
principle of index numbers. In this section, we focus on the seminal work of Jorgenson
and Griliches (1967) whose attempts to pare down the TFP residual using index numbers
and the production function as an accounting framework set the standard for a wealth of
current productivity studies. These studies represent a departure from Solow's
econometric estimation of the aggregate production function; they are basically accounting
exercises at the sectoral level. Disaggregation is their key feature in an attempt to account
for structural change which is at the heart of the development process.
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) carried quality-correction to an extreme by
attempting to explain away the TFP residual, contending its existence reflected the incorrect
measurement of input services in the aggregate production function. Their view of TFP
brings into sharper focus the nature of disembodied neutral technical change as learning-by-
doing. The TFP, the authors note, captures the effects of "costless advances in applied
technology, managerial efficiency, and industrial organization" (Jorgenson and Griliches,
1967, p. 250). When changes in applied technology involve the use of scarce resources,
then their alternative deployment involves movements along the production function.
Given the limited scope for truly costless advances, the TFP should be correspondingly
low.
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Beginning with the basic national accounting identity, they estimated the TFP rate
of growth as the difference between the rates of growth of real product and real factor input
utilizing Divisia quantity indexes.5 These rates are defined as weighted averages of the
rates of growth of individual products (factors) where the weights are the relative shares of
each product (factor) in the value of total output (input). The TFP rate of growth may be
expressed in terms of the quantities of the jth output (q.) and ith input (x.) and their
corresponding prices (p and wg)
TFP'=Q'-X'= Er.q.'- Es x.'1 I I
where the prime notation denotes rate of growth , i.e., X' = (dXldt)/X
and rj is the revenue share of the jth output defined as
ri=jpq j=1,...,m
and si is the cost share of the ith input
w j i =
As in Solow's (1957) parametric approach, the use of prices as weights for
aggregation in Divisia indices assumes revenue (cost) shares are equal to cost (output)
elasticities reflecting their marginal productivity. In other words, assuming CRS and
marginal rates of substitution equal to corresponding price ratios, Jorgenson and Griliches
showed that a TFP Divisia index greater than zero will denote a shift in the production
function, while movements along it are captured by the input indices.
The application of Divisia index formula is facilitated by its discrete form log
change T6rmqvist approximation to the continuous time formula cited above
TFP A = log(q/qt-j) - log(xtlx t-1)
where log(qIlqi-i) = 1/2 V (rjt + rj,t-1) log(qjtlqj,t-1)
log(xt/xt-i) = 1/2 (sit + si,1-) log(xitlxi,t-i)
5 The TFP index can also be computed using the dual expression relating the rates of growth of prices i.e.,
TFP'= w'- p' (Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967, p. 251-252) rather than that of quantities.
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When the conditions of CRS and perfect competition in markets for inputs and
outputs do not hold, the index number approach may not be appropriate. As we noted in
reviewing Solow's TFP, the residual may pick up the influences of increasing returns to
scale, errors in optimization, and non-competitive markets. If quantity and price data are
available, analysts can use econometric approaches to test for these conditions and
decompose the residual to identify the sources of productivity change. In the more usual
case where such data are not available, analysts proceed with the TFP calculation and
sometimes introduce second-best adjustments to estimate the potential source and
magnitude of the biases on TFP indices.
However, even when data are scarce, analysts are increasingly turning to index
numbers based on more flexible aggregator functions. As defined by Caves, Christensen
and Diewert (1982), these functional forms represent an arbitrary set of revenue and cost
shares and corresponding elasticities at a specified base point. They accommodate a variety
of substitution possibilities, including the unitary elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas case and
the constant elasticity of the CES (constant-elasticity-of-substitution) form. This flexibility
is particularly important when we are trying to sort out returns to scale. Page's (1984)
work described in Chapter 3 provides an example of the application and advantages of the
transcendental logarithmic or translog index number, which corresponds to the translog
production function, a flexible form in which output is an exponential function of the
logarithm of inputs.
The application of index number formulae to the measurement of flows of output
and labor services is based upon data on the value of transactions of each type of output
and service, which are separated into price and quantity components. Usually this is done
using price indices since quantity data are seldom available for all the series required.
Divisia quantity indexes are then calculated as shown in the formula above.
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In the case of labor, following Denison's (1962, 1974) well-known efforts, labor-
hours are aggregated using relative wages as weights, in effect, producing a measure of
labor in efficiency (or quality-corrected) units. The use of earnings is subject to the usual
weaknesses in terms of the sensitivity of the results to the classification of groups and the
presence of externalities causing divergence between earnings and productivity. For these
reasons, Denison developed a quality-corrected series of labor-hours that takes account of
educational quality, sex-age composition, number of hours worked, and disequilibrium or
structural factors such as sectoral labor shifts. Denison focused on labor because it is
labor's knowledge accumulated through education and experience that incorporates
technical change into capital goods. Moreover, contending that the age distribution of the
gross capital stock had not nor is likely to vary (a contention examined and rejected by
Kendrick), Denison discounted capital-embodied technical change in his sources-of-growth
calculations.
As we noted, current practice in productivity studies does not attempt to account for
disequilibrium factors. The assumption is that these are minor effects in industrialized
economies. Even in the context of developing countries where the development process is
characterized by adjustment lags and persistent differences in factor returns--conditions that
violate the long-run equilibrium assumptions underlying TFP--data are seldom available to
compare TFP at market and at shadow prices. The work done by Roberts (1989) on
Colombia and described later in Chapter 5 is a case in point. Once estimated, the TFP
indices and variables picking up sources of disequilibria , such as industry concentration
for the existence of market power or noncompetitive behavior, demand fluctuations to
capture capacity utilization, are examined with multiple correlation techniques.
Unlike Denison, Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) focused their efforts on the
measurement of capital to which we now turn.
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The Rental Price of Capital
As Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, p. 255) noted, the calculation of capital services
involves a "lengthy chain of indirect inference." It begins with data on the components of
the capital stock and value of transactions on new investment goods. Unfortunately, these
transactions prices are not an adequate valuation of capital services. Capital assets are
usually owned and used by the same group and well-defined rental markets for components
of the capital stock seldom exist (Diewert, 1979; Mohr, 1988). To solve this lack of
directly observable capital input prices, Jorgenson developed his neoclassical model of the
rental price of capital based on the firm's optimizing behavior. Beginning with the
constrained optimization problem to show that the rental price of capital is equal to the
marginal value product per unit of capital services, that is, pK(t) = pQ(t) dF/dK,
Jorgenson's dynamic optimization analogue yields the flow or rental price of the Kth capital
service:
pK(t) = q(t) (r + 5- q')
where q = investrent price of the capital good (asset price)
r = rate of return on all capital
8= rate of depreciation
q'= rate of capital gain
Capital stock estimates are then used to derive a Divisia quantity index of total capital input
using the implicit rental value of services as weights. Usually, the capital stock is estimated
with the perpetual inventory method in which an initial estimate of the capital stock is
increased by annual estimates of net investments.
The most problematic component in the formula is the rate of return on capital. In
their application, Jorgenson and Griliches estimated the rate of return on all capital (r) by
dividing the non-wage share of value added (including capital gains) by the current value of
the capital stock. As Mohr (1988) pointed out, this implies that entrepreneurs make capital
investment decisions (i.e., whether to add to, replace, or liquidate portions or the entirety
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of their capital stock) on the basis of the historical rather than current or replacement cost of
funds. This may overemphasize historical performance by underestimating the opportunity
costs of continued investment in that industry. Using the example of the U.S. Steel
industry, Mohr (1988, p. 114) demonstrated that in the case of declining industries the
market is probably charging them "a premium that reflects the increased bankruptcy and
price risks associated with continued investment in them."
To avoid the problem of historical versus current costs, Mohr proposed a vintage
rental price of capital formulation to reflect the composite historical costs of the mix of
vintages in the existing stock.
Pvt = qvt (rvt + St - qvt')
where v= vintage or age and t = type of asset
In Mohr's vintage model gross investment is valued at the current cost of funds and net
capital at the historical cost corresponding to respective vintages. This complicates matters
greatly since Mohr argued that the aggregate rental price of capital should be calculated
from components that are weighted averages. This means we calculate, in effect, a linear
aggregation of the constant dollar perpetual inventory flows over all vintages and capital
types. The implementation of Mohr's formulation is only recently becoming possible at the
macro level with the construction of specialized data sets (e.g., Jorgenson and Fraumeni
(1986) sectoral vintage accounts for capital). In the Technical Appendix we explain how
we applied Mohr's vintage rental price of capital formula to our firm-level sample.
Returning to Jorgenson and Griliches' (1967) efforts to pare down the TFP
residual, they found that their measurement improvements lowered their pre-correction TFP
estimate of 1.6% to an average annual rate of 0.3%. In addition to the rental price of capital
calculations, the main improvements included use of Divisia indexes and closer attention to
the choice of commodity groups in aggregation. Many of the problems with quality
correction, they maintain, can be solved by greater disaggregation and use of hedonic
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indices which utilize evidence on differences in marginal productivities across groups. In
subsequent work, Jorgenson applied his first suggestion together with the estimation of a
quality constant--a function of time and the composition of the capital input. As capital
services with relatively high prices become more important in the total flow of capital
services, sectoral capital quality increases (Jorgenson and Fraumeni, 1986).
Another refinement in their measurement of inputs involved the capacity-utilization
adjustment. Just as Denison introduced the adjustment for hours worked for labor,
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) adjusted their capital stock estimates with data on the
relative utilization of energy to account for the fluctuations in capacity utilization. These
authors use the average kilowatt hours of motors as the weight used to combine the
utilization rates across industries to obtain the total manufacturing utilization series. This
adjustment necessarily misses the short-run cyclical fluctuation in capacity utilization and
assumes uniform relative utilization within industries. Below we explain why an
adjustment for capacity utilization is needed.
Adjusting for Capacity Utilization
The adjustment for capacity utilization is a recognition that TFP measures assume
markets for inputs and outputs are in long-run equilibrium despite the reality that a firm's
capital stock may adjust slowly to changes in relative prices. Without this adjustment,
Hulten (1986) explained, true TFP growth (A') is contaminated by our erroneous key
assumption that capital services are proportional to capital stocks
A' = Q'- 0 K [K + K] - 6 L L'
and A" = A' + 0 K U'K
where 0 x = factor share or output elasticity
UK = JIK = service flowlcapital stock = capital utilization ratio
A" = unadjusted TFP rate
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If we could observe the OX and the capital and labor service flows, the original TFP
formulation (without U'K) would yield the true A'regardless of temporary disequilibrium.
Without such information we face the prospect that our weighting scheme may no longer be
appropriate, if the condition of full capacity utilization underlying the proportionality
assumption is not fulfilled because certain inputs are quasi-fixed.
Hulten further shows that in the presence of this mismeasurement (of the weights in
the capital input), the dichotomy between shifts in and movements along the production
function is seriously confounded. For example, a reduction in capital utilization (with
constant capital stock, labor, and technology) will be picked up as a fall in TFP rather than
a decrease in the quantity of capital services utilized. Most alternatives, following
Jorgenson and Griliches above, involve quantity adjustments. However, despite its limited
application, the Berndt and Fuss (1986) method focusing on price adjustment is becoming
the preferred method for accounting for the variation in U'K. 6
Price adjustments involve estimating short-run cost curves to derive the shadow
price of capital. In long-run equilibrium the capital-utilization ratio is equal to unity, but
when UK (t) 1 the factor price is no longer equal to the shadow or long-run rental price
of capital wK
pQ(t) dQ(t)IdK(t) = ZK(t) wK(t)
where ZK(t) = quasi-rent earned by capital
As Berndt and Fuss (1986) explained, ZK(t) can be considered the additional expected
profits during period t from adding one more unit of capital. When ZK(t) = wK(t), the firm
has no incentive to change its stock of capital , i.e., its location on the short-run average
cost curve coincides with the long-run cost-minimizing point. However, when ZK(t) <
wK(t), the firm encounters a relative surplus and has the incentive to disinvest. It can
maintain its output level while decreasing long-run average total costs.
6 The work of Berndt and Fuss, Hulten, and others is compiled in the Special Issue on the Econometrics of
Temporary Equilibrium in the Journal of Econometrics 33(1986).
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The empirical problem lies in estimating ZK(t). Ideally, ZK(t), interpreted as the
expected shadow rental price of capital, can be approximated with Tobin's q and
Jorgenson's rental price of capital formula--ZK(t) = q(t)pK(). Tobin's q incorporates
information about investor expectations implicit in the stock market valuation prices.
Berndt and Fuss (1986) compared traditional TFP estimates (using Jorgenson's rental price
of capital) with those derived from their adjusted model using Tobin's q to correct the rental
price. Their calculations using U.S. data (1948-1981 broken down into subperiods) show
that the TFP growth slowdown in U.S industry is significantly less than traditionally
measured. Between the periods 1965-1973 and 1973-1981, the utilization adjusted TFP is
about 65% larger than the traditional measure. Thus, rather than looking for structural
failures, these findings show that a major problem in productivity trends were those related
to the cyclical reductions in capacity utilization.
In the case of LDCs, an approximation of Tobin's q is practically impossible
because of their generally shallow capital markets. We are left with the recognition of an
important potential bias in our TFP estimates and a second-best adjustment for capacity
underutilization focusing on quantity rather than price. Even this second-best adjustment is
preferable to confusing structural declines in productivity with cyclical or temporary
reductions.
CONCLUSIONS
Our review of neoclassical models of technical change brought out a set of
guidelines for measurement, which will be echoed throughout the next chapter. First and
foremost, we must verify our assumptions about the underlying production technology and
choose index number formulae that correspond to these assumptions. Second, in the case
of measuring capital and labor inputs, we must incorporate skill and vintage differentials
that are likely to have an impact upon productivity measurement. Third, even if we are
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limited to second-best adjustments in capacity utilization, it is important to estimate the
magnitude of the potential bias. This is also true in the case of other types of disequilibria,
such as price distortions, which are particularly important in developing countries given the
popularity of import substitution policies. These guidelines can help in reducing the biases
to the TFP residual from non-constant returns to scale and the effects of temporary
disequilibrium where the prices used as weights in aggregation do not accurately reflect
relative marginal productivities.
As we noted in the critique of Solow's TFP, given the empirical problems in
correctly specifying the technical characteristics of production, let alone their changes over
time, analysts have increasingly turned to flexible functional forms and disaggregated
analyses based on micro-level data. These data allow us to deal with another source of
TFP bias--errors in optimization. This is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
DEPARTURES FROM THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL
The large literature on efficiency measurement in production reflects the belief of
many analysts that errors in optimization are an important source of bias in measuring
productivity performance. Traditionally, this literature has focused on cross-sectional
comparisons. However, with the work by Nishimizu and Page (1982) described below,
the analytical tools to measure the inefficiency introduced by errors in optimization in a
static context were integrated into the TFP's dynamic context. If errors in optimization
reduced the efficiency of firms in a given time period, these inefficiencies would have to be
taken into account in determining their net productivity gains across time periods. As
Lovell and Schmidt (1988, p. 4) note, "it [the TFP decomposition by Nishimizu and Page]
enables one to enrich Solow's dichotomy by attributing observed output growth to
movements along a path on or beneath the production surface (input growth), movement
toward or away from the production surface (efficiency growth), and shifts in the
production surface (technical change)."
The key analytical construct of this literature is the frontier production function
which sets the standard for measuring a unit's relative efficiency. After an explanation of
the premises and methods of efficiency measurement, the second part of this chapter
reviews the empirical work focusing on the hypotheses to be tested as analysts attempt to
uncover why certain firms are more efficient and whether efficiency is related to technical
change.
EFFICIENCY OF PRODUCTION AND ITS MEASUREMENT
Implicit in the concept of the production function is the notion of maximization.
This suggests producers are efficient--optimizing subject to the binding constraint imposed
by a freely accessible technology; however, when we try to estimate the production
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function, we observe both efficient and inefficient producers. In response to these realities,
the literature on efficiency measurement has developed the concept of the frontier
production function to distinguish between these types of producers (Fare, Grosskopf, and
Lovell, 1985, pp. 9-15). A contrasting view is explained by Seale (1985) in which
differences across units are attributed to differing levels of fixed factors rather than to
inefficiency. However, he notes, whether one views the differences as a result of
managerial capabilities or differing levels in the relatively fixed factor of managerial know-
how is a semantic, not a substantive, difference.
The frontier defines the best-practice rather than average technology thereby
approximating the theoretical meaning of the production function. The frontier sets the
standard for comparing the efficiency of production units utilizing similar technology.
Efficient units define the frontier and the distance from the frontier provides a measure of
an interior unit's inefficiency. From efficiency rankings, analysts attempt to identify the
causes of these errors in optimization in order to guide policy action to mitigate them. For
example, are the main causes of these errors the manager's inadequate technical or
administrative training or does the problem lie with the prices he/she faces in the market that
distort the use of inputs. In the former labelled technical inefficiency, programs for training
and information dissemination may be appropriate while in the latter labelled allocative
inefficiency, removing government intervention in credit and input markets may be
warranted. The typology of inefficiency is important if we are trying to evaluate the
performance of firms and to diagnose and formulate remedies for their failures. Different
policies may be needed to impact upon the larger production environment faced by the firm
and/or the micro environment within its plant.
According to Farrell (1957) these two types of inefficiency, technical and allocative,
must be distinguished analytically. The first relates to suboptimal usage of inputs or the
failure to maximize output with given inputs. The second relates to distorted input
proportions or the failure of producers to utilize the cost-minimizing input mix. A
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technically efficient combination of inputs places the firm on the production surface.
However, in order for this technically efficient combination to qualify as the least-cost
combination, it must coincide with the point of tangency between the production surface
and the factor price line. Neoclassical theories of production eliminate the possibility of
technical inefficiency, because they assume producers optimize subject only to the binding
constraint represented by freely accessible technology. Moreover, the first-order
conditions relating marginal products to factor prices effectively eliminate the possibility of
allocative inefficiency.
Another important type of inefficiency, scale inefficiency, relates the size of
producing units with the minimum efficient scale. Unlike technical efficiency, scale
inefficiency is not under the direct control of the firm, but reflects industry structure and the
scale of operations it allows. The measurement of scale efficiency has been a key issue in
investigations of the effects of inward-oriented development strategies upon domestic
markets. For example, Tybout, Corbo, and de Melo (1988) estimated conventional
production functions for 18 Chilean industries using plant-level data to examine industry-
wide scale and technical efficiency before and after import liberalization. These authors
used the standard tests for scale economies (the sum of input coefficients) and estimated
average technical efficiency and the dispersion about this average with the intercept and
variance from conventional production function estimation (although based on full-
information, maximum-likelihood estimators). They found evidence of positive effects on
both types of efficiency from import competition.
These authors were interested in industry-wide patterns of average technical
efficiency. They were not interested in firm-specific efficiency rankings or inter-industry
efficiency comparisons where the requirements of conventional production function
estimation are lacking and frontier models are more appropriate. The work of Caves and
Barton (1990), for example, focuses on inter-industry efficiency comparisons and uses
frontier methods to compare efficiency levels across industries with different production
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functions. After an explanation and comparison of the techniques of efficiency
measurement, we describe empirical applications of frontier models to derive firm-specific
efficiency rankings.
Steps in Efficiency Measurement
Fre, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985) specified a three-step procedure in efficiency
measurement. The first step is to determine the behavioral objective of the firm. This is
important, if we are interested in allocative efficiency rather than only technical efficiency.
If we have complete price and quantity data available, then we can examine allocative
efficiency after choosing the appropriate dual function, i.e., cost, revenue, or profit
function, establishing the choice variables for the producing unit using direct estimation
techniques. For example, if we are dealing with a firm in a regulated industry, direct
estimation of the cost function would yield information on the extra costs of technical and
allocative inefficiency. The choice of the cost function reflects our assumptions that the
input level is the choice variable and the production unit takes the level of output as given,
as in the case of cost minimization. As explained by Forsund, Lovell, and Schmidt (1980,
p.7), the firm faces the classic constrained-optimization problem:
C(y,w) = min w-x s.t. f(x) = y
where C(y,w) is the cost function in which output level and input prices are
exogenous
y = output vector
w = input price vector
x = input vector
whose first-order conditions establish the equality between the ratio of input prices and the
technical rate of substitution, holding the level of output constant. The first-order
conditions (FOC) are given by
wilwj = df(x*)idxi the technical rate of substitution
where x* denotes the optimal x
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This defines the point of minimum costs as the tangency between the isocost line
[for i = 1,2, C = wjxj + w2x2 ] and the isoquant. If this equality does not hold, the firm is
allocatively inefficient, employing inputs in the wrong proportions, i.e., w-x > C(y,w). If
the firm fails to choose the maximum output level, y <f(x), it is also technically inefficient.
Only if the firm is both technically and allocatively efficient will observed expenditure
coincide with minimum cost,w-x = C(y,w). Moreover, if the firm's output price does not
follow the marginal pricing rule, py C(y,w), the firm is scale inefficient. Only if the
firm is technically, allocatively and scale efficient will it meet the conditions for profit
maximization, i.e.,(py y - w.x) = x(py,w).
Complete price and quantity data are seldom available to examine all three types of
inefficiency. In these rare cases, the analyst can use estimation of dual cost or profit
functions to derive estimates of allocative efficiency. Most frontier applications have
focused on production frontiers, which yield information on technical efficiency alone.
Direct estimation of the production frontier is based on the behavioral assumption attributed
to Zellner-Kmenta-Dreze that firms maximize expected profits. This assumption implies
that output is endogenous; entrepreneurs can sell any amount of output they produce
without affecting the market. Output as well as input prices are given so that the
optimization problem for the entrepreneur is to produce the output level which maximizes
expected profits. Similarly, in non-frontier or conventional estimation, this assumption
allows us to derive unbiased estimates of the production parameters from ordinary least
squares (OLS).
The second step in efficiency measurement involves specifying the technology or
flexibility of the functional form of the frontier. This selection then guides the third step of
choosing the computational method. If little is known about the structure of production,
the non-parametric linear programming method imposes the least structure. With this
method (also referred to as data envelopment analysis), Lovell and Schmidt (1988, p. 13)
explain, no parameters are computed, "the sample data are bounded or 'enveloped' by a
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convex hull" of the observed input-output ratios. For example, Farrell's unit isoquant is a
series of connected hyperplanes convex to the origin in input space (Kopp, 1981). Despite
its flexibility and ability to derive unit-specific indices of technical inefficiency, this pure
programming method has three main disadvantages. First, all variation in output is
attributed to differences in technical efficiency, thereby ignoring random noise. Second,
there are no statistical tests for goodness of fit from which to make inferences. Third,
Farrell's unit isoquant requires the assumption of CRS.
On the other hand, parametric programming and statistical methods utilizing the
Cobb-Douglas impose either, greater or, in the case of the translog, fewer restrictions on
the structure of production. The deterministic parametric frontier allows non-CRS
technologies, but is subject to the same drawback as the pure programming approach. In
addition, it is sensitive to outlier or extreme observations. This has prompted efforts to
"desensitize" the frontier by reestimating its parameters excluding a percentage of the most
efficient firms until the parameters stabilize.
In order to incorporate random error into frontier models, analysts include random
and nonrandom components in composed error models where the nonrandom component
represents technical inefficiency. The advantages of this statistical model come at a price.
The analyst must assume a particular distribution for the error term, but there are no a priori
arguments from which to base this selection, and results are sensitive to these distributional
assumptions. Perhaps more importantly from a practical perspective, stochastic frontiers in
a cross-sectional context yield only average sample-wide measures of technical
inefficiency. This has limited their application in policy-oriented studies.I
Rather than focus on the error term distribution within a flexible functional form,
Tybout, Corbo, and de Melo (1988) suggest that the more pressing problems lie with the
explanatory variables. Particularly for LDCs, capital-input data are often missing or biased
1 Recently, a methodology to decompose individual efficiency indices has been proposed and is not yet
widely practised, particularly since resulting estimates are inconsistent.
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by inflation and underreporting. Accordingly, they set aside the issues of how to
compensate for nonnormal errors. Errors in variables not only make standard production
parameter estimators inconsistent, but also distort the residual term upon which the analysis
of technical efficiency is based. Missing data reduce the power of standard estimators. To
respond to these problems, the authors develop full-information maximum likelihood
estimators of production technologies, assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology using the
instrumental-variables approach. As noted, Tybout and his co-authors are not interested in
unit specific efficiency measures, but rather in sectoral averages and how these are related
to measures of protectionism and industrial structure. Given their level of analysis, they
can bypass the issue of manipulating the nonnormal error to derive measures of firm
technical efficiency.
Comparison of Frontier Methodologies
Lovell and Schmidt (1988) and Schmidt (1985) compared frontier methodologies
and provided a summary of their relative advantages and disadvantages. Although
stochastic methods allow us to differentiate between technical efficiency and statistical
noise, the complexity and sample size requirements of this method have proved an obstacle
to some empirical work. Most empirical work has focused on technical efficiency (rather
than allocative efficiency), reflecting the usual lack of price and quantity data and has relied
on the deterministic programming frontier given its computational simplicity. However, in
recognition of the statistical noise confounding their technical efficiency measures, these
analyses usually follow the estimation of technical efficiency indices (TEIs) with an
examination using multiple correlation techniques of variables explaining their variation.
These variables attempt to compensate for omitted (i.e., entrepreneurial abilities) or ill-
measured inputs (i.e., plant vintage compensates for the failure of asset prices to reflect
capital productivity). They include the experience of the entrepreneur, the labor force, and
the firm, the vintage of capital equipment, and the extent of seasonal output fluctuations.
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Schmidt (1985), a proponent of stochastic methods, considers such efforts to
"explain" the technical efficiency measure a poor substitute for the proper and complete
specification of the initial model. Although we agree that such efforts may be poor
substitutes, we find studies focusing solely on the methodological issues equally lacking
from a policy perspective. Most analysts interested in efficiency and productivity admit to
the complexity in modelling these phenomena. No single technique is clearly superior or
applicable in all circumstances and, in most cases, the analyst must bring to bear a wealth
of corroborating data to supplement and support the result of whichever model is chosen.
Below we describe how different authors have used the methods of efficiency measurement
to examine firm performance.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS OF EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT
In this section we describe the work of Cortes, Berry, and Ishaq (henceforth CBI,
1987), Page (1984), Nishimizu and Page (1984) and Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles
(1988). The first two sets of authors applied deterministic programming frontiers in a
cross-sectional context, and together with analysts such as Meller (1976) and Little,
Mazumdar, and Page (1987), they focused on the relationship between size and technical
efficiency. In effect, they examined issues related to scale efficiency by studying the
pattern of technical efficiency across size groupings for evidence of minimum efficient
scale, capital indivisibilities, and scale economies. Nishimizu and Page (1984) and
Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1988) examined the sources of productivity change over
time, using frontier methods applied to panel data. In the static context, analysts seek to
identify the determinants of technical efficiency. In the dynamic context of productivity
changes in time, they attempt to relate technical efficiency at a given period with technical
change over several periods.
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None of these analysts attempted direct measurement of allocative efficiency--the
optimality of the input mix given relative input prices--given limited data availability.
However, each made an attempt to examine indirectly differences in factor proportions and
relative prices as related to technical efficiency. This reflects a recognition that the issue of
relative prices, whether they reflect relative scarcities or are biased by disequilibrium
conditions, is particularly important in developing countries, following the import-
substitution development model. Page(1980) in his study of Ghanaian lumber-related
industries is one of few analysts to measure allocative efficiency directly. Using
accounting or shadow prices, Page compares the percentage reduction in domestic resource
costs from technical and allocative efficiency improvements. For the industries studied,
which included unprotected and protected industries, Page found larger reductions in these
costs from technical efficiency gains. This result suggests that most analysts, by focusing
on technical efficiency, are devoting their attention to the most important source of
inefficiency.
The studies described below illustrate methodological developments as analysts
seek to introduce the random error component to examine patterns of efficiency and
productivity over time as well as across firms. In choosing the appropriate methodology,
analysts must trade off model features. The more theoretically appealing models make
considerable demands upon data and estimation techniques; they tend to limit the analyst to
simple production processes, characterized by homogeneous inputs and outputs, processes
seldom at the core of manufacturing performance.
Size and Technical Efficiency
Responding to their large numbers, the attention of policy makers, multilateral aid
agencies, and analysts has shifted to small-scale and micro-enterprises during the past two
decades. This attention reflects this groups' surprising resilience, despite government
policies affecting the trade regime, private-sector investment incentives, public-sector
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purchases, as well as the tax and regulatory framework, which to some degree discriminate
against small-scale enterprises. This resilience is attributed to this groups' greater labor
intensity. In labor-abundant capital-scarce economies, small-scale firms seem to be the
prime employment generators for the unskilled, thereby contributing to reducing poverty
and inequality. As Little, Mazumdar, and Page (1987) argue, if we could establish that
small-scale enterprises employ capital and labor more efficiently than large firms, then
output would rise and be distributed more equally if we removed the biases in government
policies against these firms. Removal of such biases has become a recurrent theme in
policy circles as shown by the popularity of Hernando de Soto's study of Peru's small-
scale enterprises, The Other Path (1986). He, however, does not provide evidence on the
greater efficiency in factor use, information which only detailed studies of firm efficiency,
such as those described below, can provide.
An appropriate point of departure for our review of studies on size and technical
efficiency is the work of Cortes, Berry, and Ishaq (CBI; 1985). Their 1977 data on
Colombian metalworking firms provides the base-year data for our empirical work
described later in Chapter 5. Their examination of firm performance was prompted by the
observation that small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) showed greater dynamism
than large-scale firms during the 1970s in Colombia. Taking advantage of the downward
pressure on wages and high levels of aggregate demand, SMEs (defined as those with less
than 100 employees) registered high rates of growth in employment of 8% to 9% compared
to 6% by larger firms. CBI seek to explain the reasons underlying the SMEs economic
performance, using a sample of 65 firms in the metalworking sector and 36 firms in food
processing.
CBI found no systematic relation between size and technical efficiency.
Nevertheless, in the case of metalworking, the authors concluded that the larger SMEs
(from 49-99 employees) operate at higher levels of technical efficiency than smaller firms,
due to the indivisibilities of capital and the tendency of the most efficient to grow faster.
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Firms with 10 or fewer workers produced at 38% of best practice output compared to 70%
for the larger SMEs. In this sector, capital requirements are substantial. Even for firms
producing relatively unsophisticated fabricated metal products such as kitchen equipment, a
variety of cutting, folding, and welding equipment is needed.
To measure SME technical efficiency, CBI calculated firm-specific technical
efficiency indices (TEIs) based on a deterministic programming Cobb-Douglas frontier.
The linear programming problem is to minimize the sum of deviations from the frontier
across s firms
min Eus
subject to
a,0 +aL in Ls+ aK in Ks 2 n VAs or us 0 (s constraints)
ao, aL, aK 0
in which these deviations are forced to be nonpositive so that actual output must be below
or equal to potential or best-practice output. The alphas are the estimated values of the three
parameters estimated. Labor services are measured in unskilled equivalent labor days; each
skill category is weighted by the ratio of its wage rate to the unskilled wage rate. Capital is
an annualized service flow, assuming 10% return and economic lifetimes varying according
to new or used machinery or buildings. Value added is estimated from gross sales and the
percentage of costs not represented by intermediate purchases and services.
To capture the impact of allocative inefficiency, CBI estimated a measure of
profitability, the social benefit-cost ratio (SBC = VA/r*K + w*L), valuing factor costs at
shadow prices. Border prices of output were unavailable, and the shadow price of labor
differed by a small margin from wages paid (reflecting the fact that during the 1970s real
wages remained constant or declined). Only in the case of capital did differences with
market prices arise. CBI assumed that the social opportunity cost of capital of 10% was
higher than the average private cost because of the low cost attributed to self-financed
investment in a highly inflationary period.
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In addition to the conclusion on the lack of a systematic relation between size and
technical efficiency, CBI's study of the patterns of TEI and benefit-cost indices suggested
the following patterns of efficiency and profitability. First, setting aside the firms in
difficulty, the average entrepreneur was earning a healthy return (51% on average for the
rate of return to total capital employed by the firm), far more than he/she would earn in
alternative employment. One-sixth of metalworking firms did not cover the full cost of
inputs, although they managed to cover their variable costs , i.e., working capital and labor
costs. The continued existence of firms with such low returns, may reflect overestimation
of the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur's labor or capital--estimates based on averages
for persons with characteristics similar to those of the entrepreneurs and for capital obtained
from similar sources. Entrepreneurs, particularly former blue-collar workers, may
underestimate the cost of their own time and because of their background set relatively
modest income expectations.
Second, allocative inefficiency was not likely to be a factor confounding TEI
differences across firms. CBI (1987, p.103) examined whether price differences reflected
quality variations or differences in the market power of firms, noting that, "a high product
price [for comparable quality] would tend to be reflected (incorrectly) in our estimates as a
high level of technical efficiency and (correctly) as a high PBC." CBI discounted absolute
price differences based on evidence of the entrepreneur's estimate of how much higher or
lower competitors' prices and quality were. Nevertheless, in regressions examining the
variation in TEIs, CBI used dummy variables to account for firms' product prices differing
from their competitors. These variables were statistically significant; reported lower
product prices reduced technical efficiency 20%, while higher prices increased it by 12%.
Contrary to expectations, the usual variables, such as entrepreneur's education and
experience, and degree of labor mobility, contributed little to the model's explanatory
power.
- 44 -
Page (1984) also explored the relationship between size and technical efficiency
using Indian data covering four industries (printing, soap, shoes, and machine tools with
66, 48, 99 and 78 firms, respectively). Only in the case of machine tools did Page find that
relative technical efficiency increases systematically with size of firm, based upon pairwise
analysis of variance. Firms with fewer than 10 employees produced about 55% of best-
practice output compared with 70% for those with more than 50 employees (Page, 1984, p.
139). Unlike other industries sampled, economies of scale were related to the engineering
characteristics of the production technology and were not offset by other firm/managerial
characteristics impacting on technical efficiency that may vary across large and small
producers (as measured by number of employees). Plant scale economies, no doubt related
to the requirements for varied capital machinery in the production process, made it difficult
for smaller firms to operate efficiently in this industry, which is perhaps the most
sophisticated of the metal-mechanical sector.2
Page (1984) also used a deterministic frontier production function, but expanded
the measured inputs to utilize a four-factor translog form including capital services,
unskilled and skilled labor, and material inputs. As noted in the previous chapter, this
flexible form has the advantage of imposing relatively few a priori restrictions on the
structure of production and accommodates a variety of substitution possibilities. Its very
flexibility, however, requires the imposition of additional constraints to assure that the
frontier is well behaved, namely CRS, monotonicity (nonnegative marginal products), and
concavity. Under these constraints,the author claims, the resulting TEIs yield a set of
transitive multilateral total factor productivity indices. Transitivity makes these TEIs
particularly useful for making multilateral (rather than just bilateral) comparisons of
productivity for cross-section and time-series data, i.e., index I satisfies the transitivity test
2 Plant scale economies are also suggested by the size distribution of the sample, which is admittedly
biased towards larger firms in all four industries studied. Over one-quarter of machine tool firms sampled
had more than 50 employees compared to 7% to 10% for the other industries.
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if for units k, 1,...,m if Ii = '4,Ilrn (Caves et al., 1982, p. 74). Page therefore uses the
translog TEIs to examine "both the relationship between actual and best practice
productivity at any one data point and level differences in total factor productivity among
pairs of observations" (Page, 1984, p. 133). Because Page does not have time-series
data, the TFP lacks its dynamic context which links it to technological progress.
Page's (1984) translog frontier is given as
in y(s) = aO + Enan in xn(s) + 1/2ZZmn in xn(s) In xm(s)
where y(s) and xn(s) are indices of maximum potential output and of input levels,
respectively. He expressed input levels as ratios to the geometric mean of the sample in
each industry. Because the translog is a second-order approximation to a true production
function, scaling inputs to sample means sets these means as the point of approximation.
Page's labor input included skilled (white collar, paid family, and skilled workers, and
working proprietors) and unskilled (semi-skilled and unskilled workers, unpaid family and
casual labor) labor services and expressed in person days. For the capital input he used the
annualized flow of services, valued at historical costs and assuming a 10% discount rate
with economic lifetimes varying by asset category. He also used gross output rather than
value added, and defined material inputs as the value of all purchased material and service
inputs.
Page also derived firm-specific TEIs from the linear programming problem,
minimizing the deviations from the frontier subject to the constraints that all observations lie
on or above it and the translog is well behaved. Page tested the "fit" of his specification of
the technology by comparing the difference in the value of the objective function between
restricted and unrestricted frontiers. This comparison showed that the cost of constraining
the frontier to be linear homogeneous and convex is modest, from less than 0.5% in the
case of machine tools to 2.5% in the printing industry.
Given the lack of quantity data, Page assumed prices accurately capture quality
differences and used value figures in lieu of physical quantities. He, however, used
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conventional production function estimation to consider possible sources of allocative
inefficiency potentially biasing his TEIs. Using joint estimation of a translog production
function and the share equations, Page examined differences in factor proportions (whether
they might arise from product or factor price differences) and tested his specification of the
production technology. The results, reported in a larger study with Little and Mazumdar
(1987), illustrate the complexity in sorting out the technical characteristics of production
without complete price and quantity data.
Like CBI, Page also examined with multiple correlation techniques the relationship
between estimated TEIs and omitted (managerial abilities) and ill-defined inputs (vintage of
capital, quality of workers). To further test the relationship between size and technical
efficiency, Page regressed a variety of firm and worker characteristics including size on the
logarithm of firm TEIs. He concludes that the experience and stability of workers were
most important in explaining technical efficiency differences across firms; "a ten percent
increase in the average experience of the labor force results in a two percent increase in the
Farrell index (and hence [under CRS], to a two percent decrease in unit costs)" (Page,
1984, p. 144).
By including the experience of workers (measured as the mean of the distribution of
years of experience with the firm by regular employees) rather than just the firm's
management, the focus turns to the abilities to organize, develop, and keep good workers.
Employee firm experience together with general entrepreneurial experience and age of firm,
both of which exert an unexpected negative impact on technical efficiency, explain about
40% of TEI variation in the machine tool industry. Page suggests that the negative sign of
these coefficients reflected the importance of modem managerial methods and latest vintage
capital in the efficient operation of firms in a technologically sophisticated industry like
machine tools. In addition, capacity underutilization, proved not to be important in TEI
variation. Intuitively, we expected capacity utilization to be important in machine tools
where the firm faces more directly the indivisibility of capital. Part of the problem may lie
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in that Page operationalized this variable as a dummy variable, indicating higher output
value (in constant prices) three years prior to the survey year.
The firms in the machine-tool industry produced mainly machine-shop lathes,
milling machines, and drill presses. Having already found evidence of plant scale
economies, in the cited larger 1987 study, Page and his co-authors tested for the possibility
of dual production technologies. If firms were not employing the same technology, then,
the frontier as a standard was not applicable. The analysis of capital-labor and skilled-
unskilled worker ratios showed no systematic patterns to suggest a break between
workshop and factory methods associated with size.
This supports Dudley's (1983) findings rejecting the existence of dual production
technologies in the metal-mechanical sector in Colombia. Within size-group variation in
these ratios was large and smaller firms tended to be organized as small-scale factories.
For example, the 10 to 25 employee size group, representing slightly over one-third of the
sample, showed both high skill and capital intensity. In contrast, the largest size group
with over 100 employees, representing one-sixth of the sample, seemed to substitute rather
than complement skilled labor with capital. This group exhibited the highest capital-labor
ratio, but the lowest skilled-unskilled worker ratio. We suspect that product group and
quality as well as machinery differences may be relevant in explaining these patterns.
Larger firms may aim towards a relatively more standardized product manufactured with
both simpler and automated machinery to reduce the requirements of skilled labor.
To examine further these differences in technology, the authors incorporated the
plant vintage variable into their translog production model and found that each additional
year in the age of the capital stock reduced TFP (i.e., TEI given the static interpretation) by
2%-3% (Little, Mazumdar and Page,1987, p. 181). Moreover, they found that even in the
case of machine tools smaller plants do not generally have older vintage capital
(incorporating less efficient technologies) and, in turn, lower productivity.
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CBI's (1987) and Page's (1984) conclusions on the patterns of TEIs suggest size
and technical efficiency are related to the sophistication of the production technology. In
metalworking firms such as CBI's agricultural and kitchen equipment producers, capital
indivisibilities are important. In a more sophisticated metal-mechanical industry such as
machine-tools, capital demands are greater in terms of exploiting scale economies.
Nonetheless, according to Page (1984) other firm characteristics, particularly the
experience and stability of workers, are also important in determining firm efficiency. He,
however, did not link this result with information about Indian labor legislation or other
factors affecting labor market conditions. These conditions will prove key to our
explanation of technical efficiency patterns and changes in CBI's sample of Colombian
metalworking firms in Chapter 5.
In terms of efficiency measurement, these results confirm the importance of
verifying our basic assumptions regarding the form of the production frontier as the
standard for efficiency rankings. On average, these deterministic frontier applications
provide a lower-bound estimate of average technical efficiency from 56% of best-practice
output for CBI's metalworking sample to 69% for Page's machine-tool firms. Stochastic
frontiers would no doubt yield higher estimates of technical efficiency once random error is
taken into account. However, as Caves and Barton (1990) argue in their comparison of
deterministic versus stochastic frontier applications, results suggest there is substantial
scope for improvement of technical efficiency.
Sources of Productivity Change
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Nishimizu and Page (1982) applied the
tools of efficiency measurement in a dynamic context. They measured technical efficiency
improvements as the productivity increment from getting closer to the frontier. Technical
change, then referred to the changes in the frontier over time. This means that the TFP
residual, interpreted as technological change since the work of Solow (1957), must also
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include a component reflecting the efficiency with which technology is applied. These
authors claim that distinguishing between technological change and technical efficiency is
important in formulating effective policies to improve productivity. For example, low or
even negative rates of TFP change may coincide with technological progress but
deteriorating technical efficiency. Best-practice firms may be shifting outwards the
industry production frontier while other (interior) firms fall further behind this shifting
frontier. Moreover, as the average efficiency of firms in an industry falls, the potential for
the industry's productivity growth may also fall.
In their decomposition of TFP change in Yugoslavia, Nishimizu and Page (1982)
concluded that most of the gains in TFP were attributable to improved technical efficiency
and that greater gains were possible in this area. Although admitting no neat distinction
between technical efficiency and technological progress in theory or practice, they directed
policy attention to sectors most plagued by problems of investment planning and
implementation, lack of technical experience, and poor management and organization. This
technical assistance would help technically inefficient firms to catch up with the country's
best practice.
Working with time-series data from Yugoslavia's regionalized sectoral production
accounts, Nishimizu and Page (1982) estimated deterministic translog industry production
frontiers utilizing linear programming. Under conventional techniques, the appropriate
estimation method for a translog production function would involve joint estimation of the
parameters of the function with the system of share equations relating each input's cost
share to its price. If factor price data are unavailable or if the assumptions of profit
maximization in competitive factor and product markets fail (which provide for the equality
of observed factor income shares and output elasticities), joint estimation is precluded.
Like Nishimizu and Page (1982), most analysts have turned to frontier methods.
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To estimate a sector's production frontier, the linear programming problem follows
the simpler case described above, but this time minimizing the sum of deviations over time
(t) periods as well as units (s)
min EtEs [(20o + %t + 1/2 jttt2) + (n + mit) In xm(st)
+ 1/2 ,En mn in xm(s,t) In xn(s,t) - In y(s,t)]
s.t In y(s,t) 2 In y(slt)
to assure the observed input-output combinations lie on or below the frontier (denoted by
the underline).
The data used to estimate the three-factor frontier include series of gross output,
material input, capital input based on the replacement cost of the net capital stock, and labor
input based on the number of employed persons. Each series had data for thirteen years
(1965-1978), twenty-six social sectors, and eight regions. Nishimizu and Page (1982)
used gross output rather than value added to account for productivity changes attributable to
intermediate inputs from their improved quality or external economies. 3 Nishimizu (1979)
argued that the omission of intermediate inputs is particularly serious in disaggregated
analyses in which the contribution of an industry to national TFP change is the sum of its
own productivity increases as measured by the increase in its delivery to final demand, and
the "magnification" effect of productivity increases transmitted through intermediate
deliveries to linked industries. More fundamentally, the appropriateness of excluding
3 The use of value added as a measure of real output requires assuming separability between material and
non-material inputs such that the production function Q =f(KL,M) can be written
Q = g (v(KL), M) where v represents real value added
As stated by Fuss et al. (1978, p.244), "separability is characterized by the independence of the marginal
rate of substitution between a pair of inputs [in this case, capital and labor] from changes in the level of
another input [in this case, material inputs]." In deriving real value added (v), nominal value added (V) is
influenced by the prices of both output (p Y) and the intermediate input (pM) as in V(KLpyIpM). Given
these prices vary in strict proportion, v is
v (KL) = V (KLpxpMX' p)
where Q = a pX + b pM defines the price index.
defining the commonly used method of double-deflation.
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material inputs rests on the validity of assuming either perfect or no substitution between
purchased inputs and primary factors (labor and capital).
The translog frontier and its corresponding index numbers allow the authors to
measure a region's relative technical inefficiency in a given sector by the ratio of the indices
of observed to potential (defined by the frontier parameters) output levels. This ratio is
obtained as the antilog of the slack variables in the first constraint equation limiting all
observations to lie on or below the frontier. The shift of the production function is given
by the change in the frontier parameters over time. A region's rate of technological
progress in a given sector is calculated by combining the frontier parameters with observed
input level as in
din y(s,t)l
TFP' = = at(s) + ftt(s)t + 4nomt(s) In xm(s,t)
for each year and computing simple averages for consecutive pairs. In this equation at is
the rate of TFP change at the normalization point.4
Instead of setting sample input means as the point of normalization around which to
expand the Taylor series--the usual practice in most translog applications including Page
(1984) above, the authors chose the most developed region, the Republic of Slovenia, as
the normalization point. If the relative performance of industries varied across regions,
this choice could have biased the estimated sectoral frontiers given that the early terms of
the Taylor series provide a good approximation to an arbitrary production function only in
the neighborhood of the chosen normalization point. Also, the imposition of CRS for at
4 If the normalization point is appropriately chosen, the at coefficient should be nonnegative. #tt can take
positive, negative, or zero values for increasing, decreasing, or constant rates of TFP change. The share
elasticities of inputs with respect to time, #lmt, define the bias of TFP change. In a micro application of
this methodology, Little, Mazumdar, and Page (1987, p. 150) explain the interpretation of the values of the
Pmt's: "If a share elasticity with respect to time is positive (negative), the corresponding value share
increases (decreases) with time, and the bias is interpreted as input using (saving). If the share elasticity is
zero, the share is independent of time, and if all share elasticities are zero, the pattern of productivity is
Hicks neutral." However, as we note in our review below, given the aggregated data upon which Nishimizu
and Page's (1982) estimates are based, it is unclear how these estimates of bias might be biased by the other
technical characteristics of production.
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least some sectors may have biased TFP results in favor of regions where larger or smaller
firms predominate.
In addition to the potential problems with the CRS specification and the choice of
normalization point, there is the usual problem of all deterministic frontiers in failing to
distinguish random noise from technical efficiency. However, the more serious sources of
bias relate to the fundamental measurement problems noted in Chapter 2 and repeated in
this chapter. First, incorrect assumption of similar technology when production units are
functioning on different production surfaces will vitiate the frontier as a standard of
comparison. We find the concept of an average (aggregated) sector-wide technology
difficult to reconcile with marked subsectoral differences. As Tybout et al. (1989) note, at
this level of aggregation, TFP studies cannot distinguish between technical efficiency,
capacity utilization and scale effects. Moreover, any attempt to examine the potential bias
from allocative inefficiency, as described earlier, would have little meaning at this level of
aggregation. It is no wonder subsequent sectoral studies, such as the one by Caves and
Barton (1990), have relied on plant-level data and stochastic frontiers when unit-specific
efficiency indices are not needed.
Second, incomplete specification of measured inputs will incorrectly reflect the
productivities of factors. Without considering vintage effects, the authors' use of
replacement costs for valuing capital punishes industries and regions with older capital.
Similarly, the lack of adjustment for capital and even labor (hours worked) utilization may
further bias TFP estimates downward for regions with underutilized capacity.
The work of Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1988; henceforth CSS) shows a
theoretically appealing way of incorporating the stochastic component to Nishimizu and
Page's (1982) dynamic model of technical efficiency change. As explained in Appendix B,
CSS's variance components model estimated with panel data gets around the limitations
that have impeded stochastic frontier applications--the difficulty of deriving unit-specific
TEIs, the seemingly arbitrary choice of an error distribution for the nonnormal error
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component capturing technical inefficiency, and the assumption that factor use is
uncorrelated with technical inefficiency. Moreover, the CSS model allows technical
efficiency to vary in time as well as across firms, i.e., allowing variation in slopes as well
as the intercept. Their application to the US airline industry suggests that the increase in
efficiency levels over time, which lead to more uniform productivity levels across firms,
was related to the competitive pressures brought about by deregulation of the industry.
Building a sophisticated model from a rather complete data set, the CSS study
provides positive evidence of the early benefits of the policy of deregulation in the industry.
Despite the robust results, they require additional explanation. Because TFP, by definition
is disembodied, its sources are difficult to identify. It's no wonder the TFP has been
criticized as being "a mysterious manifestation of grace" (Harcourt, 1972, p. 48); we can
measure it, but we don't know where it comes from. As in most other stochastic frontier
applications, the main focus is methodological. It seems that the authors could have
strengthened their conclusions with an analysis of changes in managerial and other
practices that might help to explain efficiency trends.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we reviewed the methods of efficiency measurement, specifically the
concept of the frontier or best-practice production function, which in a dynamic context
helps us to account for an important source of bias confounding estimates of TFP change.
Although our review of empirical work focused exclusively on a specific type of error in
optimization, that is, technical inefficiency or the failure to maximize output with given
inputs, we described how an examination of TEI patterns by size groupings provides
information on the efficiency of the scale of productive units. Similarly, we can
complement this information with evidence of differences in factor use and output prices to
capture allocative inefficiency indirectly, which we cannot study directly without complete
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input price and quantity data. As we noted in Chapter 2 with reference to adjusting TFP
estimates for capacity underutilization, we often do not have the option of applying the
most theoretically sound method.
Our empirical work in Chapter 5 is guided by the following main conclusions from
our review of empirical frontier applications. First, the choice between frontier models
involves trade-offs between model features--the more complex and elegant the model, the
greater the data and estimation requirements. Second, even with the more statistically
rigorous models, the processes we are trying to model are complex and require
corroborating information to support results. Without such information, our efficiency
measures lack the context and specifics that might make them useful for policy making.
Only recently are comparative studies becoming available to give us an idea of the
sensitivity of results to the frontier methodology. For example, Corbo and de Melo (1986)
use Chilean 4-digit, establishment-level, census data to compare nonparametric and
parametric deterministic and stochastic frontiers. Given data availability, the choice is
between deterministic parametric and stochastic frontiers. Examining rank correlation
coefficients among different TEIs within sectors (across firms), Corbo and de Melo (1986,
p. 27) find that within the Cobb-Douglas specification, these techniques "yield broadly
similar results;" Pearson correlation coefficients range from 0.45 in dairy products to 0.96
in wine industries with 0.86 for non-electrical machinery.5 These findings suggest that
within sectors we are not likely to obtain radically different rankings for firm technical
efficiency comparisons from using the simpler deterministic parametric frontier compared
to the more complex stochastic frontier. Since we will be comparing TEIs across firms in
the same industry, this study suggests our choice of the deterministic programming frontier
is not likely to affect our conclusions.
5
These correlation coefficients correspond to the comparison between the deterministic parametric and the
stochastic frontier where the latter is based on the assumption of a half-normal nonnormal error distribution.
However, for most sectors, the results are similar based on an exponential error distribution (Corbo and de
Melo, 1986, pp. 24-25). This is not the case for the comparison of these frontiers across sectors.
CHAPTER 4
THE COLOMBIAN METAL-MECHANICAL SECTOR
In this chapter we review the key aspects of the macroeconomy in 1977 and 1989 to
highlight the difficulties and opportunities in demand and supply faced by the sector during
those years. This review will provide the hypotheses to be examined in the next chapter.
First, however, in order to provide the historical context for the survey years, we focus on
the rise of industries producing nonelectrical machinery (ISIC 382), specifically kitchen
and agricultural implements, which are the subject of our firm-level productivity analyses.
THE RISE OF KITCHEN AND AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT PRODUCERS
The 1940 Development Plan clearly placed import-substituting industrialization as
the centerpiece of development policy. Its establishment of the steel and iron works at Paz
del Rio laid the foundation of the Colombian metal-mechanical sector. Domestic
production of iron and steel was promoted through protective tariffs and the provision of
discounts and financing for high volume buyers. However, it was not until the mid-1950s
and through the 1960s that industrial policy targeted metalworking for import substitution.
Repeating a pattern established since the turn of the century, stagnant coffee exports created
imbalances in the external sector prompting increased tariff protection to contain balance of
payments deficits. During this period metal products, machinery, and transportation
equipment registered growth rates above 9%, outperforming industry as a whole; their
import requirements, however, ranged about 80% of raw materials utilized.
Dudley's (1983) disaggregated analysis of the economic performance in the metal-
mechanical sector during 1959-1966 highlights the differences within the sector. Given the
variety, complexity, and discontinuities of production processes in the sector, Dudley
posited that the more sophisticated processes yield higher productivity increments in terms
of learning-by-doing. Confirming his expectations, machinery producing industries
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registered higher labor productivity gains than those in metal products. In terms of our
sample industries, kitchen and agricultural equipment registered productivity gains in terms
of value added per worker of 5% and 116%, respectively, compared with the sectorwide
average of 51% over the eight-year period. Furthermore, Dudley found that most learning
is output-dependent in the case of kitchen equipment, reflecting the technology's relative
simplicity not only in terms of production operations but also its organization and
administrative requirements. In contrast, for agricultural equipment, learning by the firm
was largely a function of time and accumulated experience.
These productivity trends highlight differences in market structure between these
industries. In the 1960s, the mechanization of agriculture fostered the demand for
agricultural equipment and the birth of small firms. These firms were established by
former workers with experience in the few large firms that traditionally dominated the
Colombian market--large wholesalers such as the Colombian subsidiary of General
Electric, AMACHICO, a licensee of Caterpillar, and Apolo which also produced industrial
and mining machinery. In the case of kitchen equipment, there was no national production
even by foreigners prior to the 1960s. Pioneering firms in this industry had to undergo a
period of learning characterized by trial and error in copying existing imports.
Berry's (1983) estimates of capital and total productivity indices for 1969 give us
an idea of the relative performance of the sector with respect to all industry. His results
reproduced in Table 4.1 show that the metal-mechanical industries registered higher value
added per unit of capital than the average of all industry. However, this pattern changes
when value added is converted to world prices using effective rates of protection. Electrical
machinery, a heavily protected metal-mechanical subsector, was an extremely inefficient
user of capital (see second column of Table 4.1). At world prices, only nonelectrical
machinery performed above the industry average confirming its relative efficiency and
competitiveness with imports in 1969.
- 57 -
TABLE 4.1
BERRY'S RELATIVE TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATES FOR THE
METAL-MECHANICAL SECTOR: 1969
(thousands of pesos)
Capital Productivity Total Factor Productivity
Industry Market Prices World Prices Market Prices World Prices
Basic Metals 0.152 0.061 0.681 0.403
Metal Products 0.322 0.291 0.965 0.838
Nonelectric Machinery 0.342 0.368 0.939 1.266
Electrical Machinery 0.317 negligible 0.951 negligible
Transport Equipment 0.370 0.052 0.880s 0.150
Industry Average 0.290 0.217 1.000 1.000
Capital productivity= VA/K; VA =Value added and K= capital stock including financial capital. Total
Factor Productivity= VA/(Kr+W(OIR)); r = average return to capital in factory industry (excluding
beverages and tobacco) calculated at 14.7%; W = wage bill; 0 = number of occupied workers; R =
number of remunerated workers. For valuation at world prices value added is adjusted using Hutcheson's
effective rates of protection.
Sources: Berry, 1983, Table 2.18, pp.64-65.
In 1967 the balance of payments crisis generated by increasing industrial demands
precipitated a change in policy. With Decree 444 Colombia moved towards export
promotion and diversification to balance out the import substitution system of tariffs,
quotas, and prior deposits. To avoid repeating the sudden devaluation of September 1965,
President Lleras waited until foreign exchange reserve levels were restored before breaking
the stand-off with foreign creditors and agreeing to a crawling peg regime and gradual
import liberalization (Di0az-Alejandro, 1976).
Exchange rate flexibility removed the bias against tradeables, allowing the
adjustment of exporters production costs to the export product price in pesos. During
1967-197 1 the peso was devalued in real terms by almost 20% with respect to the US
dollar; however, removing this source of anti-export bias did not mean import
liberalization. Protectionist mechanisms, though less severe and gradually moving toward
greater uniformity, remained in place and the reforms added greater regulation of foreign
investment and technology transfer (i.e., limiting profit remittances and royalties).
Another key provision of the trade reform was the provision for global licensing
introduced in 1969. It allowed importers to apply for a single global license for a variety of
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capital goods and subjected this package to a 5% uniform tariff. During 1972-74, global
licensing projects represented about 6% of the value of registered imports. By 1975 this
share increased to almost 11% and these licenses accounted for about one-third of the total
value of capital goods imports (World Bank, 1983, estimated from INCOMEX data on pp.
187 and 191). On one hand, global licensing promoted the renovation of the capital stock
particularly by larger firms (dealing directly with foreign distributors) who then created a
market in second-hand equipment to supply the rapid growth of small firms in the mid-
1970s. On the other hand, it undercut domestic capital goods producers, admittedly few in
number at this early stage, who had to pay much higher tariffs for imported inputs as well
as contend with the unreliable quality of domestic steel products.
Despite rates of growth above 8% for the early 1970s, many analysts argued that
the export burst was founded upon higher capacity utilization and did not change the
secondary role of exports as an outlet for excess production (Adda, 1986; World Bank,
1983; Wogart, 1978). Indeed, as Difaz-Alejandro (1976) concluded, the availability of
foreign exchange allowed authorities to cease stop-and-go macroeconomic policies. This
stability encouraged business to bring previously idle resources into production. Diaz-
Alejandro's (1976, p.208) comparisons of relative sectoral shares for 1962-1973 lent little
support to an interpretation crediting the 1967 export promotion drive with a reallocation of
resources from less (nontradeables) to more productive (tradeables) sectors; he noted "the
Colombian experience indicates that drastic import liberalization is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for export growth."
The 1970-74 economic program made construction the leading sector and for the
first time economic policy was linked to the irreversible urbanization trends through the
provision of badly needed urban housing. President Pastrana's Four Strategies Plan
maintained that given the underutilization of capital and labor due to insufficient demand,
there was a need to push relatively labor-intensive sectors with few foreign exchange
requirements. In addition to the construction sector, the Plan also promoted export
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diversification and sought to raise agricultural productivity through land redistribution and
improve the distribution of income through progressive taxation. These goals did not
prove complementary. Adda (1986) charges that the government's promotion of
competitive commercial agriculture for export effectively set aside land reform and even
encouraged rural exodus. While some migrants were absorbed in the much-needed task of
building housing, others exerted an equally necessary dampening effect (given inflationary
trends) on real urban wages.
To channel resources into construction, the Plan created the UPAC system
(unidades de poder adquisitivo constante--units of constant buying power) to capture
domestic savings by introducing the indexation of savings, Certificate of Deposits (CDs),
and term deposits. This increased the contribution of household savings to investment
from 6% in 1972 to an average of 25% after 1973 (World Bank, 1983, p. 165). The
resulting construction boom set the stage for the rapid growth of firms producing kitchens
for domestic and industrial use. After 1974, however, industrial growth was interrupted
by the tripling of coffee prices in 1976-1977, and the repatriation of profits from illegal
drug exports. The construction boom, in the context of an already prosperous domestic
economy sustained by the export bonanza, fueled inflation. As we shall see below, the
government's efforts to dampen inflation, while liberalizing trade and the financial sector,
inadvertently created obstacles for industry and machinery producers in particular.
KEY ASPECTS OF THE MACROECONOMY IN 1977 AND 1986
Having provided the historical perspective above, we begin this section by
highlighting the key aspects of the Colombian macroeconomic context during the period
between the survey years, 1977-1986. We are then able to present a more detailed review
of the demand and the supply-side impacts upon the economic performance of firms in
nonelectrical machinery. Given the lack of four-digit ISIC data, we focus on nonelectrical
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machinery (ISIC 382), a close proxy for capital goods, which includes our sample
industries, agricultural and kitchen equipment.
The Ups and Downs Between 1977 and 1986
We noted how economic growth followed the ups and downs of the coffee cycle as
the balance of payments dictated the movement to and away from import liberalization. In
the 1970s and 1980s, the problems of inflation, a weak financial sector, and world
recession aggravated these swings. In 1970, the rate of inflation was 6.8% as measured by
the consumer price index (CPI for blue-collar workers); by 1974, it was up to 25.2%; and
by 1977, it peaked at 34.8% (see Table 4.2). Although President Lopez set out to liberalize
the financial sector in 1974-75, he reversed these reforms in 1976-77 in an effort to contain
liquidity from the tremendous increase in foreign reserves. Initially, the reforms limited the
Central Bank's developmental role, reduced reserve requirements and forced investments,
and conferred upon banks greater discretion over the management of their assets. With
these measures, he had hoped to alleviate the problems of credit rationing and an historic
low personal savings rate (averaging below 1% of GDP). With the counterreform, Lopez
tightened credit by increasing reserve requirements, created new instruments for forced
savings (i.e., exchange certificates), increased securities issues, and cut public investment.
These measures produced dramatic results as the contribution of central and commercial
bank credit to the growth in the money base fell during 1976-1979 from 26.2% to 15.2%
and from 46.5% to -33.6%, respectively (Adda, 1986, p. 141).
According to the World Bank (1983, p. 163), this financial counterreform "by
repressing the organized financial market, stimulated the growth of non-regulated financial
instruments and intermediaries" and increased the importance of credit at preferential rates.
In effect, these policies created a two-tier financial system, one heavily regulated and the
other free. The regulated tier was characterized by high reserve requirements and forced
(or directed) investments which claimed as much as 80% of a bank's loanable portfolio and
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were used to allocate credit to priority sectors at preferential rates. Access to such rates
encouraged the concentration and inefficiency of banking institutions, which were legally
shielded from foreign competition.I With respect to the unregulated or extra-bank
intermediaries, they experienced spectacular growth making even their certification for
incorporation very difficult. During this period of restrictive financial policy, this group
created a variety of innovative and highly-leveraged financing instruments whose impacts
were to be felt with the recession.
TABLE 4.2
SELECTED MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS: 1977-1986
(percent)
Real Blue Collar Fiscal Deficit
Exchange CPI year-end share of Rate of Urban
Year GDP Rate change GDP Unemployment
1977 4.2 85.7 34.8 (1.3) 9.4
1978 8.5 85.5 16.7 0.1 8.2
1979 5.4 81.7 24.8 0.2 8.9
1980 4.1 83.5 27.2 2.8 9.2
1981 2.3 81.6 28.1 5.2 9.6
1982 0.9 75.6 24.6 6.0 10.0
1983 1.6 73.6 26.7 7.6 10.7
1984 3.4 79.9 18.3 6.3 13.9
1985 3.1 91.4 22.7 3.9 15.1
1986 5.1 108.5 20.7 0.5 13.1
Real exchange rate calculations are shown in Table 4A. 1 in Appendix C. Parentheses denote a surplus in
the case of fiscal deficit figures.
Sources: Banco de La Repdblica Revista del Banco de La Repdblica, DANE Boletin de Estadistica.
Despite the tight credit policies before 1979, the metal-mechanical sector and
nonelectrical machinery industries reached their peak output levels in that year (see Chart
4A. 1). However, by mid-1980 with the collapse of coffee prices, the Colombian economy
was on the road to stagflation. President Turbay (1978-82) continued import liberalization
and stepped up open-market operations to contain inflation. Having begun an ambitious
1 Colombian banks have had little incentive to improve management and reduce their high operating costs.
World Bank (1987, p. 73) estimates of the financial sector's ratio of operating to total costs of 6% compares
badly with the 3-5% for countries in similar stages of development. A factor in these high costs is the
lower level of technological development in communications which are provided by the state company,
TELECOM which has been unable to modernize or properly maintain its equipment.
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public investment program in infrastructure and energy, he seemed unable to scale it back
and so external debt doubled during Turbay's tenure in office. As Lora and Ocampo
(1986, p. 17) concluded, Turbay took steps contrary to what was needed to contain
mounting balance-of-payments and fiscal deficits. With respect to the latter, the 1979 tax
cut, more lenient tax administration, and expanding current expenditures accounted for over
half of the fiscal deficit.
Aggravated by an overvalued peso, devaluation and recession in Colombia's main
trading partners, Venezuela and Ecuador, precipitated the worst downturn in exports in 30
years. Table 4.2 shows that GNP growth fell from 4.1% in 1980 to 2.3% and 0.9% in the
next two years, industry registered declines of 1.1% and 4.7%. From 74.4% in
November of 1980 industrial capacity utilization bottomed out at 58.2% in 1981 (Arango,
1985, p. 247). The crisis extended to agriculture and the generalized recession in the
productive sectors spread to the shallow financial sector. The financial crisis of 1982
forced the government to nationalize and guarantee the deposits of an important banking
institution, the Banco Nacional, which was facing bankruptcy. 2 Moreover, the Mexican
debt crisis of August, 1982 reduced Colombia's sources of external credit. Foreign
reserves plummeted and the country found itself in the midst of recession and a severe
balance-of-payments crisis.
To stem the crisis, the newly elected Betancur administration reversed the tide of
import liberalization. By December of 1984, 83% of import items required prior licensing
and 16.5% were included in the previously little-used prohibited category (see Table 4A.2
in Appendix C). To stimulate the economy during these years, the peso was devalued by
20% in real terms, the incentives for exports reinstated and strengthened, and the lines of
credit reopened. This focus on external deficits did not meet the requirements for World
2 The financial crisis came to a head again in 1984-1985 when the Superintendencia Bancaria forced
institutions to present their books, leading to the nationalization of Colombia's largest commercial bank.
In addition, special rediscount facilities and guarantee funds were created to recapitalize financial
intermediaries. Several measures such as the automatic financing by the central bank of a part of the
devaluation costs were offered to private companies to help their refinancing of foreign loans.
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Bank credit and the re-opening of private financing. The adjustment program, in terms of
the pace of devaluation and the reduction of the fiscal deficit, had to be stepped up and the
mechanisms of protectionism phased out.3
As illustrated by Table 4.2, by the end of 1986 the government considered the
adjustment program completed, recognizing its costs in terms of slower economic growth
and the regressive impacts of reduced social expenditures. For 1986, GDP growth
registered 5.1%, and unemployment was brought down to 12.3% from the 15.1% peak in
1985. Increases in coffee prices as well as more diversified exports of mineral and
manufactured products allowed a US$2 billion increment over previous years export
earnings. These events in the external sector helped to spread the recovery initiated in
industry during 1984. Thus, authorities noted that Colombia had "entered a new stage with
a strengthened external position, healthy public finances and a satisfactory rate of GDP
growth, combined with moderate growth of money supply and prices, and with an
unemployment rate which, although still high, showed a declining trend by year end"
(Ministerio de Hacienda y Crddito Pdblico, 1987, p. 9).
Demand-Side Impacts on Firm Economic Performance
In both 1977 and 1986, coffee export earnings stimulated aggregate demand and
thereby the derived demand for capital goods. As a share of GNP, gross fixed capital
formation (GFCF) averaged 5.4% over 1977-1986 with relatively little fluctuation (as
measured by a standard deviation of only 0.6%). In contrast, trends for the machinery and
equipment component of GFCF showed great instability, an overall lackluster performance
except for the 1978-1981 period (marking the Turbay administration's heavy investment in
3 The main steps taken included: (1) quickening the pace of devaluation to reach parity by September 1985,
(2) reducing export subsidies and beginning the staged reduction in tariff levels (see Appendix D), and (3)
cutting the fiscal deficit by expanding the base of the value added tax, limiting the growth in public
employment to 10%, and increasing the controlled prices for gasoline.
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energy and infrastructure), and an increasing share of imports (from 64% in 1977 to 81%
in 1986; see Table 4A.3 in Appendix C).
Chart 4.1 illustrates that this instability closely paralleled the growth rates for
nonelectrical machinery output. These trends illustrate the impact of stop-and-go
macroeconomic policies on business investment plans. More specifically, the dwindling
participation of domestic machinery in GFCF reflected the discrimination against domestic
capital goods: (1) in trade policies, (2) in bidding for government projects, and (3) from a
lack of financing putting domestic producers at a disadvantage with respect to importers
supported by own-country export credits. The first two issues need further explanation.
First, we noted the importance of global licensing, but the trade regime also favored
imported capital goods through low tariff protection and the exemption of public sector
purchases from import duties. Estimates of effective protection at the 4-digit ISIC level by
the Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n (1982, p. 36) for 1980, probably the height of
import liberalization, show that agricultural equipment (ISIC 3822) was provided with
negative protection (-7%).4 In contrast, for most items in electrical machinery (ISIC 383),
largely classified as consumer durables, effective protection rates averaged above 30%.
Second, domestic producers often lose government contracts to foreign suppliers because
of their smaller production capacity and the inability to subcontract larger public purchases.
In addition, for those capital goods in which the domestic firm does not face disadvantages
related to volume, technology, or specific aid credits, the uncertainty and unreliability of
government contracts is notorious.
4 Table 4A.2 in Appendix C illustrates the trends in nominal and effective rates of protection from 1979 to
1986. In all periods, protection granted to nonelectrical machinery (ISIC 382), the grouping most likely to
coincide with capital goods, is consistently below the average of all product classes.
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CHART 4.1
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES FOR NONELECTRICAL MACHINERY GROSS
OUTPUT (GO) AND GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION (GFCF) IN
MACHINERY: 1974-1986
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Source: See Table 4A.3 in Appendix C.
The stimulus from export earnings during 1977 and 1986 for purchases of
Colombian nonelectrical machinery were also dampened by the worrisome trends in the
financial sector (detailed above) which affected the cost of industrial financing. World
Bank (1983, p. 173) data show that interest rates generally outpaced inflation such that
average real rates reached (or surpassed) 8% in 1977 and 1986. The causes behind this
increase are complex and include external factors such as the parallel increases in world
capital markets as well as internal factors, mainly the rise of the two-tier financial system
and the crowding out by fiscal deficits. 5 Rates in the unregulated sector registered one to
four percentage points above already high commercial rates.
5 Other causes mentioned in the World Bank (1983, p. 173) report are: (1) the reductions in the relative
price of manufactured products both worldwide and in Colombia (1974-1980), (2) the stabilization policies
which tightened credit and shifted it to the unregulated financial sector where rates were higher (e.g., during
1973-1979 this sector's share rose from one-fifth to one-third of total industrial credit), and (3) the
expectations of more rapid devaluation.
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The instability engendered by these developments is demonstrated in Table 4.3.
Although, the metal-mechanical sector performs only slightly below the industry-wide
average for 1977-1986, its year-to-year fluctuations (indicated by the standard deviation)
are much greater. More dramatic still, is the rather poor and highly erratic performance of
nonelectrical machinery over this period.
TABLE 4.3
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF REAL OUTPUT BETWEEN SURVEY YEARS
1977 AND 1986
(percent)
Average Average 1977-1986
Industry Group 1975-76 1977 1984-85 1986 Average s.d.
GNP 3.5 4.2 3.2 5.1 3.8 2.2
All Industry 2.1 -0.3 7.6 8.8 3.9 5.0
Metal-mechanical 0.1 4.9 1.1 13.4 3.4 8.9
Nonelectric Machinery 0.9 1.0 -10.0 18.9 1.6 12.3
s.d.: standard deviation; Metal-mechanical group includes fabricated metal products (381), nonelectric
machinery (382), electrical machinery (383), transport equipment (384), and scientific instruments (385).
Data Sources: Current peso figures (except GNP) from DANE's Anuario de Industria Manufacturera deflated
with Banco de la Repdblica's Revista del Banco de la Repablica wholesale price indices to convert to 1975
prices (see Table 4A.4 in Appendix C).
Although the 1977 growth in output for these industries was barely positive, this year
marked a peak in the share of output exported (18%). The recession cut these exports in
half and by 1986 barely 8% of nonelectrical machinery output was exported.
Supply-Side Impact on Firm Economic Performance
For the entire industrial sector, the trade regime is an important determinant of the
cost and availability of inputs. For metal-mechanical producers, iron and steel products,
motors, and electrical components are important intermediate inputs, and machine tools and
other metalworking machinery are key capital goods. Domestic production in the first two
categories has been contributing an increasing share of supply, although users rely on
imports to satisfy more stringent quantity, variety, and quality specifications. We
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mentioned above the mechanisms for the negative effective protection afforded to some
capital goods producers and described the tightening of import controls in the early 1980s.
In terms of the relative accessibility of capital goods producers to imported inputs,
1977 was clearly a better year than 1986. In 1977 a majority (52%) of items were
classified in the free import list. By 1986 this share had dropped to 46%. Perhaps more
importantly, according to the data gathered by Cubillos and Torres (1987), the differences
in the rates of effective protection (a measure which takes into account the nominal
protection accorded to intermediate products) between inputs and final products increased
from a range of 3- 8% for nonelectrical machinery (see Table 4A. 1 in Appendix C).
Moreover, the overvaluation of the peso (suggested by the real exchange rate in Table 4.2.)
in 1977 provided a further incentive to importing.
These conditions had an impact upon the production decisions of nonelectrical
machinery producers; between 1977 and 1986, they reduced their dependence on imported
raw materials from almost 50% to 40% of materials consumed. In terms of the cost of
these inputs, 1986 saw higher prices with respect to 1977. The raw materials and
intermediate inputs price index registered its greatest increase over the decade in 1986 (see
Table 4A.4). In the recession years, intermediate purchases declined to almost 50% of
gross output during 1982-1983 before returning to the pre-recession average around 60%
in 1986. As we demonstrate below, raw materials and intermediate input prices were not
the only factor increasing the cost of production. High capital costs dampened investment
in production, while the recession allowed firms to stop the profit squeeze by decreasing
labor's share.
Declining Investment in Plant and Equipment
After a strong growth in the beginning of the period and a major slump associated
with the first wave of the recession in 1981, 1985-1986 saw sizeable declines in fixed
capital as measured by real book value as shown in Table 4.4. These figures are indicative
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of broad trends; we recognize this measure may underestimate the value of the capital stock
given that entrepreneurs fear the tax liability consequences of reporting more realistic
values. Over the 1977-1986 period, nonelectrical machinery averaged a modest 4% rate of
growth in fixed capital. This average rate of growth, however, masks the absolute decline
in the level of real fixed capital of almost one-third over this period. This decline proved
long lasting; fixed capital remained at 80% or less of the 1977 level between 1981 and
1986.
TABLE 4.4
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF FIXED CAPITAL AND ITS PRODUCTIVITY
BETWEEN SURVEY YEARS: 1977 AND 1986
(percent)
Industry Group/ Average Average 1977-1986
Item 1975-76 1977 1984-85 1986 Average s.d.
Fixed Capital (Real book value):
Metal-mechanical na 24.4 -10.5 2.3 1.2 11.7
Nonelectric Machinery na 24.4 -11.3 11.2 3.9 34.9
Capital Productivity (Real output per peso of real book value):
Metal-mechanical na -15.7 13.5 10.9 2.9 11.2
Nonelectric Machinery na -18.9 1.3 6.9 7.9 39.1
s.d.: standard deviation; Metal-mechanical group includes fabricated metal products (381), nonelectric
machinery (382), electrical machinery (383), and transport equipment (384), and scientific instruments
(385).
Data sources: Figures in current pesos from DANE's Anuario de Industria Manufacturera deflated with Banco
de la Repdblica's Revista del Banco de la Repdblica wholesale price indices to convert to 1977 prices (see
Table 4A.4 in Appendix C).
World Bank (1989, p. 72) estimates of aggregate (economy-wide) capital
productivity from TFP indices show that capital productivity has been decreasing about
1.1% per year during 1976-1986. This together with their estimates of the incremental
capital-output ratio, which has been increasing, suggests capital deepening in the
Colombian economy. However, Table 4.4 shows that in nonelectrical machinery capital
productivity has been fairly healthy for this period, reflecting the fact that this subsector is
still fairly young.
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We noted above the increasing real rates of interest, by 1986 commercial loans
claimed a real rate of interest above 10%. This figure illustrates the intensity of lenders'
inflationary expectations and contrasts with the barely positive rate for preferential credit.
The high rates of interest were particularly damaging given industry's reliance on debt.
The trend towards debt rather than equity financing, marked by the decline in new stock
issues, reflected the growth of financial intermediation, the biases against equity in a tax
system which disregarded inflation (until the 1979-80 reforms introducing full indexation),
and the shallowness in the Colombian stock market. The tendency of product prices and
profits to lag behind interest rates and debt service created short-term liquidity problems
and forced firms to incur further debt or cease operation. In addition, as the main source of
industrial credit, the corporacionesfinancieras (financial corporations), came to rely
increasingly on short-term CDs, firm debt moved toward shorter maturities. Domestically,
the UPAC system reserved long-term maturities for housing construction, while the public
sector captured external long-term credits. The remaining short-term external credit became
concentrated in a handful of the largest companies.
Echevarria's (1986) study of industrial financing points to the perverse effects of
such trends. In 1983, a sample of firms studied spent five times more in investments such
as real estate, purchase of short-term CDs, and speculation purchases to maintain high
prices for company assets, than in investments in own plant and production. Thus, for
larger firms, their access to preferential rates was linked to a decline in the rate of
investment and a shift toward financial rather than real investment. As the World Bank
(1983, p. 175) noted "these firms assumed the role of financial intermediaries and relent
such funds, either directly or through other intermediaries and the unorganized market."
For smaller firms, an important source of start-up capital, in addition to the unregulated
financial sector, became the partial withdrawal of accumulated severance or cesantia
benefits which was legalized in 1977. The cesantfa fund equivalent to one month's salary
for each year of employment for employees with 10 years or more seniority is due upon
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termination of employment or can be withdrawn as an interest-free loan, with the remainder
earning 12% interest annually. While spurring the growth of small-scale enterprises,
cesantia withdrawals presented a significant financial burden for existing firms.
Even more so than in 1977, the disparity between commercial and preferential credit
translated into tremendous disparities in the cost of capital across firms. For firms with
limited access to preferential credit, usually smaller firms, the cost of commercial loans
might preclude investing in their plants, thereby delaying the replacement of obsolete
machinery. Although the number of smaller firms (employing fewer than 100 workers)
increased during 1977-1986 to comprise three-quarters of nonelectrical machinery
producers, their share of net investment fell from one-third to one-quarter. We can see
similar, though less pronounced, trends in other metal-mechanical subsectors, such as
electrical machinery and transport equipment, where scale economies explain the
dominance of larger capital-intensive firms (e.g., household appliance and automobile
factories).
Declining Labor Share
The increases in the cost of intermediate and capital inputs described above put
increasing pressure on firms to look for cost savings in labor or face a profit squeeze.
Table 4.5 shows the share of value added (excluding indirect taxes) consumed by labor
compensation (including fringe benefits), general expenses, and the remainder available for
profits. Nonelectrical machinery producers managed to keep interest costs steady, contain
the increases in general expenses, as well as reduce labor's share substantially to restore
profitability levels close to the industry average. Industry-wide profitability also recovered,
but not to pre-1977 levels. In contrast, the metal-mechanical sector as a whole exhibited
deteriorating profitability as general expenses, such as insurance and other related costs, ate
into profits.
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TABLE 4.5
SHARES IN VALUE ADDED FOR SELECIED YEARS
(percent)
Industry Group/ Labor General Expenses Remainder for
Years Share Total Interest Profits
All Industry:
1970 35.9 23.2 4.5 40.8
1977* 35.3 34.7 9.4 <30.0
1980 35.1 38.7 10.2 25.1
1986* 29.0 41.4 9.4 <29.5
Metal-Mechanical Sector:*
1977 41.1 34.9 10.9 <24.0
1986 38.5 53.8 13.1 <7.7
Nonelectrical Machinery:*
1977 49.5 35.9 9.3 <14.6
1986 39.1 37.0 9.3 <23.9
Labor share includes fringe benefits. The metal-mechanical sector comprises (ISIC Second Revision): metal
products (381), nonelectrical machinery (382), electrical machinery (383), transport equipment (384), and
scientific instruments (385).
Sources: Camilo, 1987, p. 172.; * denotes own calculations using data from DANE's Anuario de Industria
Manufacturera for the cited years.
The employment trends presented in Table 4.6 show that higher employment
explained the high labor share exhibited in nonelectrical machinery in 1977; the export
boom prompted firms to hire workers and take advantage of falling real wages. In 1986
employment levels were once again on the upswing as the industry recovered from the
second wave of the recession after having shed 16% (or 2700) of jobs. Real wages made
only marginal gains and labor productivity posted a healthy increase. In 1977 they offered
a compensation package close to the average for the metal-mechanical group, by 1986 this
package was 18% below it, and 27% below the industry-wide average.
Despite the reduction in labor's share, employers and independent analysts, such as
Wogart (1982) and the Chenery Employment Mission (1987), claim that labor costs,
particularly the legislated non-wage component, represent a heavy burden. Wogart's
estimates updated by Econometria (1989) show that the entire package of mandated fringe
benefits as a proportion of wages rose from 41% in 1967 to 55% in the 1980s. In terms of
the actual (as opposed to mandated) share of fringe benefits, they rose from 52% in 1977 to
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83% in 1986 industrywide and 42% to 60% in the nonelectrical machinery subsector.
According to Econometria (1989) industrywide increases were due to: (1) increases in
social security contributions, (2) effects of inflation and payment of interest of cesanti(as,
(3) increases in extralegal fringe benefits resulting from collective bargaining agreements,
and (4) increases in severance costs during recession years.
TABLE 4.6
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF EMPLOYMENT, COMPENSATION, AND
PRODUCTIVITY BETWEEN SURVEY YEARS: 1977 AND 1986
(percent)
Industry Group/ Average Average 1977-1986
Item 1975-76 1977 1984-85 1986 Average s.d.
Employment (Remunerated workers):
All Industry 2.4 3.6 -2.7 2.3 -0.2 3.0
Metal-mechanical 2.0 10.1 -2.4 1.2 -0.3 5.2
Nonelectric Machinery 0.7 10.0 -1.9 6.6 -0.6 6.4
Real Average Compensation (Including fringe benefits):
All Industry 2.7 -5.7 3.5 0.2 3.0 5.8
Metal-mechanical 3.8 -12.1 0.8 -0.2 2.9 8.3
Nonelectric Machinery 0.9 -8.8 -2.7 0.8 2.9 25.1
Labor Productivity (Real output per remunerated worker):
All Industry -0.4 -3.8 10.6 6.3 4.1 4.8
Metal-mechanical -2.0 -4.7 3.5 12.1 3.7 6.3
Nonelectric Machinery -0.2 -8.2 -8.4 11.5 2.2 10.9
s.d.: standard deviation; Average compensation = (total compensation/number of remunerated workers).
Metal-mechanical group includes metal products (381), nonelectric machinery (382), electrical machinery
(383), transport equipment (384), and scientific instruments (385).
Data sources: Current peso figures from DANE's Anuario de Industria Manufacturera deflated with Banco de
la Repiblica's Revista del Banco de la Repdblica wholesale price indices (see Table 4A.4 in Appendix C).
Econometria (1989), however, downplays the effect of legislated fringe benefits
upon labor costs. They argue that employers make decisions based on total compensation,
so that they trade off increases in fringe benefits against increases in basic wages. As
evidence of this tendency they point to the fairly steady labor share in value added--33%
over 1977-1986 with a standard deviation of only 0.6% for industry as a whole. For
nonelectrical machinery as shown in Table 4.5, the labor share recorded greater fluctuation
over the period; it peaked at almost 50% in 1977, fell to 30% in 1981 as average
compensation plummeted and then settled to the period average at about 40%.
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One way employers managed to reduce labor's share was through higher labor
turnover to avoid benefits which accrue as a function of seniority, i.e., the cesantia. This
may be the most serious effect of labor legislation--the ensuing losses in productivity from
increased labor turnover. Available data at the national level shows greater turnover by the
increase in the number of temporary workers.
Another important effect of labor legislation was emphasized by the Chenery
Employment Mission (1987). The authors concluded that for smaller firms, the wider
coverage of labor legislation meant the loss of cost advantages so important to their growth
in the 1970s. Wider coverage is a function of inflation which has driven many small firms
above the minimum asset value for which labor legislation applies. For smaller firms, the
risks associated with a given worker are proportionately higher given the small employment
base. Moreover, for those firms operating in competitive markets, these costs cannot be
passed on to consumers. In contrast, in monopolistic industries, such as beverages and
refineries, productivity increases reflect the ability of these firms to pass on higher costs to
consumers.
This may explain the modest labor productivity growth (2.2%; see Table 4.6 and
Chart 4.2 below) in the nonelectrical machinery subsector, where industry concentration is
low and smaller firms (employing fewer than 100 workers) predominate. Low
concentration is supported by Robert's (1989) estimates of Herfindahl indices (sum of
squares of plant market shares) showing nonelectrical machinery (ISIC 382) at about 33%
to 40% of the industry average for 1977-1985. With respect to size, plants employing 100
or more employees made up less than 12% and 4% of all plants in this subsector in 1977
and 1986, respectively. In the first survey year, our firm interviews of agricultural
equipment producers also showed a highly competitive market as smaller firms forced
larger traditional producers out of the most productive agricultural region of Colombia--the
Cauca Valley. These large producers, mainly located in urban industrial areas could not
compete with the smaller firms located in this valley and offering lower prices and
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immediate servicing. By 1986 some firms, both large and small, had died and the industry
was consolidating.
Improvements in TFP
In addition to showing declines in fixed capital, reductions in employment, and
increases in the costs of production, we have shown that nonelectrical machinery was a
fairly competitive subsector. Chart 4.2 below plots the levels of labor and capital
CHART 4.2
PRODUCIVITY TRENDS FOR NONELECTRICAL MACHINERY: 1977-1986
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productivity, capital intensity, and TFP for the subsector. The latter estimates are taken
from Roberts' (1989) TFP indices for 1977-1983 based on plant-level census data.6 He
6 Roberts (1989) the 3-digit ISIC deflator series from the central bank to determine real output. Labor is
not corrected for hours worked. Material purchases are deflated using an industry-specific material price
index. The capital stock figure is derived using the perpetual inventory method using 1977 stock as the
base and differentiated by four types of capital assets: plant, machinery, transport equipment and land each
with respective depreciation rates of 5%, 10%, 20% and 0%.
-
-
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applies the Tornqvist index number formula described in Chapter 2 to series of output,
number of workers, material purchases, and capital stock derived from perpetual inventory
calculations.
The most dramatic trends are those related to fixed capital as measured by real book
value, specifically the steep and lasting decline after 1980 noted earlier. The 1977-1980
period of trade liberalization facilitated an investment boom (set in motion by the coffee
bonanza) that almost doubled capital-labor ratios in the subsector. The recession and trade
restrictions (in response to the balance-of-payments crisis) brought stability such that
capital intensity fell into the same pattern as labor productivity. TFP trends also followed
labor productivity, but displayed a more steady improvement.
According to Roberts' (1989) TFP estimates, nonelectrical machinery producers
stand out as the best and most steady performers within the metal-mechanical sector,
registering negative TFP changes for only one year. In contrast, there was only one year
of positive TFP growth industrywide, reflecting the high levels of capacity underutilization
associated with the prolonged recession. For the seven-year period, nonelectric machinery
producers averaged 5.1% TFP growth while industry as a whole averaged -2.4%.
With these estimates of TFP growth, data on entry and exit rates, import penetration
and market shares, Roberts (1989) examines the impact on productivity of a movement
away from the import liberalization begun in the late 1960s. Greater restrictions on imports
were introduced in the first years of the 1980 decade to control balance-of-payments
deficits. The authors posits that this policy shielded domestic producers from the salutary
effects of import competition , thereby promoting the growth of small inefficient firms.
Reduced competition allowed these marginal firms below the minimum efficient scale to
survive. Comparing data from 1977-80 (increasing liberalization) and 1980-83 (decreasing
liberalization), he offers as preliminary evidence of this hypothesis: (1) the increase in the
number and proportion of plants with fewer than 50 employees and (2) the decline in size
of entrants and their lower average market share. This evidence, Roberts argues, is
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consistent with the argument that trade restrictions allowed small inefficient producers to
exist.
In this preliminary work, Roberts uses size differences as a proxy for efficiency,
specifically the Herfindahl index (the sum of squares of plant market shares within an
industry) measuring dispersion of plant sizes. Finding a skewed size distribution with few
large and many small plants, he surmises differences in efficiency levels. However, the
results of his regression models to explain TFP differences across industries point to the
salutary impacts of import competition on the more highly concentrated industries , that is,
those where market shares are concentrated among a few large producers. It seems then
that without estimates of efficiency (not just proxies based on size), we might suggest that
trade restrictions allowed large inefficient producers to exist and, moreover, be profitable as
shown by Roberts data on profitability. In addition, from an examination of plant entry
and exit, Roberts concludes that trade adjustment had little effect on exit or entry and
suggests that the impact of import competition was exerted on continuing firms by
dampening the average rate of growth of plants.
Our examination of aggregate data for nonelectrical machinery producers suggests
that the death of presumably inefficient larger producers may help to explain productivity
gains. In 1986 the number of larger firms (those with more than 100 employees)
producing nonelectrical machinery was one-third of the 1977 figure. The survivors
absorbed some of the labor released by firm deaths and/or contractions so that the average
number of workers among larger firms jumped from 271 to 514, although as we noted
overall employment fell by almost 2700. Capital-labor ratios (measured as real book value
per worker) could not keep up, but these more labor-intensive survivors were more
efficient in terms of real output per worker. In 1977 larger firm labor productivity was
50% greater than that of smaller firms, by 1986 they were twice as productive, although the
differences in capital intensity between these size groups remained below 15%. These
trends are only indicative since our data are aggregates of size groupings unlike Roberts'
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plant-level data. Nevertheless, these data show that the relationship between efficiency,
size, and competition is complex and requires micro-level analyses to get an accurate
reading of efficiency patterns within a particular industry.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the early gains in productivity, the evidence suggests that the metal-
mechanical sector has been plagued by stop-and-go trade policies, which have added
uncertainty in both supply and demand. Colombian industrial evolution since the turn of
the century has followed the coffee cycle; the level of aggregate demand is closely
associated with coffee export earnings. During the upswing, coffee earnings are available
to finance industrial imports and stimulate industrial production, while the downswings are
characterized by tight import controls to relieve balance-of-payments deficits. Despite the
liberalizing reforms implemented in the late 1960s, suspended in the early 1980s recession,
and gradually reintroduced in the mid-80s, the structure of protection has not changed to fit
Colombia's evolving industrial structure. Recurrent criticisms by contemporary analysts
such as Ospina (1988) and the Central Bank (Coyuntura Econ6mica, 1986) focus on the
trade regime's: (1) continued relative protection of consumer goods sectors, (2) instability,
(3) complexity, and (4) arbitrariness given the discretionary power in the hands of public
officials charged with implementation.
In addition to the vagaries of the coffee cycle and the anachronistic structure of
protection, producers have had to contend with the chaotic effects of financial regulation
and deregulation. It is no wonder that Colombian analysts along with industry associations
label the 1980s as a period of deindustrialization. Specifically, with respect to the metal-
mechanical sector, they argue that the unstable macroeconomic climate together with a
structure of protection still focused on consumer goods has placed in jeopardy the future
technological development of the country.
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We described broad trends in factor use, noting the stagnation of plant investment
and the reductions in employment, labor share, and capital intensity. These data could
provide initial evidence for deindustrialization arguments. Nonetheless, available TFP
estimates for 1977-1983 suggest moderate productivity gains for nonelectrical machinery.
We also presented preliminary evidence suggesting that their impact across sectors and
firms may been differentiated by market structure, that is, plant size and market
concentration. In the next chapter we examine these issues with plant survey data from
agricultural and kitchen equipment producers. Specifically, we will examine how technical
efficiency is related to size and factor use. Are smaller or larger firms more efficient with
respect to total factor productivity (i.e., as measured by TEIs)? Did this pattern change
between 1977 and 1986 when trade restrictions were increasing in relative terms? How did
firms adjust to the more uncertain macroeconomic circumstances? Were reductions in labor
and postponements in replacing capital equipment compensated elsewhere to provide for
efficiency improvements and even technical progress?
CHAPTER 5
A DETERMINISTIC FRONTIER APPLICATION TO COLOMBIAN
METAL-MECHANICAL FIRMS: 1977 AND 1986
In Chapter 2 we reviewed neoclassical models that attempt to decompose
productivity change into improvements in the use of factors and the unexplained TFP
residual we interpret as technical change. In addition to TFP refinements in terms of
disaggregation, the measurement of capital, and adjustments for capacity underutilization,
we explained in Chapter 3 how frontier methods further decompose the TFP residual by
accounting for errors in optimization. Indeed, if markets were perfect and technology and
information freely accessible, we would not need to worry about such errors. Prices
would provide correct signals to direct the use of factors and informed or unmotivated
managers would be replaced. However, our analysis in Chapter 4 of the context in which
Colombian metal-mechanical firms operate suggests errors in optimization are likely to be
very important. Even our limited review of frontier studies in Chapter 3 demonstrates that
errors in optimization are important in Colombia, India , and the United States.
The purpose of efficiency and productivity measurement is simple. If we know
what is wrong, we can target policies to mitigate the problem. However, with limited data,
this diagnosis is not simple since there are three types of errors in optimization manifest at
the firm level, and their origins lie in the interrelated technical characteristics of production--
efficiency, bias, elasticity, scale, and homotheticity. Our empirical work focuses on
technical inefficiency and uses technical efficiency indices (TEIs) to examine the other two
types of errors--scale and allocative inefficiencies. As noted in Chapter 3, most frontier
studies focus on the relationship between size and TEIs. Analysts basically test hypotheses
concerning issues of scale--the existence of capital indivisibilities and/or economies of
scale. Similarly, some frontier studies examine the relationship between factor proportions
and TEIs to study allocative inefficiency. We go step further by analyzing the impact of
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distortions in product pricing and the other source of price or allocative inefficiency,
capacity underutilization.
In this chapter we describe our empirical work using the deterministic production
frontier on our sample of 50 firms initially surveyed initially by CBI in 1977 and revisited
in 1986. Following the methods of Nishimizu and Page (1982) described in Chapter 3, we
derive for our sample firms technical efficiency rankings for each survey year and then
examine the issue of technical progress by looking at the efficiency improvements in the
best-practice frontier across the survey years. After describing the key issues in our
measurement of inputs and outputs, we turn to a discussion of the patterns of technical
efficiency derived from our frontier calculations. In analyzing these results, we focus on
two sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses concerns substantive issues regarding
firm performance and the second focuses on measurement issues. The former examine the
evidence on the performance of this sample of Colombian firms to test long-debated
arguments about the efficiency of firms in the context of inward oriented development
strategies. Specifically, we look at three controversies regarding firm performance.
First, small firms are inefficient because they operate below the minimum efficient
scale in limited markets, or, conversely, they are more efficient given their more
appropriate factor proportions. Second, size and factor proportions are not systematically
and directly related and, therefore, are not the central issues in efficiency. Rather the
problems lie in managerial performance; entrepreneurs lack the technical and administrative
know-how to efficiently organize production. Alternatively, protected markets do not
provide entrepreneurs with the correct signal or incentives towards efficiency. Third, in
order to survive recession and macroeconomic instability, firms curtailed efforts towards
technical progress and focused on cost reduction. Alternatively, the argument that
necessity is the mother of invention implies these efforts may have produced cumulative
improvements which pushed out the best-practice frontier.
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Unlike the comprehensive study underway by Roberts (1989), which we discussed
in the previous chapter, we cannot hope to quantify the efficiency gains from greater market
liberalization. Using the concepts of technical efficiency and its dynamic counterpart,
technical progress, we can, however, illustrate how a nascent capital goods sector has
responded to the opportunities and limitations presented by the ups and downs of the
Colombian economy. In light of rapidly changing demand worldwide, recent literature on
competitiveness and productivity has focused on firms' flexibility as key to their
competitiveness and by extension their efficiency and productivity. For example, Sabel
(1986), Hoffman (1989), and Alavi (1990) examine the implications of flexibility for
developing country firms. They note somewhat optimistically that flexibility has long been
a key to these firms' survival. We will study the issue of flexibility using our sample of
firms by looking at the specific efforts of entrepreneurs in their attempts to survive
recession and its tightening import controls.
The subject of our second set of hypotheses is an evaluation of alternative input
measures, particularly the disaggregated capital services measure. If we cannot corroborate
the patterns of efficiency indices, then we must question their usefulness much like those
critics who labelled the TFP residual a measure of our ignorance. As we noted in the
conclusion to Chapter 3, the literature is replete with methodological pieces, but most lack
the corroborating data on specific entrepreneurial efforts that give concrete meaning to
efficiency indices. Another aspect of this evaluation involves considering the potential bias
from two important factors that tend to confound efficiency estimates--capacity
underutilization and market power. As we noted in Chapter 2, not accounting for capacity
underutilization biases the price of capital services upwards, while not recognizing market
power biases the valuation of output downward for those firms who do not exert it.
Following this introduction, we justify our choice of the deterministic frontier for
our small, but rich, set of Colombian data. Our measurement of inputs and outputs follows
the basic notions of index number theory for aggregation in which weights reflect differing
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productivities. Our most significant contribution is the application of Mohr's (1986)
disaggregated measure of capital services which takes into account vintage and type of
asset. This is an important departure from standard practice where an aggregate estimate of
total capital stock together with universal assumptions about vintage and depreciation are
the basis of capital input measures. This not only violates the principles of aggregation by
assuming all capital homogeneous, but ascribes universal qualities to capital without any
notion of whether these assumptions are applicable or not in the specific context.
MODEL DEFINITION AND JUSTIFICATION
In Chapter 3 we explained the various techniques of efficiency measurement,
indicating the requirements of each. Stochastic models offer the most theoretically
appealing approach because they explicitly incorporate random error and offer the
possibility of mitigating important deficiencies in data. These models include: (a) full-
information maximum-likelihood estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function with
instrumental variables to derive average technical efficiency indices across industries to
account for errors-in-variables problems, as in the work of Tybout (1988); (b) fixed-effects
models using joint estimation of the share equations to get around the problem of
insufficient degrees of freedom to derive firm-specific technical efficiency indices, as in the
work of Seale (1989) described in Appendix B; and (3) variable-coefficients models to
estimate a stochastic frontier from panel data allowing technical efficiency to vary across
time as well as units and producing firm-specific indices of technical efficiency, as in the
work of Cornwell, Sickles and Schmidt (1989).
Although our Colombian data is rich with qualitative and quantitative data on firm
performance for the years 1977 and 1986, the sample is small covering 50 metalworking
firms consisting of 30 firms producing agricultural implements and 20 firms producing
industrial kitchens. This sample is a subset of the 1977 data gathered by Cortes, Berry,
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and Ishaq (CBI, 1985). For 1986 we conducted a follow-up survey to the CBI one, in
which 27 of the 50 firms responded with the balance corresponding to 9 deaths and 7 non-
responses. Moreover, we do not have complete price and quantity data on all inputs and
outputs to be able estimate a fixed-effects model. We also consider the methods of Tybout
(1989) inappropriate for our specific investigation where we are interested in the patterns of
efficiency across firms rather than sectors economy-wide. Statistical frontiers do not offer
significant advantages over deterministic ones. In addition to greater sample size demands,
they require the analyst to make arbitrary judgements about the error distribution while still
ignoring the random component of this error.
In Chapter 3 we enumerated the problems with deterministic frontiers: (1) its
attribution of all deviation from the frontier to technical inefficiency, (2) its lack of tests for
goodness of fit thereby precluding statistical inference, and (3) its sensitivity to outlier data.
Despite these drawbacks, a comparison of frontier techniques by Corbo and de Melo
(1986) suggests that the deterministic frontier yields similar rankings to those of stochastic
methods. Moreover, we have tried to mitigate some of these problems. First, the
deterministically derived technical inefficiency index can be considered an upper bound
measure. Second, we recalculated the frontier without the most efficient firms in order to
identify outliers and test the stability of the estimated frontier parameters. Most
importantly, our technical efficiency indices were only one measure of firm performance.
By analyzing how closely they were related to other measures, we evaluated their
contribution towards a reasonable explanation of the main characteristics of the production
process. Like those studies discussed in Chapter 3, we use multiple correlation techniques
to examine the TEI patterns.
Our deterministic frontier model follows those described in Chapter 3. We assume
that an upper-bound measure of a firm's inefficiency can be captured by the error term u.
The linear programming problem we solved is based on a Cobb-Douglas production
function (value added is a function of capital and labor inputs)
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In VAs = ao + ak In K + al In L + us
where we minimize the sum of the deviations (over s firms) from the production frontier:
min Esus = (go + ak in K + al in L - In VAs)
subject to
go + kIn K + 2 In L _> In VAs or us <0
go, Qk ,A -O
The error term is forced to be nonpositive, reflecting that actual firm output must be below
or equal to potential or best practice output (denoted by the underlining). A measure of
technical inefficiency for each firm is the antilog of the slack variable from the
programming problem and by taking its reciprocal we derived the technical efficiency index
(TEI). We estimated separate frontiers for each industry to assure comparability of
production technologies and therefore the viability of the frontier as the appropriate
standard of performance.
THE DATA AND INPUT MEASURES
Our measurement of inputs and outputs follow basic index number theory in which
aggregation is based on a weighting scheme using relative prices to reflect differing
productivities. Because we were concerned with aggregation within (not across) a specific
unit and for only two discrete time periods, we did not use the more complex index number
formulae described in Chapter 2. Had we chosen a flexible specification of the production
technology, such as the translog, in a time-series context we would have used its
corresponding index-number formula, the Tomqvist-Theil discrete formulation. Given the
richness of our data set on the input side, we disaggregated to six classes of labor, two
types of fixed assets (machinery and buildings), and as many differing vintages of separate
machinery as reported by the entrepreneur.
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The Issue of Prices under Disequilibrium
As we noted in Chapter 2, Taylor (1979, p. 74) and Chenery (1983) have criticized
TFP studies in developing countries. By the very nature of the structural transformation
that justifies their classification, developing countries are in disequilibrium, which means
that observed prices may not reflect true scarcity or relative productivities. Although
Taylor's criticism focused on the problem of accurately capturing labor productivities in
labor abundant economies through artificially controlled wages, the issue of whether prices
accurately reflect relative scarcities is an important issue for the valuation of both inputs and
outputs. While there is an ample literature on the determination of shadow prices in
developing countries in the context of cost-benefit analyses, the issue of prices in TFP
analyses has received little attention. Most TFP studies, such as that by Roberts (1989) for
Colombia cited in Chapter 4, set aside this issue of prices. After deriving TFP estimates
based on observed prices, Roberts (1989) examines the potential biases introduced by
disequilibrium conditions. For example, he introduces the growth in sectoral demand as a
variable to account for the problem of capacity underutilization during the early 1980s
recession. He also examines profitability, market concentration, and import penetration to
account for prevailing competitive conditions.
On the other hand, CBI in their micro level study focused on shadow prices,
hoping to capture more accurately than previous studies the productivity differentials
associated with relative resource scarcities. As they note, using shadow or near-shadow
prices on the input side would require similar treatment on the output side, but the relevant
data were unavailable and product prices were not too different. Considering the broad
range of firms in the CBI sample, ranging from those with fewer than 10 employees to
those with more than 100, we tried to examine the extent of product price differentials as
well as these firms' attempts to differentiate their product through financing and
distribution.
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Unlike CBI, we chose to base our study of firms' relative performance on observed
market prices and then compare these results to those derived under equilibrium conditions
to see the magnitude of the bias presented by the divergence between market and shadow
prices. Our use of market prices means for example, that the ability of firms to claim
higher product prices while minimizing factor input costs (through positive organizational
measures, knowledge of import controls and practice in filing loan applications, or through
the exercise of privileged connections) will be reflected as higher TEIs. In effect, higher
product prices not commensurate with quality differentials will be reflected incorrectly as
higher technical efficiency. We used the real market rates for capital offered by differing
financing sources--own, commercial bank, public bank, or supplier/moneylender.
Accordingly, we used market prices for labor and output. Our main adjustment involved a
thorough consistency check to assure these data presented a reasonable picture of firm
production and finances for the survey years. We present the details of our input and
output measures in the Technical Appendix.
For comparison, we explicitly corrected for two types of disequilibrium conditions:
first, the existence of market power or a firm's ability to charge higher product prices for
quality comparable to the competition, and second, capacity underutilization. Our sample
data contain sufficient information with which to derive alternative TEIs under conditions
of full capacity and price-quality comparability. In Chapter 2 we noted the preferred
method to deal with the phenomenon of disequilibrium involves price adjustments.
However, in the case of capacity underutilization, our data allowed only quantity
adjustments. Specifically, we derived input and output estimates based on the estimated
input-output characteristics of the firm at full capacity. In turn, these data form the basis
for full-capacity TEIs. We asked entrepreneurs to estimate how much more output volume
(in percentage terms) they could produce with their existing capital equipment and how
many additional employees would be needed. We assumed that they would be able to sell
(contract) their additional output (workers) at the same price (wages) as existing output
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(workers). We expected that if firms had been able to operate at full capacity, levels of
efficiency for the sample would have been higher.
We took a similar approach to the issue of product price differentials. We asked
entrepreneurs to compare their products' price and quality with that of the competition. On
the basis of this comparison, we adjusted firm value added by the ratio of price over quality
comparisons with the competition . For firms charging lower prices for comparable
quality, this adjustment raised their value added by this ratio, in this case, greater than one.
We verified the entrepreneur's evaluation by estimating the price-quality ratio using our
own evaluation of firm quality with respect to competitors. This evaluation was based on a
composite technical competence score based on on-site evaluations of the technical
sophistication of the machinery, design and engineering capabilities, and organization of
production.
Each of these three scores are composite scores based upon a number of criteria.
The technical level considers completeness of machinery with respect to number of shops
and processes as well as the sophistication of this machinery in terms of its degree of
automation. The second score evaluates firm product design and engineering capability and
refers to three criteria: product-design capacity rates firms' abilities in drafting and design to
specification, engineering capacity rates their engineering/technical expertise in production,
and the link between design and production attempts to capture the degree of coordination
between demand, supply and production. The third score evaluates the firm on four
aspects of plant organization: plant layout, capital maintenance, quality control, and pre-
production planning.
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for these three scores. They show some
improvement over the years with continuing and significant differences by firm size as
measured by the number of employees. The industry differences in the technical level lend
further support to our estimation of separate frontier production functions. Although we
will discuss these trends below, in terms of improvement over the survey years, the most
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significant is that related to design and engineering capabilities. This reflects an increasing
professionalization of management and greater labor specialization.
TABLE 5.1
TECHNICAL COMPETENCE SCORES BY YEAR, INDUSTRY AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.)
Year and Basis All Industry Number of Employees
of Score Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
Technical level 6.7 7.6 5.4a 5.5 7.4 8.0b
(s.d.) (2.5) (2.4) (2.2) (2.5) (2.0) (2.4)
Design/Engineering 5.3 5.7 6.3 4.8 6.6 7.1a
(s.d.) (1.5) (1.6) (1.4) (1.0) (1.3) (1.3)
Plant Organization 7.3 7.5 7.1 5.9 8.0 8.lb
(s.d.) (1.8) (1.8) (2.4) (1.7) (2.8) (1.2)
1986:
Technical level 7.6 8.9 6.2a 7.4 7.0 9.6c
(s.d.) (2.3) (1.3) (2.4) (2.6) (2.2) (1.1)
Design/Engineering 6.7c 6.5 6.9 5.3 7.0 8.6a
(s.d.) (1.8) (2.0) (1.6) (1.1) (1.5) (1.5)
Plant Organization 7.8 7.1 8.4 7.1 8.1 8.2
(s.d.) (1.9) (1.8) (2.1) (2.3) (2.0) (1.1)
Agnicult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment. Scores: Technical level: a maximum 11
point score reflecting:(1) completeness of the machinery, i.e., number of shops and processes (3 points), (2)
sophistication of this machinery, i.e., manual to automated equipment (8 points); Design/Engineering: a
maximum 11 point score for (1) product design capabilities (4 points); (2) production engineering
capabilities (4 points), and (3) link between design and production (3 points); Plant organization: a
maximum 12 point score (3 points each) for: (1) plant layout, (2) capital maintenance, (3) quality control
and (4) pre-production planning. Means for given group (by year, industry and size) are significantly
different at the: a5 .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
By comparing the TEls under full capacity and price-quality adjustment against base
case TEls, we hoped to get an indication of the importance of these disequilibrium
conditions. By examining TEl differences across firms operating at full capacity we hoped
to distinguish between problems of low demand and recession from those of technical
inefficiency. Similarly, we expected that if firms' prices reflect quality differences, we
would be able to better distinguish technical efficiency from market power.
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A Disaggregated Approach to Measuring Capital and Labor
Although at the micro level we skirt the issue of aggregation across production
units, we still face the problems of unreliable data, particularly in the case of capital
measures. It is in this area of input measurement where our work presents a departure
from existing studies. The usual practice is to work from an aggregate estimate of the cost
of replacement of the total capital stock and to annualize it into a capital flow or rental price,
taking into account the years of useful life and the interest rate. Most studies assume a 15-
to-25-year life and a real cost of capital between 8% to 12%--frequently used
"guesstimates" in project evaluation studies. The CBI study attempted to estimate the
service life parameter more accurately by considering actual life of new versus used
machinery. Although they collected data on the interest rate offered in the capital markets
depending upon the source of financing (real rates varied from 2% to 12% depending on
the source--own, public or private bank, and supplier/moneylenders), as noted above, CBI
used shadow prices for TEI calculations.
We chose to follow Mohr's (1986) vintage rental price of capital formula described
in Chapter 2 and detailed in the Technical Appendix:
Pvt = qvt (ATRRvt + 5t)
subscripts v and t refer to the vintage and type of capital asset
where
qvt= asset price
8t = declining balance ratel mean service life = 1.65/msl
ATRRvt = after tax real cost of capital = rvt -iTvt
rvt= nominal after tax cost of capital
=vt wholesale price index for the output produced with the asset
This formula looks deceptively simple, however, each element is a weighted average of the
individual capital assets. Instead of a straight sum of the cost of the total capital stock used
in most studies, the characteristics of each individual element of the capital stock (i.e., its
price, service life, financing cost) are taken into account. In effect, the straight sum or
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aggregate measure assumes all capital is homogeneous. The disaggregated approach
suggested by Mohr weighs each element in accordance with index number theory to
account for differences in vintage for each type of asset that we would expect to affect that
asset's productivity. We identified two types of capital assets, machinery and buildings,
each requiring alternative assumptions about depreciation.
For a given type of capital asset, the formula for ryt is a weighted sum of the net
capital stock (in place in the base year chosen as 1970 and still in service in the current or
survey year) plus each year's stream of capital investments where the weights are the real
after tax cost of funds at the time of purchase (ATRRyr or rvr - ir where r refers to year
of purchase; see equation A. 1 in the Technical Appendix). The formula assures that all
costs of capital are decayed through the weighting scheme in which the importance of each
vintage's cost of capital decreases with age. This avoids the familiar problem of charging
historical capital unreasonable current rates; the recent cost of capital is more important in
determining the firm's overall opportunity cost of capital.
Using our estimates of mean service life and mean years in use or vintage, we also
derived the usual capital-input measure based on estimates of the aggregate capital stock.
This information, we expect, substantially improved these estimates. Rather than assume
universal parameters regarding depreciation we used those specific to the firm and the
sector. We applied an often-used formula for annualizing the capital stock into its flow or
rental price
rKd
PK =-(I+r)-n
where r = real interest rate = r- e
n = service life
Kd = K(1-3)v
K = asset price
5= depreciation = 1.65/mean service life
v= years in use
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A question of interest in this research is whether the more complex disaggregated measure
of capital yields different and more reliable results than unweighted or aggregate measures.
The zero-order partial correlation coefficient for 1977 is 89% (and significant at the .001
level) reflecting the common assumptions with respect to depreciation parameters. As we
move away from the base year, the different treatment of changes to the capital stock and
inflation reduce this correlation to 77% for 1986.
We also estimated two measures of labor to test the robustness of results. In
addition to total labor days for each of the survey years, we measured labor in efficiency
units or wage-weighted unskilled equivalent labor days. These two labor measures were
highly correlated at 86% (.001 significance level). By using basic daily wage rates as
weights (not including fringe benefits), which vary according to skill types, we expected to
pick up productivity differences related to the different skill mix across firms. Given the
decline and stagnation in real wages since 1977 due to inflation ( noted in the previous
chapter), CBI (1985) and Econometria (1989) regard that wage rates tended to follow real
productivity trends.
Specifying Production Characteristics
In addition to providing detailed information about the number and cost of different
categories of labor (managerial, administrative, technical, skilled, and unskilled) and capital
assets, these data provide insights in two other areas where there is seldom information.
First, our sample data provide a rather full description of the production process. They
allow us to quantify: the share of output produced on a unit-by-unit basis (as opposed to
production in batches or lots, or in series); the share attributed to the main product (a
measure of product specialization); the share represented by intermediate purchases; and the
share of output/inputs sold to/bought from other firms.
These production characteristics can capture a full range of production operations.
For example, at one extreme we find smaller firms whose production is on a unit-by-unit
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basis--often referred to as a discontinuous production process. As orders come in,
workers, organized with a low degree of task specialization, collaborate to produce the
given product until the next order is solicited. Product specialization may be low, imposing
the costs of diseconomies of scale and scope. The share of intermediates may be high,
reflecting a simple technology focusing largely on assembly. Accordingly, given the low
volume, but relatively diverse types of output, the firm probably does not participate in
either subcontracting for or to other firms, instead relying on direct consumer and
intermediate purchases. Some of these attributes were noted by Katz (1980, 1982) in his
characterization of the Latin American metal-mechanical sector, and more generally, by
Chudnovsky and Nagao (1983) in their review of capital goods production in developing
countries.
Second, we have a number of variables to describe the financial characteristics of
firms. We calculated an often-used measure of profitability, the price-cost margin (PCM)--
the excess revenues after covering variable costs. As Roberts (1989, p.23 ) notes, the
PCM reflects plant profits and payments to fixed factors, i.e., capital, so that "each plant's
PCM varies with the level of profits earned given demand conditions, plant efficiency, and
output market competition as well as a plant's capital intensity." As CBI (1987) confirmed,
we would also expect technical efficiency to be an important determinant of profitability.
Only in the case of highly noncompetitive and distorted markets, would we expect firm
efficiency not to be correlated with profitability. In addition, profitability is also influenced
by a variety of financial characteristics. Some of these include the real cost of capital
(ATTRvt above), the share of materials purchased on credit, the share of sales made on
credit, and the ratios of the stock of materials and finished products to sales. Again, in the
case of smaller firms, we expected these shares to be relatively low reflecting their greater
difficulty in obtaining credit for both fixed and working capital. Because of the small
amounts of credit, transactions costs for small firm borrowers are proportionately higher
than for large firms.
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PATTERNS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
In this section we describe the patterns of technical efficiency resulting from the
data and calculations discussed above. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, we will
examine three long-debated controversies: (1) the relationship between size, technical
efficiency and factor proportions, (2) the importance of managerial know-how to
production efficiency, and (3) the viability of the concept of technological progress in
developing countries. We will treat the first two issues in this section and discuss technical
progress in the next section.
Size, Technical Efficiency, and Factor Proportions
Most studies on the efficiency of manufacturing in developing countries focus on
firm size differences. One group tests the argument that the inward orientation of
developing countries encourages the growth of firms below minimum efficient scale. For
example, ongoing studies by Tybout et al. (1989) for Chile and Roberts (1989) for
Colombia using total factor productivity estimates (to trace efficiency improvements
through time) and production function estimation (to look specifically at the returns-to-scale
parameters) provide some support to this argument.
On the other hand, studies by Page (1984) and CBI (1987) compare firm-level
efficiency rankings to test the argument that smaller firms are efficient producers. In
comparison to large firms, small-is-beautiful advocates claim that smaller firms make use of
abundant labor supplies while saving on scarce capital. Although recognizing that size can
be measured by value of assets or sales, these studies use number of employees as a proxy
of firm size. As described in Chapter 3, Page (1984) finds that larger firms tend to be more
efficient and suggests that plant-scale economies operate in sophisticated metal-mechanical
industries such as machine tools. These findings are based on pairwise analysis of
variance of TEI rankings between the small firm group and other size classes. CBI do not
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find a similar systematic relationship between size and TEIs, but concede that capital
indivisibilities may explain high capital-output ratios for small firms in their metal-
mechanical sample. In the discussion below, we will first examine the relationship
between size and technical efficiency and then turn to the related issue of capital intensity.
The Relationship Between Size and TEIs
Table 5.2 presents our TEI results classified by year, industry, and firm size, as
measured by number of employees. We find no statistically significant differences across
size groups regardless of capital measure used (Table 5A. 1 in Appendix C confirms this
result in the case of the aggregate or unweighted labor measure). As noted above, CBI
(1987) also report a lack of association between size and technical efficiency for their 65
firm metalworking sample. However, Table 5.2 demonstrates that this is not the case
when we isolate the two industries (agricultural implements and industrial kitchen
equipment) common to our sample. CBI's TEIs for our common subsample show larger
firms as a group were significantly more efficient than smaller firms.
Our TEI data confirm that larger firms were able to maximize output to about 64%
of best practice. This compares with the sample average of about 56% to 58% of best -
practice output for 1977, with the more optimistic appraisal derived from our disaggregated
capital measure. This level of samplewide average efficiency is higher than comparable
estimates by CBI, although Spearman rank correlation coefficients of 62% and 66% (at the
.001 level of significance) show that CBI's and our TEIs are highly correlated. The
differences between our TEIs and those estimated by CBI are most evident in the case of
small firms; our TEIs portray a more efficient group on average. This reflects differing
measurement methodologies.
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TABLE 5.2
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY INDICES (TEI) BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM
SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percentages
with respect to the best-practice frontier
Year/ TEI All Industry Number of Employees
Measured with Firms Agricult. |Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
PKLUE 56 63 46b 56 48 64(s.d.) (28) (24) (31) (31) (27) (21)
p,-LUE 58 64 49c 55 54 65(s.d.) (28) (24) (32) (34) (23) (23)
CBI's pK-LUE 51 57 40b 41 53 64C
(s.d.) (28) (28) (26) (24) (26) (33)
1986 (current pesos):
PK-LUE 64 61 65Y 73 55 64
(s.d.) (25) (30) (18) (25) (23) (27)
pmt-LUE 63 61 64z 66 60 60(s.d.) (24) (28) (19) (23) (23) (23)
1986 (constant pesos):
PKLUE 58 60 52 59 54 67(s.d.) (24) (26) (22) (25) (24) (28)
p,-LUE 58 59 56 60 53 65(s.d.) (24) (26) (22) (26) (22) (29)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; Kitchens: kitchen equipment; pK: aggregate measure of capital flow;
LUE: labor in unskilled equivalent person days; pvt: disaggregated measure of capital services; CBI's TEI
estimates refer to those in Cortes, Berry and Ishaq (1985; printouts) based on 46 of the 50 firms common
to both samples. Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are significantly different at the:
a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level. Means by industry by year are significantly different at the: y=
.01 level; z= .1 level.
One possible explanation is that CBI's estimate of the rental price of capital included
working capital (measured as the sum of material and finished product inventories) and
ours did not. Nevertheless, and despite sample differences, Table 5A.2 in Appendix C
shows that our aggregate capital measure is only about 10% higher on average than CBI's.
The lower variance for our figures reflects a much more uniform sample having excluded
15 firms producing a variety of pumping/irrigation equipment and diverse agricultural
capital goods. CBI did not make use of the asset-specific information regarding vintage
and service life given their reliance on the traditional unweighted formula for annualizing
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capital stock estimates.1 In light of the positive relationship between firm size and
working capital demonstrated by CBI (1987, p. 1 17), we expected that exclusion of
working capital from our TEI calculations would favor larger firms. Comparison with CBI
results suggests this was not the case.
An alternative explanation for the different patterns in our and CBI's TEIs lies in the
calculation of the deterministic frontier whose main weakness is its reliance on a subset of
the observations. CBI do not report attempts to de-sensitize the frontier. This involves re-
estimating the frontier without the most efficient observations until parameter estimates
stabilize. We considered this an important step in light of the broad range of firms in the
sample; the more diverse the sample, the greater the problem of outlier data biasing the
frontier. By de-sensitizing the frontier, we seemed to have reduced the bias favoring the
largest firms. From the original CBI sample, we excluded a group of producers of varied
agricultural capital goods, mostly pumps and post-harvest equipment, thereby maintaining
a more homogeneous subsample.
TEI differences across the two industries fall in line with expected patterns. For
example, Table 5.2 shows that in 1977 kitchen equipment firms were busy meeting the
demand of the construction boom. Demand was strong and allowed this group to produce
on average less than half of best-practice output. As noted in Chapter 4, this demand was
fueling by channelling credit to housing; as a share of total institutional credit outstanding,
the construction sector claimed 27% of funds compared to 20% and 25% for agriculture
and manufacturing, respectively. Agricultural equipment producers, on the other hand,
were engaged in a competitive race as some of the largest and oldest firms located in the
industrial cities lost markets to smaller firms located in the richest agricultural areas.
1 CBI do not explain their assumptions on depreciation, and according to the formula they provide (CBI,
1987, p. 241) depreciation is not incorporated into their rental price of capital calculations. We should also
note that our labor estimate is about 18% lower, although our measurement methodology differed only
marginally from CBI's.
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By 1986, the average efficiency of surviving firms increased to over 60% of best-
practice output, although the patterns across industry and firm sizes vary depending on
whether measures are in current or constant pesos. Agricultural equipment producers
slipped slightly compared to the marked gains of kitchen producers. This is unexpected
considering that competition was keener in the former and the recession had a more
devastating impact in clearing out marginal firms (as described below). Nevertheless, the
gains in technical efficiency are corroborated by our evaluation of their technical
competence, specifically their organization of production. Table 5.1 shows that in terms of
plant organization, kitchen equipment firms registered greater gains . It appears that while
agricultural equipment producers focused on improving their capital equipment, as shown
by their technical level, kitchen equipment firms concentrated on improving plant
organization.
Survivors vs. Nonsurvivors
In Chapter 4 we described difficult economic conditions of the intervening period
between survey years. In 1977 firms had to fight hyperinflation. By 1986 hyperinflation
had not subsided, but firms had to face two additional challenges--the recession and stricter
control on traded inputs. It is no wonder that one-fifth of the original firm sample died in
this intervening period. These deaths were attributed mostly to plummeting demand in the
two waves of the recession. Not surprisingly, given the disarray in the financial sector, the
next most important reason was problems with debt. In addition to firm deaths,
nonsurvivors included 8 firms (16%) which ceased production and turned to repair and
retail activities. In terms of timing, firm deaths coincided with the first trough of the
recession beginning in 1981; firms performing marginally in 1977 were too weak to
survive.
An examination of death rates by industry shows that agricultural implements firms
were most severely affected, Whereas only one of the original 20 kitchen equipment firms
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died (a death rate of 5%), 9 of 30 or 30% of agricultural implements firms failed. This is in
line with overall industry trends as demonstrated by comparing 1977 and 1986 gross
output levels for the respective 4-digit ISIC aggregates. In agricultural machinery (ISIC
3822), real 1986 gross output was about one-half that registered in 1977. In kitchen
equipment (ISIC 3824,3829 and 3812), real 1986 gross output was 70% to 80% of 1977
levels depending on whether we use our implicit industry deflators or those published by
the Central Bank (see Technical Appendix and its Table A.3).
Our review of aggregate census data in Chapter 4 suggested that larger firms in
nonelectrical machinery appeared to have sustained heavy losses during the 1980s
recession; however, from our sample data, we find that survival was not systematically
related to firm size. Examining the differences between survivors and nonsurvivors, we
found nonsurvivors were less than half as productive in their use of capital and labor, and
their sales and value added averaged 45% and 38% that of survivors in 1977. On average,
surviving firms also had: a more stable labor force (mean years of production workers'
experience with the firm), a more experienced entrepreneur (years of experience in
production/administration), a higher ratio of skilled workers, a later vintage capital stock,
higher technical competence scores, and higher TEIs. These differences, however, were
not statistically significant.
Table 5.3 shows statistically significant differences between survivors and
nonsurvivors in 1977 according to two definitions of survival--survival in production and
survival in the industry. Even by the more stringent definition of survival in the industry,
single-factor productivity ratios for both capital and labor measures would have been good
predictors of firm survival into 1986.
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TABLE 5.3
DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS BETWEEN SURVIVORS AND NONSURVIVORS:
1977 SINGLE-FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in thousands of current pesos
Item compared across Survival in Production Survival in Industry
groups: Survivors Nonsurvivors Survivors Nonsurvivors
VA/pK 15.8 8.8b 17.9 7.5a
(s.d.) (15.2) (5.1) (15.9) (4.4)
VA/pyt 10.6 6.0b 12.3 4.7a
(s.d.) (10.9) (4.2) (11.3) (3.6)
VA/LUE 0.2 0.2b 0.3 0.la
(s.d.) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
VA/LPD 0.5 0.3b 0.5 0.3a
(s.d.) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1)
VA: Value added; pk: aggregate measure of capital flow; pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow; LUE:
labor in unskilled equivalent person days; LPD: labor in person days. Means of respective groups (by
definition of survival) are significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
Under the definition of survival in the industry, some TEIs registered significant
differences of means. This failure of our 1977 TEIs to predict survival consistently into
1986 reflects the reality that technical efficiency is but one aspect of firm performance. For
example, the TEI based on the disaggregated capital measure (pvt) and labor in unweighted
person days (LPD) showed survivors were 15% more efficient in 1977 than nonsurvivors
who averaged about 40% of the best-practice output. TEI results for the full-capacity and
quality-adjusted scenarios suggest that nonsurvivors had more fundamental problems than
those related to underutilized capacity or the lack of market power to charge prices
commensurate with their product quality. Even under full capacity and output market
conditions, nonsurvivors were less efficient than survivors in 1977. We turn first to the
issue of size and capital intensity and then to their relationship with other production
characteristics to sort out these other factors.
Size and Factor Proportions: Capital Indivisibilities
Our TEIs for both 1977 and 1986 show medium-scale firms tend to have the lowest
levels of technical efficiency of all size groupings. This difference, however, is much less
pronounced for TEIs based on the disaggregated capital measure (pyt-LUE in Table 5.2).
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On the basis of TEIs and capital-labor ratios, presented in Tables 5.2 above and 5A.3 in
Appendix C, we find no support for the argument that small firms tend to be labor intensive
and large ones capital intensive. For 1977 medium-scale firms are both the most capital-
intensive and least-efficient size group. By 1986 small firms show the highest capital
intensity yet they also tend to be very efficient. These data also show that larger firms
spread their capital over a larger number of workers so that, in fact, these firms cannot be
considered capital intensive.2 Apparently, technical efficiency is consistent with a full
range of capital-labor ratios. Echoing the findings by Little, Mazumdar and Page (1987),
our comparison of capital-labor ratios between survivors and nonsurvivors provides no
support for the argument that inappropriate factor proportions were linked to poor
performance. Regardless of the capital or labor measures used, differences in capital
intensity between survivors and nonsurvivors were slight; we could not reject the null
hypothesis of no difference between these groups.
Although CBI capital measures differ, they also conclude that small firms have high
capital-labor ratios providing evidence for the existence of capital indivisibilities. They note
that this pattern of capital intensity is related to firm growth; in the face of capital
indivisibilities firms grow into their equipment gradually adding more workers and thereby
lowering their capital-labor ratios (see Table 5A.3 in Appendix C). Our most capital-
intensive size group in 1977, medium-scale firms, were younger. By 1986, however, the
relationship between size, age, and capital intensity appears to have been disrupted by the
early 1980s recession and its contingent reductions in employment. The most capital-
intensive group in this later year, small firms, tended to be older with more experienced
entrepreneurs and older vintage capital equipment (see Table 5A.4 in Appendix C).
2 CBI (1987, p. 117) data on capital-labor ratios (measured as the total stock (not service flow) of fixed
capital per unskilled equivalent person day) show that medium scale firms have the lowest capital intensity,
followed by small firms, and that large firms are the most capital intensive. Even when we derived
comparable capital stock to labor ratios we confirmed the pattern we report above in the text.
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Size, Factor Proportions, and Other Production Characteristics
The production data in Table 5A.5 in Appendix C provide further signals as to the
reason behind the capital intensity of medium-scale firms in 1977. Compared to other size
groups, they had higher levels of primary product specialization, a higher degree of vertical
integration (as signalled by the low intermediates share or alternatively a higher share of
value added), together with a higher share of subcontracted output for other firms. Taking
advantage of the high growth economy of the late 1970s, these firms invested in capital
equipment. In order to maximize its use, they sought greater specialization and forward
linkages. In contrast, the largest firms, which tended to be the oldest both in terms of firm
age and capital vintage, registered the lowest capital-labor ratios, while producing a wider
range of products (mostly in batches or in series versus unit-by-unit) and subcontracting
inputs from other firms (see Table 5A.5 in Appendix C). Given their substantial capacity,
larger firms took advantage of this period of high growth to increase capacity utilization
through product diversification and some exporting as a way to break the limitations of
domestic market.
By 1986, after the recession took its toll, some of the capital-intensive medium-
scale firms had lost employment and thus fell to the ranks of small firms, making this the
more capital-intensive size group. To exploit their capital equipment, they increased their
subcontracting to other firms. Surviving large firms also lost employment, but found they
had to renovate a portion of their capital stock (as shown by the later vintage of capital of
this size group for 1986), move toward greater primary product specialization, and reduce
the share of intermediates as well as subcontracted inputs. This differential response to
sagging demand by firm size mirrors similar behavior noted by Scott (1983) in his study of
subcontracting linkages in the US garment industry; large firms tend to contract linkages
while small firms increase them to survive.
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The statistically significant differences between survivors and nonsurvivors are
presented in Table 5.4. These differences support the trends noted above. The death of
three large agricultural implements firms in the sample showed their failure to adjust their
organization of production to lagging demand; nonsurvivors' share of unit-by-unit
production was one-third that of survivors. More than firm size, we find that age of the
firm and the institutional learning this represented was important; nonsurvivors tended to be
younger. However, regardless of the definition of survival, nonsurvivors stand out for
their dependence on customer orders and lower profitability. This reliance on orders
reflected a shortage of working capital. Moreover, nonsurvivors also had greater
dependence on intermediate purchases yet a lower share of these purchased on credit than
survivors. In terms of profitability, given that our PCM is based on value added, lower
profitability equates with a higher labor share--the product not distributed to labor goes to
profits.
As we noted in the previous chapter, an important trend in nonelectrical machinery
was the reduction in labor's share. It appears that nonsurvivors' failure to follow these
sectoral trends was a factor in their demise. In 1977, a time of high aggregate demand,
almost three-quarters of entrepreneurs noted a problem with the cost of labor, while almost
half cited problems with labor tractability, such as union demands or threats of labor
unionization. By 1986 the recession had eased labor demands. For that year, less than a
third of surviving firms reported labor cost problems. The slack economy of this latter
period reduced the share of those reporting any kind of labor problems to less than one-
quarter from 90% in 1977. At the same time, shorter-term contracting as the predominant
type of labor contract increased from 28% to 39% of the sample. This was an effective
means of reducing labor costs; those with shorter-term contracting registered significantly
lower wage bills and fringe benefits.
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TABLE 5.4
DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS BETWEEN SURVIVORS AND NONSURVIVORS:
1977 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percentages unless otherwise noted
Item compared across Survival in Production Survival in Industry
groups: Survivors Nonsurvivors Survivors Nonsurvivors
Unit-by-unit Production 31 11C 28 26
(s.d.) (39) (31) (37) (42)
Intermediates Share 43 54b 43 49
(s.d.) (14) (12) (13) (14)
Sales by Order 56 80C 52 78b
(s.d.) (42) (34) (43) (32)
Materials on Credit 59 22b 57 41
(s.d.) (37) (41) (38) (45)
Price Cost Margin 61 51c 64 50b
(s.d.) (21) (19) (21) (18)
ATRRvt 6 4c 5 5
(s.d.) (3) (3) (3) (3)
Firm age (years) 15 lOc 15 13
(s.d.) (11) (7) (12) (9)
Labor Share of VA 39 49c 36 50b
(s.d.) (21) (19) (21) (18)
Capacity Utilization 81 66c 84 67b
(s.d.) (21) (27) (21) (23)
The first three items are expressed as a percentage of output; Price Cost Margin=(Value added-Total wage
bill)/Value added; VA- Value added; ATRRvt: after tax real cost of capital; capacity utilization=(actual value
added/full capacity value added). Means of respective groups (by definition of survival) are significantly
different at the:a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
Without complete quantity data on output as well as inputs to examine allocative or
price efficiency, we cannot definitively say whether small firms were overcapitalized.
Although technical efficiency tells us whether firms maximize output (i.e., are located on
the production surface), allocative efficiency verifies whether they use the cost-minimizing
mix of inputs (i.e., are located on the point of tangency with the isocost line defining the
trade-off between factors). Comparison of the after tax real cost of capital (ATTRvt; see
Table 5.6) suggests that large firms had higher costs, but we cannot claim that smaller more
capital intensive firms were encouraged to overcapitalize because of relatively cheap capital.
The evidence from Table 5.4 suggests that nonsurvivors' lower rates may have initially
made marginal investments feasible. However, the recession proved a more rigorous test,
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lending some support to those opposing preferential credit whose low rates make even
marginal investments appear feasible.
We tried to examine differences in capital intensity using multiple correlation
techniques. Table 5A. 6 in Appendix C presents the results of the estimated regression
models. The results are poor especially for 1977, but they tend to complement the patterns
we noted above. In the case of the capital-labor ratio based on the disaggregated capital
measure (pvt), size contributed to the explanatory power of the model, but its coefficient
was not statistically significant and the magnitude of the impact of size on capital intensity
minor. Other variables related to the organization of production and the capital-labor trade-
off were more important. For example, in line with expectations, the higher the share of
unit-by-unit production, the lower the capital intensity. Labor costs were also important.
Those entrepreneurs reporting labor cost as a problem did opt for more capital, and the
coefficient for the skill ratio variable suggests they tended to substitute capital for skilled
labor.
This complementarity of capital and unskilled labor echoes the findings by Little,
Page, and Mazumdar (1987, p. 170) discussed in Chapter 3. As these authors point out,
these findings are incompatible with recent empirical work based on aggregate
manufacturing sector production functions in LDCs. Rather they support historical studies
of productivity differentials between the United States and England demonstrating a higher
elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled than unskilled labor. Given the United
States' relative scarcity of skilled workers, it enjoyed a faster rate of capital deepening than
England. For 1977, 75% of entrepreneurs complained about the availability of skilled
workers. The most important determinant of capital intensity for both capital measures,
however, was the share of input costs subcontracted from other firms. As expected, the
greater the dependence upon the production of third parties, the lower the firm's capital
intensity.
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A surprising result from our attempts to explain the variation in 1977 capital
intensity is the positive impact of capital costs. Indeed, the three most efficient kitchen
equipment producers had high capital costs and high capital-labor ratios in relative terms.
As a result, they registered high labor productivity and in general paid higher wages for
skilled workers (though comparable wages for unskilled) than other firms. These same
patterns hold when comparing all kitchen equipment producers with those in agricultural
implements. Moreover, these patterns do not suggest that capital-intensive firms were
using inappropriate factor proportions implying a problem of allocative inefficiency.
Differences in factor prices were not significant.
For 1986 differences in factor prices were smaller than in 1977. The results from
the 1986 regression model reflect different considerations in the capital labor trade-off. As
noted above, the focus shifted away from labor to material inputs and capacity utilization.
Following our three kitchen equipment makers cited as most efficient in 1977, these firms
added employees thereby reducing their capital intensity. However, they continued to
define the best-practice frontier because of their ability to keep capacity utilization above
and materials inventory below the average.
These relationships and trends are confirmed from our analysis of the determinants
of technical efficiency. We estimated separate regression models for each survey year to
account for variations in slope, which were apparent in the matrix of correlation coefficients
and confirmed by the poor performance (F test results) of the model pooling data for both
1977 and 1986. Even a cursory look at the different conditions between survey years and
the changes in the surviving firms during this period would suggest pooling to be
inappropriate. Table 5.5 presents the best fit derived from our modelling efforts.
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TABLE 5.5
REGRESSION RESULTS: DETERMINANTS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
Standard Errors in parentheses
Ln TEl as dependent variable measured with LUE and:
Independent 1977 1986 1986(1977$P)
Variables Pk T t k T t k vt
Constant 0.14 0.17 -2.14a 0.30 -3.04a -3.00a
(0.59) (0.61) (0.55) (0.51) (0.70) (0.64)
D-industry dummy 0.28 0.35c -0.18
(agriculture=1) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13)
Intermediates share -2.20a -2.96a
(% of output) (0.64) (0.67)
Unit-by-unit prdtn. -0.67b -1.04a
(% of output) (0.22) (0.24)
CEO experience 0.23c
(ln of years) (0.12) (0.13)
Skill Ratio -0.53
(% skilled in prdtn) (0.35)
University dummy 0 3 7 b 0.32c
(attendance=1) (0.19) (0.19)
Vintage of capital 0.45b 0.16 0.39b 0.35b
(In of years) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15)
Technical level 0.81b
(% of top score) (0.34) (0.33)
Plant organization -0.67 -0.88c 0.98b 0.65c 0.56
(% of top score) (0.52) (0.54) (0.43) (0.40) (0.40)
Subcontracting -1.31c -1.29c
(% of output) (0.73) (0.76)
Capital labor ratio -0.21c -0.24b
(In pesos/worker) (0.12) (0.09)
Materials Stock -1.24b . 30 b . 5 4b .1 2 9 b
(% of sales) (0.52) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
R2 adjusted 0.52 0.64 0.47 0.31 0.52 0.54
N (observations) 34 34 23 26 23 23
F 6.16a 9.40a 7.54a 3.87b 5.81a 6.15a
1977$P- constant 1977 pesos; Ln: natural logarithm; Agriculture: agricultural implements; Pk:
aggregate measure of capital flow; Pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow; LUE: labor in unskilled
equivalent person days; Regression coefficients are significant at the: a-- .00 1 level; b= .0 1 level; c= .1I
level.
For 1977 we find that in the presence of other variables describing specific
production characteristics, neither firm size nor factor proportions were important in
explaining firm variations in technical efficiency. The most important variables, all exerting
a negative effect on technical efficiency, were the share of intermediates (that reduced the
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firm's value added), of unit-by-unit production (that reduced savings from even limited
labor specialization and imposed diseconomies of scope), and of output sold to other firms
(that exerted a similar and limiting effect as reliance upon orders in a time of high
demand). 3 The disadvantage of the discontinuous production process in both years is clear
from a comparison of the most and least technically efficient firms. The least efficient
produced almost the entirety of their output on a unit-by-unit basis. This translates into a
much higher labor share even with equal capital intensity.
For 1986 we can also conclude that firm size appears to have little impact on
technical efficiency. However, we found that for our constant peso (1977$P) models,
capital intensity, in part reflecting underutilized capacity, worked against technical
efficiency although with minor impact; a ten percent increase in the capital-labor ratio was
associated with a 2% decline in technical efficiency. Confirming our earlier findings
regarding the increasing difficulties in obtaining material inputs, the results for both capital
measures, deflated and in current pesos, show that the share of materials in stock exerted
the greatest negative effect on technical efficiency. As import controls tightened relative to
1977, firms significantly increased their material inventories (see Table 5A.7 in Appendix
C), and this reduced the efficiency of production. In 1977, half of the firms reported
material inputs problems; by 1986, two-thirds claimed this to be a serious difficulty,
although most found there was little they could do to mitigate the problem.
In terms of the increasing importance of flexibility in industrial competitiveness
pointed out by analysts such Sabel (1986), surviving firms proved their adaptability to
changing conditions. However, the costs of stockpiling materials imposed real losses in
terms of efficiency taking these Latin American firms further from the Japanese model of
3 We also tested variables representing the share of inputs brought from other firms and an overall linkage
variable (the sum of subcontracting to and for other firms), but these performed poorly. To test whether
these linkages were related to firm size, we introduced into the regression models interaction terms
representing these various forward, backward, or overall linkages with dummy variables for small, medium,
and large firms. This effort was unsuccessful, and we found no evidence of an association between firm size
and linkages. The failure of these results to support to our earlier statements on the differential response of
small vs. large firms to recession are related to the high degree of correlation among variables.
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just-in-time inventories and the tight network of firm subcontracting this model requires.
Flexibility was the key to the survival of one of our largest and most efficient agricultural
implements firms. Starting with over 80 employees, a majority skilled workers, this highly
profitable firm sold exclusively through distributors. By 1986, the firm was still quite
profitable with the same proportion of skilled workers. However, it was reduced to 18
employees, sold one-third of its output directly to consumers, shed some unprofitable
product lines while reducing its materials inventory. It had also changed management.
This is the subject of the next section.
The Problem of Managerial Know-How
Managerial know-how has been the focal point of efficiency measurement. It is the
input that has been considered in short supply in developing countries and refers to both the
technical and administrative aspects of managing production activities. The problem in
these countries lies not so much on the lack of trained personnel to fill managerial
positions, but rather on the incentives provided by the limited and protected markets. On
the one hand, managers insulated from competition will likely not put forth the same effort
as those motivated by it. On the other hand, even with some competition, in manufacturing
sectors characterized by a few large firms and many small ones, the costs of and access to
technical information will be even greater obstacles than in countries with less distorted
industrial structures. It is no wonder that a key element in many developing country
industrial policies has been the establishment of agencies to disseminate technical
information. For example, Page's (1980) study of the efficiency of Ghanaian firms in
timber-related industries concluded that training and extension programs for entrepreneurs
could produce substantial efficiency gains, even in the context of protected markets that
distorted factor proportions.
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Entrepreneurial Organizational Capabilities
Previous attempts to explain TEIs (such as by Page (1984) described in Chapter 3)
conclude that entrepreneurial and worker experience are the most important determinants of
technical efficiency. Our results support this conclusion to a limited extent. As shown in
Table 5.5, regression results for 1977 confirm the positive impact of entrepreneurial
experience (which included all relevant experience in the industry or as a user of its
products) and the more important role of university training.
By introducing our technical competence scores (for technical level or
sophistication, design and engineering capabilities, and plant organization presented in
Table 5.1) into the regression models, we tried to distinguish between the different, but
very specific production-related, capabilities proxied by variables such as CEO experience
or education. For 1977 we found that only plant organization contributed to explaining TEI
variation, though the negative sign of this coefficient was unexpected. A potential
explanation concerns the managerial hierarchy this variable may reflect; firms with the
highest scores for plant organization tended to have more management personnel. The
most efficient firms managed their operations with a small core of managers, often only the
entrepreneur and a plant foreman in the case of smaller firms.
By 1986, however, the recession brought leaner management and the plant
organization variable picked up the trends to rationalize production operations in an effort to
cut costs. Similarly, the technical level variable picked up the importance of fairly
complete, if not sophisticated, equipment. The aging of the two industries in the sample
brought about a greater professionalization of production operations, and, as a result,
entrepreneurial experience and education no longer contributed to explaining TEI variation.
In fact, in terms of their association with the TEIs, entrepreneurial experience like
age of firm registered negative zero-order partial correlation coefficients for 1986. Nine
years after the first survey, the average entrepreneur claimed almost 25 years of experience,
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and in terms of firm size, older entrepreneurs concentrated in smaller firms claiming almost
30 years of experience compared to 19 years for larger firm CEOs (see Table 5A.4 in
Appendix C). Furthermore, the percentage of entrepreneurs receiving additional training
(through participation in courses, workshops, seminars) dropped from almost half in 1977
to one-quarter in 1986. Most entrepreneurs did not keep up with new methods in the
technical or administrative area. Indeed, many entrepreneurs of all ages noted how tiring it
was just to keep their firms alive even after the worse of the recession. Three quarters
expressed a need for technical assistance, but slightly over 40% sought and received it, in
most cases, from the government training agency, SENA. It seems, then, the problem was
not the cost or availability of technical/managerial information, but of the entrepreneur's
time. Although in the long term such efforts would have been worthwhile, in the short
term their opportunity cost was unreasonably high given the immediate problem of
surviving the recession.
Labor-Force Characteristics
Worker experience, as measured by average years with the firm, was not correlated
with technical efficiency, contrary to Page's (1984) results. This variable showed little
variation across firms although in 1977 larger firms tended to have more experienced
workers. This probably reflected the greater difficulties of larger firms to avoid labor laws
protecting seniority. After the recession, this difference across size groups vanished. We
already noted the effects of the recession on labor: the decline in long-term contracts and the
reduction in labor's share in value added. Slack demand together with the burden of labor
legislation led firms to take drastic measures. For example, some medium-size firms, the
most susceptible to unionization or worker suits filed in the Ministry of Labor, temporarily
closed down their plant and set up separate companies to handle hiring.
In terms of other labor input measures, we found that the percentage of skilled
workers (whether as a percentage of production or total workers) showed a negative
- 111 -
correlation with technical efficiency. This perverse relationship suggests that firms found
to be efficient under our TEIs, achieved this efficiency with a relatively unskilled work
force. Those firms with higher participation by skilled workers and technical professionals
may simply not have learned to use their talents effectively. This is the case with firms
relying on unit-by-unit production processes. In terms of technical professionals, a key
argument in the flexible specialization literature is confirmed by entrepreneurs' complaints
of engineers who refuse to "get their hands dirty" on the shop floor.
The capital equipment available to workers may be the more important determinant
of technical efficiency. The key aspect of capital is vintage; later vintages embody the latest
technology. Unfortunately, existing TEI studies do not have data regarding the vintage of
capital. CBI in their analyses tested a variable representing the percentage of second-hand
equipment, but found little relationship with technical efficiency. Our vintage variable also
performed poorly in 1977 models but, contrary to our expectations, in the 1986 model,
contributed positively to technical efficiency; a 10% increase in the vintage of capital was
associated with an increase of about 4% in technical efficiency. We surmise that this
seemingly contrary evidence is because workers had more experience working with older
vintage machinery and this learning process was reflected in greater efficiency. These
results tend to support Pack's (1984) findings in his study of productivity in the Philippine
textile industry. He found that firms with newer equipment had lower relative efficiency
because of suboptimal usage--management and workers lacked the technical know-how or
experience to use this equipment efficiently. 4
4 Pack (1984) suggests that this is a problem of inappropriate factor proportions; firms miscalculate the
type and quality of inputs they will need, in the Philippine case the miscalculation involved spare parts.
This together with the negative impact of capital intensity on TEls (Table 5.5) provides a hint that for
those firms which renovated their capital stock, at least during the sluggish demand faced in 1986, capital
intensity aggravated the problem of lower capacity utilization.
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Patterns of Profitability
A critical element in firm performance is profitability and one of its leading
determinants should be technical efficiency. Indeed, under perfect competition the most
efficient firms should be the most profitable (setting aside the broader issue that under these
conditions profits should fall to zero in the long-run). Comparison of TEI patterns in Table
5.2 and those of the price cost margin (PCM)or profitability indicator, shown in Table 5.6
suggests this may be true. In general, technically efficient firms were also the most
profitable. The least efficient followed the pattern noted by CBI (1989) in which very
small firms (with fewer than 10 workers) managed by former blue-collar workers held on
to a marginal existence. These entrepreneurs value their independence and so apparently
underestimate the opportunity costs of their time. Table 5.6 also confirms the macro trends
noted in Chapter 4 with respect to the profitability decline and the increasing capital costs
between the two survey years.
TABLE 5.6
PROFITABILITY AND CAPITAL COSTS BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percent
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
PCM 59.3 60.4 57.6 51.4 62.0 69.0b
(s.d.) (20.8) (19.2) (23.4) (22.8) (16.0) (17.8)
ATRRvt 5.3 4.7 6.2c 5.4 5.0 5.5
(s.d.) (2.7) (2.9) (2.2) (2.8) (2.7) (2.7)
1986:
PCM 58.2 62.2 53.8 56.2 55.0 70.0
(s.d.) (18.0) (18.5) (17.1) (21.6) (15.5) (15.4)
ATRRvt 7.6a 7.0 8.2 7.1 7.1 9.6
(s.d.) (3.3) (3.2) (3.3) (2.8) (3.7) (3.1)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; PCM: price-cost margin=(Value added-
total wage bill)/Value added; ATRRvt: after-tax real cost of capital. Means for given group (by year,
industry, and size) are significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
When we examined the determinants of profitability, we found once again that firm
size contributed little when other variables representing production characteristics were
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present. As shown by regression model results in Table 5.7, TEIs alone accounted for
about half of PCM variation for both years. The TEI coefficient remained fairly stable
across years and alternative measures; a 1% increase in technical efficiency was associated
with an increase in profitability of .2%. On the other hand, other coefficients were not so
stable. For example, longer-term labor contracts, despite their higher costs, added to 1986
profitability. Although labor stability proved unrelated to our TEIs, this surprising
association with profitability may reflect the administrative costs imposed by worker
turnover.
TABLE 5.7
REGRESSION RESULTS: DETERMINANTS OF PROFITABILITY
Standard Error in parentheses
PCM as dependent variable regressed on Ln TEI based on LUE and
Independent 1977 1986
Variables Pk Pvt Pk Pvt
Constant 0.61a 0.54a 0.46a 0.37a
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
Labor Contract -0. 15 b 0.08b
(longer term=1) (0.05) (0.04)
Quality premium 0.07 0.11b
(adjusted/actual) (0.06) (0.05)
Ln TEI 0.25a 0.20a 0.28a 0.27a
(see column head) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Technical level 0.26a 0.32a 0.19b 0.26b
(% of top score) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Design/Engin. level 0.20c 0.33b
(% of top score) (0.12) (0.14)
R2 adjusted 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.56
N (observations) 50 50 26 26
F 18.76a 22.83a 14.94a 11.48a
PCM: price-cost margin=(Value added- total wage bill)/Value added;Ln- natural logarithm; LUE- labor in
unskilled equivalent person days; pK: aggregate measure of capital flow; pvt: disaggregated measure of
capital flow; Quality Premium, see Table 5.11; Regression coefficients are significant at the:a= .001 level;
b= .01 level; c= .1 level. Other financial characteristics tested are in Table 5A.7 in Appendix C.
The importance of the firm's design and engineering capabilities reflect two trends:
first, the professionalization of management noted earlier, and second, increased marketing
efforts. During the high demand of 1977, 40% of firms made no specific marketing efforts
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relying exclusively on word of mouth. By 1986 less than a quarter continued to rely on
their clients for advertising.5
THE EVIDENCE ON TECHNICAL PROGRESS
In order to examine the movement of the best-practice frontier, we followed the
Nishimizu and Page (1982) methodology of pooling both year's data and minimizing the
error or technical inefficiency term across years as well as firms. The reliability of the
resulting estimates, shown in Table 5.8, hinges upon the accuracy of the implicit deflators
used to adjust output and inputs (see Technical Appendix). The figures in the table lend no
support to the claim of technological decline in the case of these two industries.
TABLE 5.8
POOLED TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY INDICES (TEI) BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND
FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percentages with respect to the best-practice
frontier
Year/ TEI All Industry Number of Employees
Measured with Firms Agricult. I Kitchens 1-20 21-40 1 41+
1977:
PK-LUE 39 45 31b 42 33 41
(s.d.) (22) (19) (24) (24) (18) (21)
p,-LUE 37 41 31c 35 34 43(s.d.) (21) (18) (24) (24) (16) (20)
1986 (constant pesos):
PK-LUE 45 55 36c 49 39 57(s.d.) (28) (28) (27) (34) (20) (39)
pa-LUE 45 56 35c 46 41 59
(s.d.) (31) (30) (28) (38) (22) (37)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; PK: aggregate measure of capital flow;
pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow; LUE: labor in unskilled equivalent person days; pvt:
disaggregated. measure of capital flow. Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are
significantly different at the: a=.001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
Comparing the above table with the base case TEls in Table 5.2 shows that
although kitchen equipment firms significantly increased average efficiency in 1986, the
5We did not have data to quantify firmns' marketing efforts. Part of the problem was the wide variation
among those firms doing nothing, those doing some advertising (in newspapers and trade publications), and
those hiring full-time salespeople.
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frontier firms in this second year only slightly pushed out the best-practice frontier.
Agricultural equipment producers demonstrated clearer gains despite the devastating effect
of the recession on this industry (see Table 5A.8 in Appendix C). To examine this
relationship more systematically we estimated regression models to "explain" changes in
technical progress across firms. Table 5.9 presents our results in explaining the variation
in the level of technical progress (pooled TEI) for 1977 and 1986 and the changes between
these two years. In the context of technical progress, the model of the 1986-1977 changes
is the most meaningful because it looks at the changes in the best-practice frontier. It
shows that cumulative efficiency improvements as well as entrepreneurial efforts helped to
push out the frontier. The importance of static efficiency in the initial year to dynamic TFP
gains confirms similar findings by Caves and Barton (1990).
We tested a variety of proxies for entrepreneurial effort, including changes in
product design, additional training, and recourse to different sources of information or
technical assistance by the entrepreneur, most of which abated with the demands for
survival in the recession. The two proxies that did contribute to the explanatory power of
the regression model were changes in production method and in technical level. Changes
in technical level, reflecting improvements in terms of the completeness and sophistication
of machinery, performed better than variables specifically quantifying the replacement rate
of capital assets (net change in capital stock as a percentage of total 1986 capital stock; see
Table A.4 in the Technical Appendix) or the changes in factor proportions. Changes in
production reflected improvements in processes, particularly their rationalization. Between
the survey years, there was a shift from increasing mechanization reported by the majority
in 1977 to reorganization of production.
We also included in the 1986 and 1986-77 models a dummy variable denoting
change in the primary product to pick up the changes in production this may require and the
potential biases from our implicit output deflators derived from incomplete price and
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quantity data. The efficiency losses caused by such dislocation are illustrated in table
below.
TABLE 5.9
REGRESSION RESULTS: DETERMINANTS OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS
Standard Errors in parentheses
Pooled Ln TEI as dependent variable based on LUE and
Independent 1977 1986 Changes 86-77*
Variables Pk T Pvt Pk I pvt Pk pvt
Constant -0.52a -0.48a -0.37 -0.75c -0.03c -0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.36) (0.48) (0.07) (0.06)
TEI 0.88a 0.96a 1.15a 1.19a 0.16 0.45a
(In for 1977,1986) (0.06) (0.04) (0.22) (0.29) (0.11) (0.12)
ATRRvt -0.02c
(percentage) (0.01)
Design/Engineering 0.36 1.13
(% of top score) (0.55) (0.75)
Technical level 0.19b 0.24a
(% of top score) (0.07) (0.06)
Product design 0.13c 0.12b
(change=1) (0.07) (0.06)
Primary product -0.14 -0.29 -0.15b -0.l 7 b
(change=1) (0.17) (0.23) (0.07) (0.06)
Production method 0.16b 0.10
(change=1) (0.08) (0.07)
R2 adjusted 0.82 0.93 0.55 0.46 0.29 0.46
N (observations) 50 50 27 27 26 26
F 115.27a 202.87a 11.44a 8.32a 5.52a 10.70a
* Dependent variable not logged and independent variables refer to 1986-77 changes; Ln: natural
logarithms; LUE: labor in unskilled equivalent person days; pk: aggregate measure of capital flow; pvt:
disaggregated measure of capital flow. Regression coefficients are significant at the: a= .001 level; b= .01
level; c= .1 level.
These results are confirmed by examining those firms that pushed out the best-
practice frontier. In the case of agricultural-implement producers, two very different firms
were responsible for this technical progress. The first employed 90 employees compared
to 12 for the second and produced over 10 times the latter's sales volume. Neither of these
firms produced on the frontier in 1977, but the changes they instituted since then were key.
The large firm began to take the competition from smaller firms more seriously after
witnessing the decline of one of Colombia's oldest and largest machinery producers.
Instead of continuing the practice of price leadership (exerted by the larger older firm just
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cited), the managers of this large firm reduced management layers, realigned its product
prices with those of smaller competitors, and initiated an aggressive advertising, sales and
service campaign through its distributors. These changes were implemented by a new
CEO, who unlike his predecessor, managed to restore peace with the firm's labor union.
The small 12 worker firm, basically a family operation, stands out as unique for its
purchase of programmable second-hand equipment. The purchase and successful
incorporation of this equipment were no doubt due to the tireless efforts of the entrepreneur
(as leader of a cooperative of small and medium scale firms to improve their access to
capital and material inputs), his wife (as accountant and sole marketing expert), and their
son (as plant foreman responsible for adapting the new machines to the firm's operations).
In addition, we must note that in this decision to increase automation, substitution of skilled
labor was a consideration. This firm reported its reluctance to increase employment for fear
of the costs of labor legislation and scarcity of responsible competent workers. This is a
clear example where programmable equipment vitiated the traditional trade-off between
flexibility and the low-cost high-productivity associated with automated high volume
production. This type of equipment is rare in Colombia and most entrepreneurs still
considered this an alternative for only the largest producers.
The frontier firms among kitchen equipment producers were also represented by a
small (10 employees) and a large firm (57 employees), but they used different strategies
from those detailed above. The small firm defined the best-practice frontier in 1977, grew
to 31 employees by 1986, but despite its attention to pre-production planning remained on
the frontier only under the full-capacity and price-quality comparability alternatives. What
was a very complete capital stock in the first survey year remained essentially unchanged
by the second. The large firm also increased its employment over the survey years, but
managed to push out the frontier. It renovated some of its equipment to accommodate a
larger workforce, but exercised strict control over its workers by paying them in
accordance with their output. All frontier firms in both industries focused on containing
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unit costs to be able to offer lower product prices. For kitchen equipment firms, this
seemed the sole objective; they made no conscious efforts to improve upon the techniques
currently used in their production, claiming they were well tested and routine.
The strategy toward decreasing labor demands and associated costs was a common
feature not only of frontier firms but also of surviving firms as we noted earlier. Although
real wages made slight gains, as shown in Table A.3 in the Technical Appendix, workers'
relative power declined during the survey period. Only in the case of production workers
in the large agricultural frontier firm did union negotiation assure substantial increases in
fringe benefits and smaller job losses relative to management. However, even in this case
Colombian workers lost out by this firm's decision to set up a plant in Ecuador rather than
continue to export. In terms of the future competitiveness of Colombian industry, this
strategy and the general climate of labor-management confrontation, will present further
obstacles to achieving the productivity standards of the model of flexible specialization with
its reliance on shop floor cooperation.
Finally, with respect to the hypotheses about firm size and managerial know-how,
once again we found that size was not systematically related to technical progress nor was
such progress correlated with specific managerial capabilities. Similarly, factor proportions
were not systematically related to technical efficiency. More important were the
characteristics of the organization of production and the firm's ability to adjust them to
changing circumstances. TEI rankings for 1986 were not significantly different from those
for 1977. Although the firms defining the frontier changed in the case of the more
competitive agricultural equipment market, efficient and inefficient firms tended to remain at
the top and bottom, respectively, of the distribution of TEI rankings across the survey
years.
- 119-
EVALUATION OF MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGIES
In Chapters 2 and 3 we discussed the potential biases introduced by capacity
underutilization and non-competitive markets. Although we have touched on these issues,
in this section we briefly evaluate the adjustments applied in this study. This evaluation
entails a comparison of TEI patterns for the base case with those generated by correcting
for each of these disequilibria. We also evaluate the gains from disaggregation by
comparing the alternative measures of capital and labor, unweighted versus weighted.
Prices Under Disequilibrium
We expected our admittedly second-best adjustments to show that TEIs would
improve as firms moved to operate at full capacity, on one hand, and charge prices
commensurate with their quality, on the other. In both cases average technical efficiency
declined. In the case of quality correction, comparing base case and quality-adjusted TEIs
for 1977 shows that while average efficiency declined, this decline was greatest for kitchen
equipment and medium-scale firms (see Table 5.2 above and Table 5A.9 in Appendix C).
These trends are understandable for the latter size group because they already enjoyed
price-quality comparability in 1977 (see Table 5A. 11 in Appendix C). By the same token,
we expected that because of their high quality premia, the average efficiency levels of
kitchen equipment would rise rather than fall after adjustment. In fact, with respect to best
practice average output levels fell by 8%-16% with the higher figure corresponding to TEIs
based on the aggregate capital measure. A possible explanation is that those with the higher
quality premia were not the most efficient (according to our base case TEIs) producers,
i.e., those defining the production frontier. Instead, the latter were penalized (or more
accurately, not favored by the quality premium because they were close to price-quality
comparability) and consequently brought down average efficiency levels for that industry.
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In the case of the capacity utilization adjustment we find once again that the gains in
efficiency of those most affected by disequilibrium did not compensate for the losses of
those less affected, but more efficient (see Tables 5.2 above and 5A.10 in Appendix C).
Samplewide, capacity utilization fell from 78% to 60% between the survey years (see Table
5A. 12 in Appendix C). Kitchen firms experienced the steepest decline, but agricultural
equipment producers registered the lowest absolute levels. The TEIs based on the
disaggregated capital measure show that these firms would have averaged about 7% greater
output under full capacity.
By 1986 price-quality distortions and their dispersion across firms was down to a
minimum; compared to less than 20% in 1977, about half of the surviving firms in both
industries felt their prices were in line with their product quality. This reduction in firm
market power exercised through product prices is confirmed by Table 5.11 which
compares the rankings of base case and price-quality corrected TEIs. In contrast, capacity
underutilization became a problem in 1986; the Spearman rank coefficients for 1986 full
capacity and base case TEIs registered the lowest correlation among the comparisons
presented.
TABLE 5.11
COMPARISON OF BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE TEIS
Spearman rank correlation coefficients (in percent)
Base case vs. Price-quality Base case vs. Full Capacity
corrected TEIs TEIs
Year/ Item pK-LUE T pt-LUE pK-LUE pt-LUE
TEls:
1977 84a 72a 88a 84a
1986 95a 78a 54a 35
Pooled TEIs:
1977 94a 90a 92a 88a
1986 96a 94a 68a 68a
PK: aggregate measure of capital flow; pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow; LUE: labor in unskilled
equivalent person days. Spearman's r is significant at the: a= .001 level.
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Gains from Disaggregation of Labor and Capital
Earlier in this chapter we explained the rationale behind disaggregation and noted
that although widely accepted for labor there are no comparable applications, except the
present, for capital. In spite of the very different formulas for the aggregate (pK) and
disaggregated (pvt) measures of the rental price of capital, we reported zero-order partial
correlation coefficients of 88% and 77% for 1977 and 1986, respectively. This high
correlation demonstrates the beneficial impact of using more accurate data (rather than
universal assumptions) regarding mean service life and vintage in the aggregate capital flow
formula, thereby producing an improved aggregate measure. We suspect that even when
detailed information by individual asset is unavailable, estimated averages of these two
parameters for machinery and buildings would represent an improvement upon universal
assumptions.
We consider more important a comparison of the results of manipulating alternative
measures than comparisons of the values of these measures. Table 5.12 illustrates the
corresponding Spearman rank and zero-order partial correlation coefficients for two
important variables used in this study: TEIs and capital-labor ratios.
The correlations are fairly high once again. For the base year 1977, it appears that
if we decide to apply the disaggregated labor measure (LUE), even in the case of metal-
mechanical industries where capital needs are demanding and indivisibilities apply, an
improved aggregate capital measure would not yield substantially different results. This is
confirmed by the results of our regression models; in the TEI, capital intensity, PCM and
pooled TEI models, the coefficients are quite similar. Only if we consider the goodness-of-
fit indicators (the R2 adjusted and the F statistic) can we conclude that our disaggregated
capital measure (pvt) performs somewhat better.
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TABLE 5.12
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL AND LABOR MEASURES
Correlation coefficients (in percent)
Comparison of PK vs. Pvt Comparison of LUE vs. LPD
measured with measured with
Year/Item LUE LPD K Pvt
Spearman rank for TEIs:
1977 92a 84a 83a 89a
1986 (current) 77a 81a 808 87a
86-77 change 71a 72a 65a 84a
Zero-order partials for capital-labor ratios:
1977 88a 878 98a 98a
1986 (current) 71a 98a 59a 53b
1986 (1977$P) 77a 98a 59a 91a
86-77 % change 66a 648 56a 97a
pK: aggregate measure of capital flow; pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow; LUE: labor in unskilled
equivalent person days; LPD: labor in person days; 1977$P: 1977 constant pesos. Correlation
coefficients are significant at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level.
As we move away from the base year, however, the problems of aging and
incorporating real additions/deletions to the capital stock became issues of concern in the
choice of alternative capital measures. The table above shows a fairly steep drop for 1986
in rank correlation of current peso TEIs based on aggregate versus disaggregated capital
measures. The same holds true for current peso capital-labor ratio measures. On the other
hand, the two capital measures are more highly correlated in their constant peso
formulation, but the 1986 models based on pvt slightly outperform those based on PK. In
the case of pK, we used the published deflators to deflate 1986 replacement costs. For pvt
we had enough information from entrepreneurs to age the capital stock incorporating
additions and deletions in terms of their 1977 replacement costs. The additional
information on 1986 replacement costs allowed us to derive the implicit deflators, which
we then compared against those published by the Central Bank (see Table A.3 in the
Technical Appendix).
As the above table shows, the differences between capital measures are magnified
when we compare 1986-77 changes in TEIs and capital-labor ratios. By examining the
individual cases or firms for which alternative measures of capital-labor ratios differ most,
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we can piece together the source of these differences. Alternative estimates of changes in
capital intensity differ the most in those cases where changes in capital equipment have
involved sophisticated or used machinery. The pK measure will underestimate the change
in the case of sophisticated machinery for which appreciation has been greater compared to
more simple equipment. It will overestimate the change involving used machinery for
which depreciation has been greater compared to new equipment. Even this improved
aggregate measure averages out the capital changes based on universal deflators and
averages for mean service life and vintage.
Table 5.12 also illustrates that the biggest differences between alternative measures
show up between wage-weighted (LUE) and unweighted (LPD) labor measures when
combined with aggregate capital (pK). When combined with pvt, resulting estimates are
quite comparable. It is as though changes in capital overshadowed changes in labor which
were almost uniformly towards a reduction of workers and/or hours worked and of the
differential between unskilled and other production workers wages, thereby reducing the
differentials between the two labor measures.
CONCLUSIONS
Our research used the tools of efficiency measurement to examine patterns of
efficiency in two Colombian metal-mechanical industries. We used firm TEIs to test
hypotheses regarding the characteristics of firms in developing countries with long histories
of import substitution. First, we found no systematic relationship between technical
efficiency nor technical progress and firm size. This suggests that the issue is not that
small or large is efficient, except in the case of the very small which fall below minimum
efficient scale for these industries. There are a range of plant scales consistent with
technical efficiency. In other words, within a given technology (what is referred to as the
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ex-ante choice) there is flexibility allowing a range of factor proportions (ex-post) and types
of plant organization.
Although the patterns of capital-labor ratios support the existence of capital
indivisibilities, we could not conclude that differences in factor proportions were potential
causes of technical inefficiency. In the second survey year, capital intensity was associated
with lower TEIs, but this reflected the severe problems of capacity underutilization
affecting both industries.
Second, the most important determinants of technical efficiency change with market
circumstances. In the first survey year we found that the entrepreneur's experience and
education were key variables. By 1986 with the maturing of both industries and the trial by
fire represented by the recession, the general level of managerial know-how had increased
and more specific production-related capabilities and efforts became important. Most
important, however, were the difficulties in obtaining material inputs whose stockpiling
imposed real efficiency losses and took Colombian firms further away from the ideal of the
flexible specialization model and its reliance on just-in-time inventories.
Another obstacle to the achievement of this ideal was presented by a survival
strategy based on labor discipline as firms pursued short-term goals of cutting costs. The
recession provided an opportunity to reduce employment as well as labor's share. Without
doubt, the impact of this antagonistic labor-management relationship will have
repercussions for future productivity gains.
Third, our examination of productivity changes provided no evidence of technical
regress in these industries. The firms who pushed out the best-practice frontier were
represented by small as well as large firms and their strategies reflected different industry
conditions. The death of one-third of the agricultural implements firms in the sample led to
a modest renovation of its capital stock. The retreat from trade liberalization did not put an
end to competition, but rather an end to the cut-throat price wars of the 1970s between
small and large long-established firms. For kitchen equipment firms recession signalled the
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closing of only one firm, but the reduced demand of the 1980s brought on a competitive
race for customers that focused firm strategies on cutting costs.
Nevertheless, we also found that TFP gains across survey years was strongly
associated with firm relative technical efficiency in the initial survey year. This suggests
that static efficiency in one period strongly affects dynamic productivity gains in the future.
We would expect, therefore, that agricultural implements producers will in the future once
again show greater TFP gains relative to kitchen producers. The latter have focused on
cost-cutting and see any further improvements in technique as unwarranted by current
market conditions.
Fourth, in terms of measurement methodology, we found that the comparison of
base case and adjusted TEIs yielded unexpected results. Although we had evidence that
capacity underutilization and non-competitive product pricing were market factors in 1986
and 1977, respectively, we found they did not significantly bias technical efficiency and
TFP estimates. For inefficient firms affected by these market factors, we found these were
not the only causes of their relative inefficiency; in the absence of this disequilibria, they
were still disadvantaged by more fundamental problems. For example, in the case of the
full capacity adjustment, our examination of their answers suggests that those entrepreneurs
most affected by underutilization may not have correctly evaluated the costs of higher
utilization of their capital equipment. In part, this reflected their interpretation of the full
capacity question as an inquiry into the technical limits of their equipment thereby skewing
estimated input mixes.
In terms of the measurement of capital and labor, we found that the gains from
disaggregation were confirmed by a slightly better fit of regression models. Our evaluation
of the traditional aggregated and the data-intensive disaggregated measure of capital yielded
no significant differences although our aggregated measure benefitted from specific
information regarding vintage and service life. If we compare even our improved measure
aggregated capital measure with CBI's version, we do note significant differences leading
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to very different patterns in capital-labor ratios. However, the demands of disaggregation
are directly related to the heterogeneity of inputs and outputs.
We leave the policy implications and new research questions to be addressed for the
next and final chapter.
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have organized this chapter into four sections. The first sets out the purpose
and hypotheses of the research described in the preceding chapters. The discussion then
turns to a brief review of the approach and methodology we chose to guide our hypotheses
testing, including an explanation of how we dealt with the practical difficulties of
operationalizing the methods described in Chapters 2 and 3. In the third section we report
the results of our analyses and compare them to similar studies, including the Cortes, Berry
and Ishaq (CBI, 1987) work which provided the base year data for our 1977-1986
comparison of firm performance. We conclude by examining the policy implications of our
results and suggesting new directions for future research.
PURPOSE OF RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES TESTED
The focus of this research was to examine and quantify as accurately as possible the
changes in productivity in two metal-mechanical industries. Through these changes in
productivity we traced the changes in the relative efficiency of firms and by comparing the
movements of those firms defining best-practice production techniques we traced technical
progress. The purpose of this study of efficiency and technical change was, first, to be
able to evaluate firm economic performance, and second, to uncover what firm strategies
made for success or failure in difficult market circumstances. The ways firms managed the
limitations and opportunities presented by the production environment would identify those
policies most, or, alternatively, least supportive of efficiency in production.
The literature on productivity measurement in LDCs has focused on the interrelated
issues of firm size, efficiency, and factor proportions. In many cases the industrial
structure established under import substitution has led to a skewed size distribution of firms
characterized by few large and many small firms. Such a skewed distribution cannot be
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justified by small domestic markets alone. The controversy lies in how these firms are
evaluated; namely the arguments focus on why large or small firms are more efficient. On
one hand, large firms exploit economies of scale whereas the small fall below the minimum
efficient scale. In spite of their scale inefficiency, these small firms survive, however,
because of limited import competition. On the other hand, many argue that because they
save on scarce capital and make use of abundant LDC labor supplies small firms are
allocatively efficient. Their factor proportions reflect the relative scarcities in developing
economies. Large firms, in contrast, respond to the distorted incentives of protectionist
policies and can be neither allocatively nor scale efficient--they are too capital intensive and
their scale of operations too large for the domestic LDC market.
Moreover, without the incentives of competition, LDC managers fail to produce the
maximum with given inputs. Even if they purchase inputs in the correct proportions, they
fail to use them optimally because they lack the training or motivation to keep up with
technical and administrative methods. Usually, this problem of technical inefficiency is
traced to the lack of training for small firm managers and to a lack of motivation for those in
large firms. Recently, attention has focused on another aspect of managerial capabilities.
Given the instability of markets, some claim small firm managers are more flexible or
adaptable because they are unencumbered by internal bureaucracies and rigid labor
contracts. Nevertheless, large firm managers can draw upon greater resources with which
to weather changing market conditions. These characterizations of small versus large firms
are an empirical matter and form the first group of hypotheses we tested.
The second set of hypotheses focused on technical progress. The difficulties faced
by most Colombian firms in the 1980s led some analysts to claim technical stagnation in the
face of recession, trade restrictions, and financial crises. Firm survival strategies had to
focus on cost-cutting, setting aside for more propitious times specific efforts towards
technical improvements. If we extrapolate efficiency at a given time to future gains in
productivity, these dynamic losses would set Colombia further behind international best
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practice. An alternative interpretation focuses on the salutary effects of the increased
competition accompanying reductions in aggregate demand. In order to survive, firms are
forced towards greater efficiency and thereby necessity becomes the catalyst for technical
progress.
We chose to focus our empirical efforts on the metal-mechanical sector because it
most closely corresponds to the usual definition of the capital goods sector. Although the
industries we studied, agricultural and kitchen equipment, represent the beginnings of a
capital goods sector in Colombia, their experience offers an indication of how the country
might fare with more sophisticated industries in this sector during later phases of its
technological development.
APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
In order to quantify relative efficiency levels across firms and productivity
improvements in time, we chose the firm as our unit of analysis. Increasingly, even in
studies of industrial structure, firm-level data are being used to avoid confusing the various
and interrelated characteristics of production--bias, elasticity, scale, efficiency, and
homotheticity. These are the basic concepts of neoclassical production theory which guide
most production function estimation and analyses. On one hand, these analyses tell us
whether our assumptions about the underlying production technology are correct. They
quantify the technical characteristics of production with respect to the average production
function. In the case of efficiency, this average is not particularly useful as a benchmark
for evaluating firm performance. For this purpose we need a tool that will get us closer to
the true meaning of the production function which defines the different input combinations
that can produce maximum output. The tools of efficiency measurement, specifically the
frontier production function, provide the appropriate benchmark by allowing us to quantify
firm efficiency with respect to the best-practice frontier.
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In Chapter 2 we reviewed neoclassical models that attempt to decompose
productivity change into improvements in the use of factors, and the unexplained TFP
residual we interpret as technical change. In addition to TFP refinements concerning
disaggregation, the measurement of capital, and adjustments for disequilibrium conditions,
we explained in Chapter 3 how frontier methods further decompose the TFP residual by
accounting for errors in optimization. Indeed if markets were perfect and technology and
information freely accessible, we would not need to worry about such errors. Prices
would provide correct signals to direct the use of factors and informed or unmotivated
managers would be replaced. However, our analysis in Chapter 4 of the context in which
Colombian metal-mechanical firms operate suggested errors in optimization are likely to be
very important. Even our limited review of frontier studies in Chapter 3 demonstrated that
errors in optimization are important in Colombia, India as well as the United States.
With limited data, the diagnosis of these errors is not simple since there are three
types of errors in optimization manifest at the firm level and their origins lie in the
interrelated technical characteristics of production. Our empirical work focused on
technical inefficiency and used technical efficiency indices (TEIs) to examine the other two
types of errors--scale and allocative inefficiencies. Once calculated, our firm efficiency
rankings allowed us to investigate the relationship between technical efficiency, size and
factor proportions. Most frontier studies focus on the relationship between size and TEIs
which involves testing hypotheses concerning issues of scale--the existence of capital
indivisibilities and/or economies of scale. A few frontier studies also examine the
relationship between factor proportions and TEIs to study allocative inefficiency. Our
frontier study has taken efficiency analysis one step further by attempting to account for
disequilibrium conditions. Specifically, we analyzed the impact on TEIs of distortions in
product pricing and the other source of price or allocative inefficiency, capacity
underutilization.
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With frontier methods we quantified errors in optimization and examined the
relative efficiency of small versus large firms. In order to estimate firm-specific efficiency
rankings we applied deterministic frontier methods using linear programming. By pooling
data from both survey years we estimated the shifts in the best- practice frontier over these
years to derive estimates of technical progress. The main disadvantage of the deterministic
frontier is that it attributes all deviation from the frontier to technical inefficiency. By not
allowing for random error, these frontiers yield upper-bound estimates of inefficiency, a
fact which must be kept in mind when interpreting resulting TEIs. Another important
disadvantage is the sensitivity of the deterministic frontier to extreme or outlier data. We
have tried to mitigate this by re-estimating the frontier without the most efficient
observations until frontier parameters stabilize.
Although our sample was small, beginning with 50 firms in 1977 and following up
with 27 firms in 1986, we calculated two separate Cobb-Douglas production frontiers for
the two industries included, agricultural and kitchen equipment. Despite their common
classification within metalworking, these industries have different production technologies.
These differences are reflected in the completeness, type and sophistication of their
machinery. This limited number of observations precluded estimation of stochastic
frontiers as well as more flexible forms. Stochastic models offer the most theoretically
appealing approach because they explicitly incorporate random error and offer the
possibility of mitigating important deficiencies in data. Moreover, since we had only two
time periods we could not take advantage of panel data analysis to derive firm-specific TEI
that would allow variation in technical efficiency across time as well as units (as done by
Cornwell, Sickles and Schmidt, 1989). Based upon the comparison of functional forms
and frontiers by Corbo and de Melo (1986) for Chile for nonelectrical machinery, there was
no a priori evidence that the Cobb-Douglas specification would be inappropriate. We
therefore decided to focus on what the literature points to as the most serious problem in
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frontier estimation--the measurement of inputs and outputs, particularly capital. These
issues are discussed in the following section.
Practical Difficulties with Measurement
Although our Colombian data are rich with qualitative and quantitative data on firm
performance for the years 1977 and 1986, the sample is small as we noted above. Most
important, this sample lacks complete price and quantity data on all inputs and outputs.
Our labor, and particularly, capital input data are unusually detailed, but incomplete
quantity information on output precludes estimation of dual cost or profit functions that
would allow us to systematically analyze allocative efficiency. Nevertheless and despite
incomplete price and quantity data, we examined the potential biases of allocative
inefficiency by studying the relationship between TEIs and factor proportions. To pinpoint
further the possible sources of this type of inefficiency we compared these relationships
using market prices with those obtainable in the absence of market power and capacity
underutilization, that is, after adjusting for disequilibrium conditions.
Thus, we chose to base our study of firms' relative performance on observed
market prices and then compare these results to alternatives assuming equilibrium
conditions to see the magnitude of the bias presented by the divergence between market and
shadow prices. In effect, then, the ability of firms to claim higher product prices while
minimizing factor input costs (through positive organizational measures, knowledge of
import controls and practice in filing loan applications, or through the exercise of privileged
connections) were reflected in higher TEIs for our base case scenario. Accordingly, we
used the real market rates for capital offered by differing financing sources--own,
commercial bank, public bank, or supplier/moneylender as well as market prices for labor
and output. Our main adjustment involved a thorough consistency check to assure these
data presented a reasonable picture of firm production and finances for the survey years.
Even at the sectoral level where structural change and resource allocation effects are
- 133 -
important, derivation and use of shadow prices in productivity analysis is only recently
being developed. Although an imperfect tool, we derived alternative TEIs based upon full
capacity and price-quality comparability to simulate the likely effects of disequilibrium
conditions.
In addition to the issue of prices under disequilibrium, we had to deal with two
other important and troublesome measurement problems. The first focused on aggregation
within units of varied inputs and output and the second involved deflation.
As we noted in Chapter 2, index number formulas can guide us through proper
aggregation by weighting different categories of an input according to the category's
relative marginal productivity as reflected by its price. In terms of labor, we used relative
wages to aggregate various labor types within the firm into unskilled equivalent person
days. In the case of output, data on aggregate sales did not provide the necessary
information for a similar weighting. This means, in effect, we assumed homogeneous
output. In the case of capital, our sample provided rich detail about the vintage, service
life, and cost of individual capital assets. This allowed us to apply Mohr's (1988; see
Chapter 2 and the Technical Appendix) vintage rental cost of capital formula, which
extends Jorgenson's original formulation based upon firm optimizing behavior and
developed to solve the problem of the lack of directly observable capital input prices when
assets are owner-utilized. Rather than resort to universal assumptions about useful life and
vintage, our capital input estimates incorporate actual firm data.
Mohr's formula assures that all capital costs are decayed through a weighting
scheme in which the importance of each vintage's cost decreases with age. This avoids the
nagging problem of charging historical capital unreasonable current rates. To date, we
know of no other application of Mohr's theoretically appealing formulation. This
application, therefore, represents the most significant methodological contribution of our
research.
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Lastly, in order to avoid the problems of adjusting historical asset prices to a
common base year, we used replacement costs. CBI based their capital input estimates on
total capital stock valued at commercial cost, which would reflect the stock's historical cost
in current pesos. However, as we explained in the Technical Appendix, by 1986,
entrepreneurs were less certain of the prices their individual assets would sell for than the
costs of replacing them. Regardless of the base used, deflation of asset prices to a common
base year was needed to capture the real changes between 1977 and 1986. Since we had
detailed information and many firms had made few changes in their capital stock, we were
able to estimate implicit deflators to adjust our disaggregated capital measure. For the sake
of a more complete and consistent valuation of individual assets we used replacement costs
for capital. In the case of labor, we applied regional deflators published by the Central
Bank hoping these would capture the improvements in the labor force brought about by
greater access to education. In the case of output, we complemented 1977 and 1986 price
data with the entrepreneur's and our own evaluation of how the product changed to derive
implicit deflators. We fully acknowledge the difficulties of accurately capturing quality
differences as well as changes in output mix in our 1977-1986 comparisons. Therefore,
we introduced into our TEI regression models variables to capture the potential biases from
these factors.
RESULTS FROM HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Using the tools of efficiency measurement we examined patterns of efficiency in
two Colombian metal-mechanical industries. We used firm TEIs to test hypotheses
regarding the relative efficiency of firms in developing countries with long histories of
import substitution. First, echoing CBI's (1987) and Page's (1984) results, we found
substantial scope for efficiency improvement, even considering that ,on average, technical
efficiency reached a lower bound estimate of about 56% of best-practice output for both
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survey years. This difference between the average achieved and best-practice output cannot
be attributed entirely to the random error component ignored in deterministic programming
frontier models.
Second, we found no systematic relationship between technical efficiency nor
technical progress and firm size. Only in the case of very small firms did we find evidence
of capital indivisibilities. Especially in the case of agricultural implements producers, these
firms were too small to support the number and variety of metalworking machines required
by the production technology. In light of the indivisibilities and threshold effects of capital,
we examined whether differences in factor proportions were potential causes of technical
inefficiency. In the second survey year, capital intensity was associated with lower TEIs,
but this reflected the severe problems of capacity underutilization affecting both industries.
Overall, neither size nor factor proportions were systematically associated with technical
efficiency.
This suggests that the issue is not that small or large is efficient, except in the case
of the very small which fall below minimum efficient scale for these industries. Instead,
we found a range of plant scales consistent with technical efficiency. Our firm sample did
not support the popular myth of small labor-intensive firms. Measuring size by number of
employees, we found that smaller firms were more capital intensive than larger ones who
spread out their capital among a wider employment base. In addition, with the drawn out
recession leading up to the second survey year, firms' growth patterns were disrupted.
Instead of firms growing into their capital stock by adding workers, the recession forced
medium-scale firms to reduce their employment thereby making the small firm group (with
fewer than 20 workers) the most capital intensive. Similarly, we found little support for
the myth of the large firm as capital intensive and burdened by excess capacity. Just as
small firm entrepreneurs were able to maximize the use of their capital by subcontracting
work to their employees, large firm entrepreneurs accomplished the same by diversifying
their product line. In other words, in terms of technical, scale or allocative efficiency, size
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was not the most important factor. Within a given technology (what is referred to as the
ex-ante choice) there was flexibility allowing a range of factor proportions (ex-post) and
types of plant organization.
Third, the most important determinants of technical efficiency changed with market
circumstances. In the first survey year we found that the entrepreneur's experience and
education were key variables. By 1986 with the maturing of both industries and the trial by
fire represented by the recession, the general level of managerial know-how had increased,
and more specific production-related capabilities and efforts became important. Most
important, however, were the difficulties in obtaining material inputs in the second survey
year. Import restrictions resulted in firm stockpiling. This practice imposed real efficiency
losses on all firms regardless of size or factor proportions and took Colombian firms
further away from the ideal of the flexible specialization model and its reliance on just-in-
time inventories.
Another obstacle to achieving this ideal was the firms' survival strategy based on
cutting labor costs. The recession provided firms an opportunity to reduce employment as
well as labor's share. We might interpret the puzzling negative relationship between TEIs
and employee skill level as a sign of the impact of deteriorating labor-management relations
or, at the very least, a sign of the inefficient deployment of labor; both cases are represented
in the sample. In either case, this failure to maximize labor efficiency will have
repercussions for future productivity gains.
These trends are particularly worrisome because we also found that TFP gains
across survey years were strongly associated with firms' relative technical efficiency in the
initial survey year. This suggests that static efficiency in one period strongly affects
dynamic productivity gains in the future. We would expect, therefore, that agricultural
implements producers in the future, once again, will show greater TFP gains relative to
kitchen equipment producers. The latter tended to focus on cost-cutting and considered any
further improvements in technique as unwarranted by current market conditions.
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Fourth, our examination of productivity changes provided no evidence of technical
regress in these industries. Small as well as large firms pushed out the best-practice
frontier despite efficiency losses from stockpiling material inputs and cutting labor costs.
Their strategies reflected specific industry conditions. The death of one-third of the
agricultural implements firms in the sample led to a modest renovation of survivors' capital
stock. The retreat from trade liberalization did not put an end to competition, but rather an
end to the cut-throat price wars of the 1970s between small and large long-established
firms. In the case of kitchen equipment firms, recession signalled the closing of only one
firm, but the reduced demand of the 1980s brought on a competitive race for customers that
focused firm strategies on cutting costs and improving production organization.
In terms of measurement methodology, we found that the comparison of base case
and adjusted TEIs yielded unexpected results. Although we had evidence that non-
competitive product pricing and capacity underutilization were market factors in 1977 and
1986, respectively, we found they did not significantly bias our indices of technical
efficiency and technical progress. For inefficient firms affected by these disequilibrium
conditions, we found these were not the only causes of their relative inefficiency; in the
absence of disequilibria, they were still disadvantaged by more fundamental problems
noted above.
In terms of the measurement of capital and labor, we found that the gains from
disaggregation were confirmed by a slightly better fit of regression models. Our evaluation
of the traditional aggregated and the data-intensive disaggregated measure of capital yielded
no significant differences because our aggregated measure benefitted from specific
information regarding vintage and service life. If we compare our improved aggregate
capital measure with CBI's version, we do note significant differences leading to very
different patterns in capital-labor ratios. However, the demands of disaggregation are
directly related to the heterogeneity of inputs and outputs. In cross-sectional studies of
firms with broadly similar production processes, the disaggregated capital measure is not
- 138 -
likely to make a difference. This is not so in comparisons of varied firms across different
time periods, particularly in the context of rapidly changing technology.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND NEW RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Our findings support earlier results by CBI (1987) and Page (1984) regarding the
inaccuracy of relating firm size and efficiency. In the metal-mechanical sector with its
demanding capital requirements, neither size nor factor proportions are the main
determinants of firm efficiency. This suggests that credit or trade incentives based upon
firm size are not warranted since firm size is not a proxy for firm efficiency. As Little,
Mazumdar, and Page (1987) conclude, only if small firms are more efficient in terms of
their total factor productivity do they deserve special consideration. The insolvency or, at
best, lack of sustainability of LDC development banks, whether for agricultural or
industrial credit, confirms that preferential treatment for smaller producers is not an
appropriate policy to promote efficient domestic production. Preferential access for larger
producers is even less desirable because of its likely regressive distributional impact.
More important, as the recent work of Hernando de Soto suggests, is removing the
obstacles to market entry faced by small producers. Our findings suggest to LDC policy
makers that firm size, factor proportions, or even the presence of import competition per se
are not all important. Both metal-mechanical industries we studied were established under
import substitution. They have grown, however, in a climate of domestic competition as
firms of different sizes have stolen the market share of long-established larger firms. As
these industries mature and growth in the domestic demand for their products levels off,
international competition and markets will become increasingly important. Accordingly,
Colombian policy makers will have to overcome the main obstacles to efficient production
we found in our 1986 analysis--access to imported material inputs and use of labor. It
would seem that the standard popular prescriptions of trade liberalization (elimination of
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preferential treatment, exemptions and non-tariff mechanisms as well as reduction of the
tariff levels and their dispersion) are warranted. However, these efforts must be
complemented by measures to encourage greater competition, enforce and update labor
legislation, and improve training and access to information for both management and labor.
In terms of specific efforts to speed technical progress, our findings echo those of
Nishimizu and Page (1982) in which the scope for productivity improvements from
technical efficiency gains appear larger and more immediate than those potentially available
from expensive programs to promote research and development. In view of the aging
capital stock of our surviving companies, replacement will become increasingly critical to
efficient production. Our most efficient and technically progressive firms were those that
either because of their greater resources or access to imports were able to replace their
capital stock. In the case of our small 12-person firm, second-hand numerically controlled
machines were obtained because of the entrepreneur's leading role in an association of
small and medium-scale manufacturers. In the case of our larger firms, their knowledge of
the import bureaucracy (INCOMEX) and ready access to capital allowed them to replace
machinery selectively.
Finally, in terms of future research directions, we would recommend more
concerted efforts to develop more complete and detailed firm-level data bases to allow
systematic analysis of technical, scale and allocative inefficiency. Although recent research
increasingly uses plant-level census data to study industry structure and performance, this
does not preclude the need to develop a more detailed time-series for a subsample of units.
If we are interested in looking into the "black box" of production, we need to put some
effort into developing larger and richer data bases that will allow analysts to test
theoretically rigorous, but data-intensive, stochastic frontier models.
A larger data base would have provided a firmer test of our hypotheses and allowed
greater exploration of issues at which our limited data set only hinted. For example, with a
greater number of observations, we could have tested the differential response of small and
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large firms to recession; as small firms seemed to turn increasingly outward to exploit their
capital equipment, larger firms seemed to retract their linkages and opt for more vertical
integration to accomplish the same purpose. As we noted in the introductory chapter, the
metal-mechanical sector has historically played a key role in technology creation and
diffusion because of its varied backward and forward linkages. Moreover, as the literature
on flexible specialization suggests, but we could not test, the efficiency of firms may be
tied to the efficiency of these linkages that traditionally in LDCs have not been well-
articulated. It seems that future research efforts should focus on the nature of these
linkages and their relationship to technical efficiency, firm size, and factor proportions.
Such a study, particularly in a cross-country comparative framework, would help to
explain the apparent dynamism exhibited by small firms and more fully capture their
contribution to efficiency and technological mastery.
APPENDIX A
SOLOW'S MODELS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
This appendix sets forth a more detailed explanation of Solow's most important
models of technical change: disembodied technical change or total factor productivity (TFP)
and capital embodied technical change.
THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND DISEMBODIED TECHNICAL
CHANGE
Solow's key assumption of neutrality in technical change equates the ratio of
marginal products before and after technical change and corresponds to Hicks' definition of
neutrality measured along a constant capital-labor ratio. There are two alternative
definitions, each developed for the specific issues addressed (Allen, 1967). Harrod
focused on the requirements for steady state growth and therefore defined neutrality along a
constant output-capital ratio, where neutral technical change is labor-augmenting; Q = F(K,
A(t)L). Solow later offered his own brand of neutral technical change, defined along a
constant output-labor ratio as capital-augmenting to fit his vintage model; Q = F(A(t)K,
L). Hicks' measure is designed to capture the complex effects of innovations on relative
factor prices and the substitution induced by these innovations (Blaug, 1985).
Beginning with
Q = A(t)f(KL)
Solow differentiates with respect to time and divides by Q,
Q'= A'(t) + A(t) dfdK (K'K)/Q + A(t) dfldL (L'L)/Q
equates factor shares with factor elasticities (i.e., A(t) af/aK = aQ/aK and A(t) af/aL =
aQ/aL), and rearranges terms
Q'= A'(t) + dQ/dK (K'K)/Q + dQ/dL (L'L)IQ
Under the first order conditions for profit maximization, a factor's output elasticity (which
is not observed) is equal to its share in Q
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6x = dQ/dX (XIQ) = wxXIpQ
given dQ2dX = wx/p (first order conditions)
where (9 = output elasticity offactor X = K, L
wx= factor price of X
p = output price
to derive the familiar equation in which the rate of growth in output is decomposed into the
rate of disembodied technical change A' and the rate of growth of the factors.
Q'= A' + K K'+ L L'
where the prime notation denotes rate of growth, i.e., A'=(dAldt)IA
Soon after Solow, Salter (1966) was the first to focus on disaggregation to capture
structural change as resources shift across sectors. Salter is given credit for attempting to
isolate systematically and comprehensively the various influences captured by the residual--
returns to scale as well as the neutrality, bias, and substitution effects of changes over time
in best-practice techniques in individual industries (Brown, 1966,pp. 105-108). However,
his measures are similarly confounded by the interdependence of the technical
characteristics of production and movements in relative prices described above. More
recent efforts attempt to account for the effects of resource reallocation accompanying
structural change. For example, Syrquin (1984, p. 80) shows that aggregate TFP growth
(A') is equal to an average of the sectoral TFP rates plus terms that pick up the sectoral
reallocation effects of capital and labor
'= Epi6K'i + EpitdjL'- + EpiA'i
where pi = QiIQ = output share of sector i
6x = output elasticity offactor X in sector i
This formulation takes explicit account of the shifts in resources that occur with
structural change. It extends the growth accounting work by Kuznets (1966), the
adjustments to traditional TFP by Denison (1962), and builds upon Chenery's focus on
disaggregated analysis. Such analysis has become an important contribution to traditional
neoclassical methods which assume long-run equilibrium.
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VINTAGE MODEL OF EMBODIED TECHNICAL CHANGE
After assuming disembodied technical change, Solow recognized the problem of
assuming homogeneous and malleable capital which evades the whole issue of aggregation
by ignoring the differing productivities of different vintages of capital goods. As Harcourt
(1972, p.48) explains, it is as though
"at any moment in time, all existing capital goods could be costlessly and
timelessly changed into the latest cost-minimizing form as indicated by
expectations of future product and relative factor prices...Thus disembodied
neutral technical progress may be likened to a mysterious manifestation of
grace--when...capital and labor, are gathered together in this life, there
immediately occurs a rise of considerable dimensions in total factor
productivity."
The problem of aggregation with respect to capital was dramatized by the debate with Joan
Robinson over the possibility of constructing a quantity index of capital. Robinson argued
that such an index had to be independent from the distribution of the product and relative
prices; only then could it be legitimately used to analyze the distribution of the product
given that the amount and rate of profits are determined by the technical characteristics of
production.
Solow's (1959) vintage model accommodates both embodied and disembodied
technical change to account for the heterogeneity and durability of capital. Like most
vintage models, vintage or age determines the productivity of capital with the latest vintage
capital embodying the most advanced and productive technology. These models highlight
the importance of the rate of investment on the rate of technical change by assuming that
each vintage of capital represents the gross investment for that period. Similarly, each
vintage represents the choice of ex-ante production and substitution possibilities given
relative factor prices and demand conditions at the time of the investment decision. The
assumptions vary regarding factor substitutability before and after the installation of new
machinery, with most neoclassical versions allowing some ex-post substitution. There are
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three types of vintage models categorized by the combination of assumptions on ex-ante
and ex-post substitutability between labor and capital. Putty-putty models allow
substitution before and after the installation of new capital equipment. Clay-clay models
assume fixed factor proportions in both instances while most mixed models allow only ex-
ante substitutability. For the latter, the assumption of infinite capital is replaced by the
determination of obsolescence.
Solow's (1959) model defines output at a given time as the integral over the output
of existing vintages and their labor requirements together with a shift factor to account for
disembodied technical change. Solow's vintage model is
Q(t) = Ae - 40)t L(t) a e(6 + X)v I(v)dv]o
where A = shift factor
I(v)= gross investment of vintage v in year t
y = rate of disembodied technical change
8= rate of depreciation
= rate of embodied technical change
a = labor share
#3= capital share
where the expression in brackets defines capital as a function of gross investment in
vintage v, depreciated and improved at a constant rate over the economic life of these assets
(in this case assumed infinite). Both capital and labor are affected by disembodied neutral
technical change. As Nadiri (1970, p. 1144) notes, conditions for aggregation over
heterogeneous capital inputs require that the rate of substitution between them to be
independent of the quantity of labor used with them. Moreover, the condition for
aggregation over heterogeneous production units even with homogeneous capital further
requires technical change to be capital-augmenting. These are basically the conditions
postulated by Solow in this model.
However, the empirical problems involved in identifying the parameters--the rates
of embodied and disembodied technical change and of depreciation, and the factor shares--
- 145 -
have limited the model's application. Solow's results (re-establish the importance of capital
accumulation underestimated by his previous effort) are inconclusive due to their sensitivity
to the method of estimation and the data utilized (Nadiri, 1970, p. 1162). This has limited
empirical applications particularly in LDCs where data constraints are greater.
Moreover, growth theory has turned to general equilibrium models of these
economies claiming an ability to better capture the complex interdependencies among
variables (e.g., Kelley and Williamson, 1973). These claims are justified in principle, but
these models have gotten us no closer to understanding the black box of production and
technological progress. In addition, there have been other approaches to modelling the link
between technical change and investment. For example, the models of Arrow (1962) and
Kaldor and Mirrless (1962) mark a move away from the traditional notion of the production
function. Their focus is on modelling the production of capital goods as a function relating
inputs to a cumulative index of activities, in terms of cumulative output or time spent.
These models have been little used in applied work.
APPENDIX B
STOCHASTIC FRONTIERS
Stochastic frontiers are the most theoretically advanced but the least applied of
efficiency measurement techniques. They explicitly account for statistical noise providing
analysts the basis for hypotheses testing. Following Schmidt (1985, p. 303), in the typical
stochastic model output is bounded from above by a stochastic production function
ys = A + Zixsi + vs - us US 2 0
where vs is the random component and satisfies the usual normality assumption. The
challenge in this type of frontier is the treatment of the nonnormal error we assume captures
technical efficiency. In order to estimate this model, analysts usually assume that vs, us,
and xsi are mutually independent and specify a distribution for us. The most popular
distribution is the half-normal though, as Schmidt (1985, p. 305) notes, "for no reason that
is readily apparent" although the exponential distribution is also used. The next step is to
estimate MLEs by maximizing a likelihood function whose derivation can be intractable.
Alternatively, the model can be estimated using OLS and then "correcting" the constant
term with a consistent estimator of E(u) based on the higher moments of the least squares
residuals.
These estimation procedures yield an estimate for (vs - us), and we face the problem
of distinguishing us from this composite error term. E(u) can be estimated consistently, but
provides a measure of mean technical efficiency for the sample. In order to get firm
specific TEIs, some analysts such as van den Broeck (1988) have applied a procedure
based on the conditional distribution of us given (vs - us) , i.e., E(us/vs - us) evaluated at the
estimated values of (vs - us) and the parameters. Schmidt (1985, p. 308), however,
considers the fact that "the separation of noise and inefficiency ultimately hinges on strong
(and arbitrary) distributional assumptions" as the most serious problem of stochastic
frontiers.
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This problem can be avoided when panel data are available by resorting to a fixed-
effects model in which firm technical inefficiency (us) is time invariant
yst = as+ xstJp + vst - us
where vst = random error component
us= technical efficiency component
The fixed-effects model overcomes three important problems of frontier models. First, we
get around the problem of having to make distributional assumptions regarding v and u.
Second, we need not assume that the xst are uncorrelated with ust. Rather than assume that
managers make production decisions without prior knowledge of stochastic components,
we can argue that firms can anticipate technical inefficiency and this may well effect their
decisions. Thus, we need not assume all inputs are exogenous and uncorrelated with the
error term.
Third, the problem of distinguishing us from (vs - us) becomes manageable since
with panel data we have T rather than just one observation for us. In sum, then, the
advantage of the fixed effects model is its requirement for a minimal set of assumptions.
This advantage, however, is traded off against the assumption that firm effects are constant
over time. The estimation procedure guarantees this; the first step is to transform the data
into deviations from group means ridding the model of time invariant variables. We can
then apply OLS to the transformed data to derive the "within group" or fixed effects
estimators for . For example, Hsiao (1985, p. 137) shows that the transformed model
becomes
Yst - Ys = 1(xst - s)+ (Vst - Ys)
where group means are denoted with the double underline i.e., xs = Et xst/T
t = T
A recent application of the fixed-effects model with panel data in the context of
technical efficiency is the work by Seale (1985). He builds upon the seminal work by
Hoch (1962), using a joint estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function and share
equations to derive unit-specific TEIs, but normalizes these measures relative to the frontier
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firm rather than the average. Using the "within" estimator, he treats individual firm effects
as fixed implying different intercepts but the same slope coefficients for each firm (to avoid
having to make distributional assumptions about the composed error term). Seale's
production function is:
In yst = a jin Lst + a2 In Kst + ds + vst where ds are the individualfirm
efficiency measures
Postulating that entrepreneurs maximize expected profits (thereby making output
endogenous) and that they can sell their output without affecting its price, he derives factor
demand equations from the first order conditions for profit maximization to create a system
of K+1 equations (where K refers to the number of variable factors). Seale's work focuses
on the Egyptian cement tile industry, which presents clear advantages in terms of the
homogeneity of its output (basically colored and non-colored tiles). The author is able to
gather quantity data and so avoids the problem of estimating the production frontier from
monetary values. The problem of aggregation across firms in also avoided, but that of
labor and capital inputs remain. Seale aggregates labor hours according to a scheme
categorizing workers by activity that he claims roughly coincides with wage-weighting.
Using incomplete data on machine hours along with data on the number of machines by
type, quantities and prices of some raw materials purchased, he derives a proxy variable for
machine hours. Output is measured in square meters and aggregation is value weighted.
Seale (1985) finds that technical efficiency is related to size. Inefficient firms tend
to be too small reflecting the various restrictions on the availability of capital in Egypt.
Given an increasing population, the industry faces increasing demand and is in the process
of adjusting to meet it. The overall policy implications are clear--a removal of restrictions
on capital would allow firms to grow and operate at a more efficient scale than before--if
we accept that technical efficiency is time invariant over the two and a half years covered by
the study. Despite the disaggregated level of this study, Seale (1985) does not support his
conclusion with examples of the problems of capital availability faced by his firms. Other
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than citing differential access between rural and urban firms, his study offers no insights
into the specific problems faced by his 25 firms.
Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1988, henceforth CSS) extend the application of
the "within" estimator. To exploit the advantages of panel data without having to assume
technical efficiency is time invariant, the us are replaced by a flexible (in this case,
quadratic) function of time whose parameters vary across firms
ust= 6s1 + 6s2 + 6s3t2
This function captures productivity growth, whose rate varies across firms such that levels
of firm inefficiency are allowed to vary over time (CSS, 1988, p. 1). Specifically, the time
derivative of ust provides an estimate of TFP growth.
A firm's efficiency level for a given time period is calculated by comparing the
firm's actual output to the frontier level--the production function of the most efficient firm,
the one with the highest intercept in the ust equation above. The CSS model is defined as
Yst = Xst + wst(s + Vst
where wst = [1,t,t2]
Os = [ Osi + 8s2 + 6s3]
With this specification CSS measure efficiency by the cross-sectional variation and
productivity growth from the variation across time. In the case of time invariant technical
efficiency, the typical stochastic model will yield residuals given by (yst -Xsj) which are
an estimate of (vst - us). To estimate firm technical inefficiency, the residuals are averaged
over time. In the CSS model with efficiency varying over time, the procedure is similar.
To estimate Os these authors regress the residuals for firm s on wst to provide an estimate of
ust that is consistent. They calculate relative efficiency levels (assuming output is measured
in logarithms) in percentage terms with respect to the most efficient firm from
RTEIrt = max(Qst) - rt r = J,...,S for r~s
S = 1,...,S, t = 1,...,T
CSS estimate their model using quarterly data (T = 48) for eight airline companies (S = 8)
and specifying a special case of the translog
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In Q = Inao + aKln K + aLln L + aEln E + aMln M + EsSeasons + Eslfn Attributes
+ 21s_<rln Attributes Attributer
where Q = available ton miles
L = number of employees
E = quantity of energy consumed
M = quantity of materials consumed
Seasons = indexed from winter through summer
Attributes = average stage length, service quality index.
in which outputs and inputs are expressed as Tornqvist indices. This functional form
assumes that the average technology is given by a first-order approximation in the
logarithms of inputs, and a second-order approximation in the logarithm of output
attributes. When CSS attempted to introduce second-order terms for the inputs, they were
unable to obtain unique parameter estimates given the almost perfect collinearity in the
moment matrix (CSS, 1988, p. 34). They chose not to impose further structure on the
model by adding first-order conditions in order to increase the degrees of freedom. This
functional form, nonetheless, follows Schmidt's preference for incorporating directly into
the production function those factors believed important.
In order to incorporate time varying technical efficiency, CSS apply the Hausman
and Taylor (1981) suggestion of identifying those elements of xst correlated (endogenous)
and uncorrelated (exogenous) with the us. and using the uncorrelated elements as
instrumental variables to derive unbiased estimates of the fts. According to Hausman and
Taylor (1981, p. 1384), "because the only component of the disturbance which is
correlated with the explanatory variables is time-invariant, any vector orthogonal to a time-
invariant vector can be used as an instrument." The authors assume capital (K) and energy
(E) are correlated with the us and labor (L) and materials (M) are considered exogenous. A
rational expectations interpretation of contract signing, applicable to the airline industry,
provides a rationale for assuming managers consider the labor input as given. Changes in
input usage during the quarter will likely involve changes in hours worked not in number
of employees, which is used as the labor input variable. The material input is derived as a
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residual category including various types of goods and services. Because CSS construct
the Tornqvist quantity index for materials using a variety of price deflators and aggregate
price indices, the chances of their correlation with changes in efficiency in the airline
industry are reduced, barring monopsonistic behavior by the firms.
The authors' testing procedures supports these exogeneity assumptions. CSS
applied the Hausman-Wu statistic based on the differences between the within and their
efficient instrumental variables (IV) estimates. Comparing the results from within group,
their efficient IV, and generalized least squares estimators, the authors found that the first
two are very similar, but the second is slightly more precise.
APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND CHARTS
CHAPTER 4
CHART 4A.1
REAL GROSS OUTPUT FOR NONELECTRICAL MACHINERY (ISIC 382), METAL-
MECHANICAL SECTOR (MM), AND ALL INDUSTRY: 1974-1986
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TABLE 4.A.1
REAL AND EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES PESO/DOLLAR 1975-1986
(percent)
Real
Nominal Ratio US to Real Effective Effective
Exchange CPI Blue Colombian Exchange Export Exchange
Rate Collar Inflation Rate Subsidy Rate
Year (NER) (COL) (US/COL) (RER) (EES) (REER)
1975 100.0 100.0 1.00 100.0 6.7 106.7
1976 112.2 125.7 0.85 95.4 6.5 101.6
1977 117.9 161.3 0.73 85.7 8.1 92.6
1978 125.3 191.6 0.68 85.5 9.6 93.7
1979 136.5 246.7 0.60 81.7 11.7 91.3
1980 151.6 310.7 0.55 83.5 13.3 94.6
1981 174.7 392.7 0.47 81.6 7.2 87.5
1982 205.4 487.2 0.37 75.6 7.7 81.4
1983 252.9 568.2 0.29 73.6 12.3 82.7
1984 323.1 672.0 0.25 79.9 14.5 91.5
1985 456.1 822.8 0.20 91.4 14.4 104.6
1986 628.5 995.6 0.17 108.5 8.7 117.9
RER = NER(US/COL) - measures the extent to which the rate of peso devaluation offsets differences
between the rate of inflation in Colombia (COL) and its main trading partners (US); REER = RER +
RER(EES) - incorporates the effects of export subsidy incentives.
Data sources: Banco de La Repdblica data except for the EES column from the World Bank (1983,
p.185).
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TABLE 4A.2
STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION IN SELECTED YEARS BY BROAD PRODUCT CLASSES
Mean and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percent
Period/ February 1979 December 1979 December 1984 December 1985 December 1986
ImrtItem NP EP PL NP EP PL NP |EP |PL NP EP |PL NP EP PL
Consumer 43 87 48 39 81 32 66 139 46 93 72
s.d. 22 50 22 49 37 120 16
Intermediates 22 32 43 20 29 28 22 25 18 22 55
s.d. 11 21 10 18 15 48 10
Metal Product 40 67 46 36 59 41 100 76 65
s.d. 11 27 10 25
Nonelec.Mach 24 29 49 22 28 46 31 40 25 25 47
s.d. 19 29 18 28
Electric Mach 34 53 52 32 50 52 75 51
s.d. 18 38 16 34
Transport Eq. 37 82 73 34 75 70 42 100 31 49 65
s.d. 40 102 34 91 45 155 28 87
Total 28 48 46 26 43 33 42 71 83 31 52 72 64 63
s.d. 19 43 18 40 30 89 16 53 59
Actual tariffs levied:
Nonelec.Mach 27 29 31
Total 22 43 20 36 20 37
s.d. 50 60 63
NP=Nominal rate of protection; EP=Effective rate of protection and takes into account the nominal protection accorded to intermediate products;
these represent theoretical tariffs, actuals levied for selected items are shown in the bottom two rows of this table; PL=percentage of items requiring prior
license as opposed to those in free or the seldom used prohibited import list; Nonelec.Mach=Nonelectrical Machinery (ISIC 382); Electric Machinery
(ISIC 383), and Transport Eq.= Transport Equipment (ISIC 384).
Sources: 1979 data come from World Bank, 1983, p.193; 1984 data from Cubillos and Torres, 1987, pp.78-82 ; 1985 data from Coyuntura Econd5mica,
1986, pp.57-62 and Ospina, 1988, pp.48-49b; 1986 data from World Bank, 1987, pp.31-32 and refers to 22 national accounts sectors such that these
EPs are not directly comparable to other years estimates based on import chapters.
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TABLE 4A.3
TRENDS IN GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION (GFCF): 1975-1986
(percent)
Annual Rates of Growth in Machinery Imports as Share
Year Total GFCF Machinery share of GFCF of all Machinery
1975 -3.8 -3.5 31.8 59.7
1976 9.5 4.4 30.4 63.3
1977 0.7 1.9 30.8 63.8
1978 9.3 15.7 32.6 66.3
1979 3.8 7.8 33.8 68.2
1980 13.2 16.6 34.9 74.4
1981 6.3 7.1 35.2 78.4
1982 3.0 -0.6 33.9 82.6
1983 1.2 0.9 33.9 82.9
1984 1.2 -3.2 32.4 80.6
1985 -5.2 -18.7 27.8 77.9
1986 8.1 25.7 32.2 80.7
Sources: Banco de La Repdblica and National Accounts data.
TABLE 4A.4
CHANGES IN PRICES BETWEEN SURVEY YEARS 1977 AND 1986
(percent)
Industry Group/ Average Average 1977-1986
Price Index 1975-76 1977 1984-85 1986 Average s.d.
GDP Deflator 24.2 29.1 24.0 22.7 23.5 3.4
ISIC 382 24.5 25.6 37.3 19.9 24.6 8.1
CPI Blue Collar 21.8 34.8 20.5 20.7 24.5 5.2
Capital Goods 23.1 18.1 29.4 24.3 23.2 4.3
Intermediates 22.2 10.6 21.3 26.6 20.2 4.9
s.d.=standard deviation; ISIC 382 corresponds to nonelectrical machinery. Unless otherwise specified all
indices are wholesale price indices; capital goods includes construction as well as machinery and
equipment.
Data sources: Banco de la Repdblica's Revista del Banco de la Republica.
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CHAPTER 5
TABLE 5A.1
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY INDICES (TEI) BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM
SIZE: UNWEIGHTED PERSON DAYS
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percentages with respect to the best-practice
frontier
Year/ TEI All Industry Number of Employees
Measured with Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
PKLPD 49 56 38b 51 42 52
(s.d.) (26) (22) (28) (27) (24) (26)
pt-LPD 50 52 47 48 48 55(s.d.) (26) (23) (31) (28) (23) (27)
1986 (current pesos):
PK-LPD 59c 58 57 63 51 64(s.d.) (25) (27) (22) (23) (21) (33)
pyt-LPD 58 56 56 64 51 53(s.d.) (26) (28) (23) (20) (24) (36)
Changes 1977-1986:
PKLPD 4 -4 13c 3 6 3
(s.d.) (26) (27) (22) (29) (25) (28)
pyt-LPD -1 -5 20 4 -3 -5
(s.d.) (29) (32) (27) (33) (28) (29)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; PK: aggregate measure of capital flow;
pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow; LPD: labor in person days. Means of respective groups (by
year, industry, and size) are significantly different at the: a= .00 1 level; b= .0 1 level; c= .1I level.
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TABLE 5A.2
COMPARISON OF CBI AND OWN INPUT, OUPUT, AND OTHER MEASURES
In 1977 current pesos unless otherwise noted
CBI Estimates Own Estimates
(N = 65) Standard (N = 50) Standard
Item Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Number of employees 33 29 31 25
LUE 20,985 18,684 17,160 13,612
LPD n.a n.a 8293 6566
Value Added (000's) 4861 6776 4355 5741
Capital services -PK 287 390 318 289
Capital services -pv, n.a n.a. 568 578
Value Added/LUE 208 115 326 182
Value Added/pK 23 20 14 14
Firm age (years) 14 11 14 11
N: number of observations or firms in sample; pK: aggregate measure of capital flow; pvt: disaggregated
measure of capital flow; LUE: unskilled equivalent labor in person days; LPD: labor in person days. The
15 firms we excluded from the original CBI sample were producers of varied agricultural capital goods
including pumps and machinery for post-harvest use.
Source: CBI data from Cortes, Berry, and Ishaq (1987) p. 90.
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TABLE 5A.3
CAPITAL LABOR RATIOS BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in pesos
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. |Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
pyfLUE 20 18 24 19 26 16c
(s.d.) (13) (9) (18) (7) (20) (11)
pv/LUE 36 33 40 33 43 33
(s.d.) (26) (24) (29) (16) (33) (30)
1986 (current pesos):
pK/LUE 296 315 275 402 248 232b(s.d.) (149) (138) (163) (163) (105) (144)
pv/LUE 357 347 368 560 254 260b(s.d.) (303) (331) (282) (434) (153) (98)
1986 (constant pesos):
pKJLUE 41a 44 38 56 34 33b(s.d.) (22) (20) (24) (24) (14) (21)
pv/LUE 52 48 56 82 40 31c
(s.d.) (51) (29) (69) (77) (24) (22)
1977-86 Changes (increment in constant pesos):
pK/LUE 20 28 l1b 21 18 21(s.d.) (20) (16) (20) (24) (19) (17)
pLLUE 18 21 16 14 25 14
(s.d.) (42) (34) (51) (36) (51) (37)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; pK: aggregate measure of capital flow;
pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow; LUE: labor in unskilled equivalent person days. Means of
respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level;
c= .1 level.
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TABLE 5A.4
INPUT CHARACTERISTICS BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in years unless otherwise noted
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
Firm age 14 14 15 14 13 16
(s.d.) (11) (11) (10) (12) (8) (12)
CEO exp. 19 18 20 21 17 17
(s.d.) (10) (10) (10) (12) (9) (8)
Skill Ratio(%) 44 47 40 44 44 44
(s.d.) (18) (18) (18) (19) (19) (17)
Workers exp. 3 3 3 3 3 4c
(s.d.) (2) (2) (2) (2) (1) (2)
Vintage-capital 8 8 7 7 7 9
(s.d.) (4) (4) (4) (3) (4) (4)
1986:
Firm age 21b 21 21 24 17 25
(s.d.) (13) (15) (11) (13) (9) (21)
CEO exp. 25b 24 26 31 22 22
(s.d.) (11) (12) (11) (12) (11) (9)
Skill Ratio(%) 46 47 44 44 44 55
(s.d.) (20) (22) (18) (20) (21) (16)
Workers exp. 3 3 3 3 3 3
(s.d.) (1) (1) (1) (2) (1) (1)
Vintage-capital 12 13 11 14 12 10
(s.d.) (5) (3) (6) (4) (6) (4)
Agricult.- agricultural implements; CEO exp.: entrepreneur's experience in sector weighted by type of
experience--production or administrative in the firm and elsewhere; experience of workers refers to
experience in the firm; skill ratio is the ratio of technical and skilled workers to total production workers.
Means for given group (by year, industry, and size) are significantly different at the: a- .001 level; b- .01
level; c- .1 level.
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TABLE 5A.5
PRODUCTION CHARACTERISTICS BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) as a percentage of output except*
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. |Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
Unit by unit 27 20 38 47 15 8a
(s.d.) (39) (34) (43) (42) (30) (26)
Main product 52 56 48 53 62 37
(s.d.) (25) (26) (24) (22) (31) (17)
Intermediates 45 48 41c 48 39 48c
(s.d.) (14) (13) (15) (15) (13) (11)
Subcontracted 3 1 5 1 7 1
(s.d.) (10) (3) (16) (3) (19) (1)
Subcon.Input* 8 8 9 10 2 10
(s.d.) (10) (10) (10) (10) (3) (12)
Exported 5 6 3 1 4 11C
(s.d) (14) (16) (9) (4) (11) (22)
1986:
Unit by unit 24 19 29 35 25 2
(s.d.) (37) (33) (43) (43) (38) (2)
Main product 57 60 56 49 58 64
(s.d.) (18) (13) (20) (16) (21) (15)
Intermediates 39 42 36 43 37 38
(s.d.) (13) (13) (12) (13) (14) (18)
Subcontracted 7 5 9 16 3 0
(s.d.) (20) (12) (27) (34) (7) (0)
Subcon.Input* 8 9 8 7 10 7
(s.d.) (12) (11) (13) (9) (14) (3)
Exported 1C 2 1 0 1 5c
(s.d) (4) (5) (2) (0) (2) (8)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; *Subcon. input: percentage of input
costs subcontracted from other firms. Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are
significant at the: a= .001 level; b-= .01 level;c=.1 level.
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TABLE 5A.6
REGRESSION RESULTS: DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL INTENSITY
Standard Errors in parentheses
Ln Capital Labor Ratio as dependent variable measured with LUE
and:
Independent 1977 1986 1986(1977$P)
Variables Pk Pvt Pk |Pvt Pk |Pvt
Labor contract
(longer-term=1)
Unit-by-unit prdtn.
(% of output)
Skilled Wkr.Ratio
(% prdction wkrs)
Vintage of capital
(In of years)
Labor cost problem
(yes=1)
Capital problem
(yes=1)
Capacity utilization
(%)
Employees
(ln of number)
ATRRvt
(%)
Subcont. inputs
(% input costs)
Design/Engineering
(% of top score)
R2adjusted
N (observations)
F
-3.95a
(0.34)
-0.21c
(0.16)
-0.20
(0.14)
0.63b
(0.23)
-3.11a 0.04
(0.27)
-0.22
(0.18)
-0.62b
(0.27)
-0.59
(0.48)
-0.25
(0.17)
0.72b
(0.26)
0.17
(0.11)
0.09b
(0.03)
-1.24c -1.51c
(0.72) (0.86)
0.18
50
3.68b
0.23
50
3.43b
0.13
(0.21)
-1.67a
(0.38)
-0.81
(0.52)
0.44
26
5.90a
0.60
(0.57)
-0.33
(0.31)
-0.95b
(0.25)
-1.96a
(0.50)
-0.64
(0.67)
0.50
26
7.32a
-1.57a
(0.44)
-0.18
(0.17)
-1.11a
(0.72)
-0.32
(0.27)
-0.66
(0.92)
-1.73a -2.08a
(0.39) (0.63)
-0.92c
(0.52)
0.44
26
7.46a
-1.43
(0.89)
0.32
26
3.89b
Constant
Ln: natural logarithm; pK: aggregate measure of capital flow; pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow;
LUE: labor in unskilled equivalent person days; 1977$P: constant 1977 pesos; Regression coefficients are
significant at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
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TABLE 5A.7
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percentages
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 | 21-40 41+
1977:
Direct Sales 60 55 68 85 51 31a
(s.d.) (40) (40) (40) (24) (38) (41)
Sales on credit 62 67 54 56 71 63
(s.d.) (34) (34) (35) (36) (26) (39)
Mat. on credit 52 46 61 40 77 44b
(s.d.) (40) (47) (31) (39) (31) (42)
Output in stock 5 5 5 6 7 1
(s.d.) (12) (14) (10) (15) (11) (1)
Mat. in stock 13 13 14 11 11 21c
(s.d.) (15) (12) (19) (13) (6) (21)
Fringe Benefit 37 37 37 31 38 45a
(s.d.) (11) (10) (13) (11) (6) (1 1)
1986:
Direct Sales 53 55 51 63 55 32
(s.d.) (37) (35) (41) (43) (35) (31)
Sales on credit 59 74 41b 49 60 72
(s.d.) (35) (35) (26) (40) (31) (36)
Mat. on credit 54 46 63 35 63 66
(s.d.) (45) (45) (44) (48) (42) (41)
Output in stock 29c 40 17 50 21 10
(s.d.) (61) (83) (23) (104) (21) (11)
Mat. in stock 20b 20 20 15 23 20
(s.d.) (13) (14) (14) (10) (15) (14)
Fringe Benefit 44 48 40 34 46 56b
(s.d.) (16) (17) (14) (16) (4) (25)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; Output and materials in stock are
expressed as a percentage of total output; fringe benefits are expressed as a percentage of the basic wage.
Means for given group (by year, industry, and size) are significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01
level; c= .1 level.
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TABLE 5A.8
1977-1986 CHANGES BY INDUSTRY AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percent
All Industry Number of Employees in 1977
Changes in Firms Agricult. |Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
TEI based on:
PK-LUE 3.6 -5.4 13.3c 10.7 8.1 -9.7(s.d.) (29.9) (26.2) (31.5) (31.4) (33.2) (21.4)
pv-LUE 0.3 -6.5 7.7c 3.2 4.2 -7.8(s.d.) (23.8) (27.0) (18.1) (25.5) (24.1) (22.8)
Capital-labor Ratio:
pK/LUE 153.4 206.7 96.0c 121.7 142.6 200.0
(s.d.) (161.9) (163.7) (144.6) (126.5) (139.2) (223.4)
pv/LUE 91.9 138.0 42.3b 71.0 82.7 125.6
(s.d.) (124.6) (136.8) (90.6) (135.0) (101.7) (150.7)
Pooled TEI based on:
PK-LUE 3.2 5.6 0.5 0.2 0.5 9.6(s.d.) (21.9) (23.5) (20.6) (25.8) (12.7) (28.6)
pt-LUE 4.0 9.0 -1.4 4.7 0.7 7.9(s.d.) (22.2) (25.5) (17.9) (27.4) (16.1) (26.5)
Other Variables:
Employees 0.6 -9.2 11.1 49.4 -13.3 -29.1b
(s.d.) (61.7) (52.7) (70.8) (84.1) (28.2) (43.5)
Real sales -2.7 -17.8 13.6 4.2 -4.0 -7.8
(s.d.) (70.3) (49.7) (86.5) (59.2) (64.2) (94.3)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; pK: aggregate measure of capital flow;
LUE: labor in unskilled equivalent person days; pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow; pooled TEIs
identify frontier firms over both years. Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are
significantly different at the: b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
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TABLE 5A.9
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY INDICES (TEI) BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM
SIZE: PRICE-QUALITY COMPARABILITY*
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percent with respect to the best practice-frontier
Year/ TEI All Industry Number of Employees
Measured with Firms Agricult. |Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
PK-LUE 53 63 38a 52 42 660(s.d.) (29) (25) (30) (33) (22) (27)
p,-LUE 51 64 32c 51 39 640(s.d.) (30) (25) (27) (31) (26) (28)
1986 (current pesos):
PK-LUE 63b 60 65x 72 54 66
(s.d.) (25) (30) (20) (25) (24) (27)
pv-LUE 59 54 65x, 54 61 63(s.d.) (24) (27) (20) (23) (23) (32)
1986 (constant pesos):
PK-LUE 55 53 57 58 47 68
(s.d.) (24) (25) (24) (26) (20) (30)
pv-LUE 57 58 56 61 51 67(s.d.) (25) (27) (24) (26) (23) (30)
1977-86 changes:
PK-LUE 4 -12 21b 7 17 -18C
(s.d.) (33) (29) (28) (32) (29) (31)
pvt-LUE 5 -18 29a 0 25 -19b(s.d.) (36) (33) (22) (35) (23) (40)
1977 Pooled:
PK-LUE 41 47 31b 42 32 46
(s.d.) (25) (20) (29) (27) (18) (27)
pv-LUE 37 42 28c 39 27 44(s.d.) (25) (21) (29) (29) (16) (23)
1986 Pooled:
PK-LUE 42 54 30b 46 34 58
(s.d.) (29) (28) (27) (36) (19) (38)
pv,-LUE 42 53 31c 42 36 59(s.d.) (32) (27) (33) (36) (26) (38)
*Price-quality comparability is derived from adjustment of value added based on technical competence scores
and the entrepreneur's own evaluation. Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment;
pK: aggregate measure of capital flow; LUE: labor in unskilled-equivalent person days; pvt: disaggregated
measure of capital flow. Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are significantly different
at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level. Means by industry by year are significantly different at the:
x= .001 level.
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TABLE 5A.10
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY INDICES (TEI) BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM
SIZE: FULL CAPACITY
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percentages with respect to the best-practice
frontier
Year/ TEI All Industry Number of Employees
Measured with Firms Agricult. |Kitchens 1-20 | 21-40 | 41+
1977:
PK-LUE 51 53 48 48 48 60
(s.d.) (29) (27) (33) (33) (25) (27)
p,-LUE 52 55 48 48 48 63(s.d.) (30) (27) (34) (34) (23) (27)
1986 (current pesos):
PK-LUE 55 61 51 50 55 68(s.d.) (28) (27) (29) (29) (26) (32)
pvt-LUE 63c 67 55 64 59 65(s.d.) (26) (24) (26) (26) (24) (33)
1986 (constant pesos):
PK-LUE 56 61 51 59 53 61(s.d.) (25) (24) (25) (26) (24) (27)
pv-LUE 54 57 52 57 51 58(s.d.) (26) (25) (25) (27) (22) (31)
1977-86 Changes:
PK-LUE -4 -4 -3 -2 -3 -7
(s.d.) (25) (29) (21) (30) (22) (28)
pv,-LUE 0 0 1 15 1 -15(s.d.) (34) (32) (38) (43) (23) (35)
1977 Pooled:
P-LUE 39 46 29b 42 33 41(s.d.) (26) (25) (25) (28) (24) (26)
pv,-LUE 38 44 29b 40 32 40(s.d.) (25) (24) (25) (28) (21) (25)
1986 Pooled:
PK-LUE 45 45 44z 42 43 54
(s.d.) (24) (24) (26) (27) (22) (28)
pv,-LUE 50c 55 44z 46 48 62(s.d.) (25) (25) (25) (29) (23) (31)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; pK: aggregate measure of capital flow;
LUE: labor in unskilled equivalent person days; pvt: disaggregated measure of capital flow. Means of
respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level;
c= .1 level. Means by industry by year are significantly different at the: z= .1 level.
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TABLE 5A.11
PRICE-QUALITY CORRECTION FACTORS BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM
SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percentages
Year/ Basis of All Industry Number of Employees
Quality Premia Firms Agricult. |Kitchens 1-20 | 21-40 41+
1977:
CEO estimates 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.1 l.lb
(s.d.) (0.4) (0.2) (0.6) (0.5) (0.1) (0.3)
OverallScore 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1
(s.d.) (0.4) (0.2) (0.5) (0.5) (0.2) (0.3)
1986:
CEO estimates 1.1c 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0
(s.d.) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
OverallScore 1.0b 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
(s.d.) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; Quality premium= (price-quality adjusted
value added/actual value added). Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are significantly
different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
TABLE 5A.12
CAPACITY UNDERUTILIZATION BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in percentages
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
1977:
Capacity Utiliz 78 71 89a 70 84 85c
(s.d.) (23) (23) (18) (24) (20) (22)
C/B Ratio 90 85 97b 88 91 91
(s.d.) (22) (27) (11) (30) (15) (15)
1986:
Capacity Utiliz 60a 60 61 52 61 72
(s.d.) (21) (17) (26) (18) (19) (30)
C/B Ratio 79a 82 76 86 73 83
(s.d.) (29) (32) (27) (40) (20) (28)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; Capacity utilization= (actual value
added/full capacity value added); Cost-Benefit Ratio=(full capacity total wage bill/actual total wage
bill)/(full capacity value added/value added). Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are
significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
APPENDIX D
THE COLOMBIAN IMPORT REGIME
Despite the 1984 adjustment program, the import regime remains complex. Import
control is exercised by the following mechanisms:
a) The import licensing regime sets the number of import items included in the
prohibited, prior license, and free import positions. Prohibited items dropped to less than
2% of the total and free items rose to 36% during 1984-1986. As shown in Table 4A.2 in
Appendix C these percentages compare unfavorably with earlier years, but reflect a gradual
liberalization in recent years.
b) The tariff structure sets the level and dispersion of tariff rates. The reforms of
1985-1986 sought to reduce the average level of tariffs, their dispersion across tariff
positions, and to correct the relative biases between agriculture and industry. Nonetheless,
the World Bank regards the 1986 average rate of 51.5% and the variation across individual
items from 0 to 200% as high. Moreover, the persistence of a complex system of
exemptions (mandated in an ad hoc manner by the executive branch, legislated for
government imports and goods destined to free-trade zones, or dispensed by customs
officials at their discretion) complicate the picture given by an examination of the statutes
alone.
c) The foreign exchange budget controls the resources paid from central bank
reserves and allocated for free imports. This budget also sets the guidelines (i.e., with
respect to stage of fabrication discriminating raw materials, intermediates, final consumer
goods, and capital goods) for distributing the remainder of imports requiring prior license.
Non-reimbursable imports paid out of own-funds or included under international
agreements, free ports, and special regions are controlled through the discretionary
licensing by INCOMEX.I This continues to draw criticism from the World Bank because
1 Nonreimbursable import requests originate from direct foreign investors, from government and quasi-
government importers often using foreign loans, and from Colombians after long stays abroad. Between
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the basis for this licensing is past import demands "which in turn reflect past goals
regarding the protection of existing Colombian industry" (World Bank, 1987, p. 25).
Although an expansion of the budget has taken place, analysts note the necessity to
coordinate the size of this budget--a mechanism to control the balance of payments--with
the import licensing regime--a mechanism to guide resource allocation (World Bank, 1987;
Coyuntura Econ6mica, 1986). Without such coordination further liberalization of the
licensing scheme would be limited by budget constraints to finance imports.
1968-1980 the proportion of nonreimbursables in total registered imports has remained stable at about 13-
16% with about 90% of items in this category requiring prior license since 1976. For reimbursables
claiming the balance (87-84%) only about half of the items require prior license (World Bank, 1983, pp. 14-
15).
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
In this technical appendix we describe the details of the calculations behind our
estimates of capital, labor and value added. In light of the challenges in deriving accurate
estimates, we performed extensive consistency checks across measures and tested
alternative measurement methodologies to examine the robustness of our results. In all
cases, as we explain in Chapter 5, we used market prices. In the case of capital we
estimated two measures, an aggregated and a more data-intensive disaggregated measure,
both based on a peso valuation of the machinery rather than a physical measure of its use,
such as machine hours. For the labor input, we estimated two physical measures in terms
of person days per year and unskilled labor equivalent days per year. The latter is wage-
weighted to account for the differing productivities of labor as reflected in differing wage
rates. The value added measure follows traditional accounting practice and is based on
aggregate peso valuation of gross output. We will discuss below how we estimated each
of these input and output measures as well as detail our treatment of deflation since one of
our main objectives in this study is to compare firm performance in 1977 with that of 1986.
With respect to the sources of data presented in tables here and in other chapters,
unless otherwise specified, these data refer to our firm sample.
CAPITAL INPUT CALCULATIONS
Most microeconomic studies of technical efficiency start with an aggregate estimate
of the cost of replacement of the total capital stock and then annualize it into a capital flow
taking into account the years of useful life and the interest rate (see Chapter 5, p. 90).
Typically, these studies assume a 10 to 25 year service life and a real cost of capital
between 8% and 12%. The Cortes, Berry, and Ishaq (CBI, 1985) study from which our
data for 1977 were drawn attempted to more accurately estimate these parameters by
considering the actual life (given new or used machinery) and the real interest rate actually
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applied to the financing of the capital asset (rates varied from 2% to 12% depending on the
source--own, public or private bank, supplier/moneylender). An alternative approach is
derived from sectoral productivity studies relying on data about the components of the
capital stock and the value of transactions on new investment goods. Rather than relying
on an aggregate total figure, the components of the capital stock are aged and decayed as
time and changes take place. As the reader will note, our calculations for this disaggregated
measure draw heavily from Mohr's (1988) extensive survey of capital measurement
techniques.
Both approaches recognize that transactions prices are not an appropriate valuation
of the flow of capital services derived from a given asset. Capital assets are usually owned
and used by the same group and well defined rental markets for components of the capital
stock seldom exist (Diewert, 1979; Mohr, 1988). Their real value is related to the return
obtained by renting the capital asset. Therefore, when the asset is owner-utilized, the value
of the capital services from that asset is called the user cost or rental price. As noted above,
in the aggregated approach, this rental price is derived rather mechanically by annualizing
the capital stock figure. The disaggregated approach is firmly embedded within the
neoclassical theory of production and the assumption of firm optimizing behavior.
Moreover, as we explained in Chapter 2, to avoid the problematic choice of the
proper rate of return on capital, either historical or current, we applied Mohr's (1988, p.
126) vintage cost of capital measure (rvt) to reflect the composite historical costs of the mix
of vintages in the existing stock a follows
K =t e e.9
ryt= Kt (roK-t)+ K (r- x K (r1-i- r1) (A.1)
where
K t,= the portion of the historical net stock (subscript n) of capital in place in the
beginning of base year 0 and remaining at the beginning of the current year t
Kt = K"I + I +1 = net capital stock of old capital at the beginning of
year t plus gross investment during year t-J
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ro = truncated cost of capital for vintages purchased before the base year and
corresponding to KO, the initial capital stock (as in perpetual inventory
models)
r,= after-tax cost offunds at time T
r, = expected rate of inflation in output prices
n
I" = portion of historical gross investment made in year T still economically usefulT t
at the beginning of the current year t
e7r = expected rate of inflation in output prices associated with the decision to
purchase each vintage of capitalfrom year T = 0 to year t-1
i; t= gross investment during year t-1
Mohr's vintage model charges gross investment the current cost of funds and net capital the
historical cost corresponding to respective vintages. It is a weighted sum of the net capital
stock and each year's stream of capital investments where the weights are the after tax cost
of funds (rr - zr) at the time of purchase. This formula assures that all costs of capital are
decayed through the weighting scheme in which the importance of each vintage's cost of
capital decreases with age. This avoids the problem of charging historical capital
unreasonable current rates; the recent cost of capital is more important in determining
overall opportunity costs.
To apply the above formula, we set 1970 as the base year and t to 1977 and 1986
for each survey year, respectively. We chose 1970 as the base year because our pre-1970
interest rate data was incomplete; from 1970 through 1986 we were able to complement our
sector and firm specific data with industry-wide data on corporate tax rates gathered by the
World Bank (1989). Therefore, the estimates for the after tax cost of funds (rr - rZ from
equation A. 1 above) which we used as weights for aggregation of individual assets rely on
sector and firm specific data. We used the wholesale price index for the sector (SIC 382)
to account for inflationary expectations in the sector's output prices. To account for direct
taxation on the cost of capital we estimated the rr component as
rr = (1 -UT)iL
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where ur = marginal corporate income tax rate at time r
ir = pre-tax nominal interest rate (by source offinancing) at time T
Our assumption that all the firms in our sample were impacted by corporate income taxes is
based on our examination of their tax declaration forms which in many cases represented
the only documentation available. If we assume smaller firms were less likely to pay taxes,
our measure of r, may underestimate their cost of capital.
Once we adjusted for inflation (rr - xr), we encountered the familiar problem of
negative real rates particularly when entrepreneurs obtained their financing from
development banks which charged them below-market rates. In these cases we followed
the Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) practice noted in Chapter 2. We calculated a value for
rr as the ratio of the non-wage share of value added to the current value of the capital stock.
We did not have the year by year data needed to derive firm specific estimates and therefore
resorted to an average of the 4-digit SIC aggregates. To reduce the potential biases from
resorting to a different methodology we averaged the estimates from the two methods cited.
Following the dictates of index number theory, Mohr further argues that the other
components of the rental price of capital formula (not just the cost of capital) should also be
weighted averages. Therefore, Mohr rewrites the rental price of capital as
Pvt = qvt (rvt + 5 - ivt)
where fY2  "l
K" t t= t
qvt = _K t 40 + Kt q 4+ IK, t .- t_
subscripts v and t refer to vintage or age and the current year
This means we calculate, in effect, a linear aggregation of the peso perpetual inventory
flows over all vintages for each firm.
In terms of implementing the formula, qvt was given by the entrepreneur and
compared across firms to check its reliability. In addition to the asset price, entrepreneurs
provided information about the particular asset's service life, and the year of purchase
and/or manufacture to determine vintage. In order to avoid the thorny problems of
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deflation of historical asset prices, we used replacement costs. In 1977, CBI gathered total
capital stock estimates at commercial cost ,which together with their shadow price of capital
formed the basis for their TEIs. This is reasonable since commercial costs should reflect
the asset's historical cost in today's pesos. Unfortunately, commercial costs in 1977 were
not provided for individual assets, and we found that some entrepreneurs were less certain
of the prices their assets would sell for in 1986 than the costs of replacing them. This
reflected changing preferences for new versus second-hand equipment. In 1977 two-thirds
of entrepreneurs expressed a preference for new equipment although 60% recognized the
cost advantages of second-hand equipment. By 1986 only 15% noted these cost savings.
In many cases, the entrepreneur could not provide a complete disaggregation of the
firm's capital assets beyond an estimate of the total capital stock, value of buildings or rent,
and information about the main equipment. We assumed that the balance (that is, the
difference between the aggregate estimate of the capital stock and the sum of the
disaggregated components) had vintage, service life and cost of funds characteristics
similar to the weighted average of the disaggregated components. There were only two
cases in which this unknown balance represented more than one-half of the firm's total
capital stock. These prompted an examination of other corroborative information regarding
the firm's capital stock to assure our assumptions were not unreasonable.
Depreciation was estimated as
_ declining balance rate
service life of the asset
This formula for economic depreciation captures the decline in asset price due to
aging. If we were to construct an age-price profile, it would be downward sloping and
would shift upwards with inflation. The entrepreneur provided estimates for the
denominator. The lack of a subscript shows that we assume a constant rate of depreciation
for all assets. This was not the case since we followed Mohr's (1986) suggestion to
differentiate between classes of capital assets, in our case between machinery and
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buildings, and follow the aggregation scheme dictated by index number theory. This
transforms Mohr's vintage rental price of capital formula easily to
Pvt = qvt (rvt + 3t- nvt) where t refers to the type of capital asset
In the case of machinery, the declining balance rate was taken from Hulten and Wykoff s
(1981) estimate of 1.65 for metalworking machinery. They derived this figure from their
econometric estimation of age-price profiles using a Box-Cox power transformation on US
data. Given their estimate of 13.5 for the mean service life of this class of assets, Hulten
and Wykoff s figures yield a rate of depreciation of 12.2%.1
TABLE A.1
DEPRECIATION RATE AND MEAN SERVICE LIFE (MSL) BY YEAR, INDUSTRY,
AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.)
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. |Kitchens 1-20 | 21-40 41+
1977:
MSL (years) 17.0 17.6 16.2 16.8 17.4 17.1
(s.d.) (4.4) (3.6) (5.3) (4.8) (3.4) (4.8)
Depreciation (%) 12.2 12.4 12.0 12.6 11.7 12.1
(s.d.) (2.8) (2.5) (3.3) (2.8) (3.1) (2.7)
1986:
MSL (years) 17.2 16.7 17.7 17.1 17.7 15.6
(s.d.) (3.8) (2.1) (5.1) (2.4) (4.6) (4.0)
Depreciation (%) 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.3 13.1 12.5
(s.d.) (2.5) (2.8) (2.3) (2.9) (2.6) (2.8)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment.
In the case of buildings, when owned by the firm, we assumed a declining balance
rate of 1.5 and a service life of 30 years for buildings, figures confirmed by Hulten and
Wykoff. These parameters which yield a depreciation rate of 5% are those assumed by the
World Bank for a broad class of capital assets including machinery (World Bank, 1989, p.
143). This contrasts with Roberts (1989) TFP study using plant-level census data whose
results we described in the previous chapter. He differentiated two additional types of
1 The authors note that their estimate is very close to the BEA (.1278) figure used to estimate net capital
stock.
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assets, land which does not depreciate, and transport equipment which he depreciates at a
faster rate than machinery. Even his rates for machinery (10%) are in no way comparable
to those we estimated and presented in Table A. 1. As in most studies, his rates are
universal rates of depreciation while ours take explicit account of service life which as the
cited table shows varies across industries and size of firm.
As shown in Table A. 1, mean service life across our sample of 50 firms averaged
about 17 years for both 1977 and 1986 with corresponding depreciation rates of 12.2% and
13.0%, respectively. With the higher depreciation rate for 1986 we would expect a lower
mean service life given the formula for depreciation. However, this relationship is
confounded by the fact that the depreciation rates shown are weighted averages of the two
classes of capital assets.
We examined the potential bias introduced by using Hulten and Wykoff's US
estimate of the declining balance rate (1.65) with our Colombian data. On one hand, it
would seem that this rate would be higher in a developing country such as Colombia. Such
a higher rate would tend to yield a higher rate of depreciation and ultimately a higher rental
price of capital. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there may be differences in patterns of
use. Colombian users tend to be harder on the equipment , in part because operators are
less skilled and experienced in its use. This would suggest a more rapid aging of the
machinery. On the other hand, the difficulties of obtaining machinery (i.e., changing
import controls, paperwork and financing) have prompted entrepreneurs to prolong the
useful life of their equipment and adapt it to fulfill new needs.
Without additional data, however, we are unable to argue that the declining balance
rate should be lower or higher than the 1.65 assumed. When we changed this assumption
to 1.5 and 2 (the lower and upper limits most often used in the literature), this did not
change our capital estimates significantly. In effect, these alternative assumptions form an
upper and lower confidence band about our base case (See Table A.2). For a given capital
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TABLE A.2
CAPITAL MEASURES BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE UNDER THREE DECLINING BALANCE RATE
ASSUMPTIONS
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in thousands of pesos
Capital 1977 1986
Flow All Industry Size by Employees All Indus Size b Employees
Measures Firms Agricul. Kitchen 1-20 21-40 41+ Firms A cul. Kitchen 1-20 21-40 41+
I. Depreciation = 5 = 1.65/MSL
PK 317 295 351 121 457 485a 3199 3612 2754 2084 2925 5916a(s.d.) (284) (246) (339) (71) (350) (242) (2289) (2893) (1368) (1395) (1221) (3664)
PK (1977$P) 439 495 378 295 397 808b,
(s.d.) (318) (403) (190) (202) (159) (528)
p. 568 505 662 213 749 944a 3714 3600 3837 2906 3096 6778b
(s.d.) (578) (513) (666) (149) (601) (568) (2892) (3389) (2374) (2794) (1897) (3672)
p, (1977$P) 518 514 522 455 462 776
(s.d.) (444) (420) (486) (579) (280) (524)
II. Depreciation = 6 = 1.5/MSL
PK 328 307 359 126 469 503a 3402 3856 2913 2292 3083 6230"
(s.d.) (294) (256) (347) (73) (359) (252) (2416) (3047) (1444) (1534) (1271) (3908)
PK (1977$P) 469c 531 402 326 420 854b(s.d.) (338) (426) (202) (223) (168) (564)
p. 546 487 635 206 721 906a 3607 3483 3740 2806 3014 6591"(s.d.) (553) (497) (630) (147) (579) (643) (2807) (3299) (2290) (2710) (1858) (3527)
pt (1977$P) 507 503 512 447 447 768
(s.d.) (438) (419) (475) (567) (273) (526)
III. Depreciation = 6 = 2/MSL
PK 294 269 332 110 431 447a 2801 3140 2435 1690 2614 5286a(s.d.) (266) (225) (320) (67) (331) (220) (2040) (2581) (1232) (1138) (1139) (3155)
pK (1977$P) 380 425 331 236 350 714a(s.d.) (280) (356) (167) (163) (145) (453)
p. 615 543 723 227 810 1031a 3943 3855 4037 3119 3274 7164"(s.d.) (638) (549) (754) (151) (653) (766) (3070) (3586) (2544) (2952) (1983 (4012)
pvt (1977$P) 537 535 540 461 494 788
(s.d.) (454) (421) (503) (596) (294) (518)
Agricul.: agricultural implements; MSL: mean service life of firm capital equipment; PK :aggregate measure of capital flow; p,: disaggregated measure
of capital flow using Mohr's vintage rental price of capital formula; 1977$P: constant 1977 pesos. Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and
size) are significantly different at the: a--.00I level; b- 0 1 level; and c= at .1I level. Sources: firm survey data for 1977 (n=50) and 1986 (n=27).
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measure, disaggregated or aggregate, the three alternative estimates of capital flows had
zero order partial correlation coefficients of 99% and were significant at the .001 level.
Adjusting Capital Measures for Inflation
We described above the treatment of inflation with respect to the asset price of
capital. However, given the rapid pace of inflation in Colombia, we had to adjust the data
provided by the entrepreneur (interviewed during the first six months of 1978 and 1986) to
December 1977 and December 1986 prices. We used the wholesale capital goods price
index, provided by Colombia's central bank, to make these monthly adjustments. In the
case of the aggregate measure of capital, we also used these indices to adjust 1986 figures
to the December 1977 price level. In the case of the disaggregated measure of capital, we
had sufficient information about additions and deletions to the capital stock and their
relative prices in both years to be able to estimate implicit deflators. Table A.3 compares
our implicit deflators with those published by the central bank.
TABLE A.3
COMPARISON OF DEFLATORS BY INDUSTRY AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.)
BdIR Own Implicit Deflators derived from sample data
Input or Output Deflator All Industry Number of Employees
Item 12/77-86 Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
Capital goods 6.8 8.7 8.0 9.5 8.4 8.4 10.2
(s.d.) (6.5) (5.7) (7.4) (5.3) (7.8) (5.6)
-except buildings 6.7 10.6 10.1 11.0 7.1 10.5 16.8
(s.d.) (10.6) (11.9) (9.1) (4.3) (9.4) (18.4)
Unskilled labor 6.2 8.8 9.6 7.6b 9.0 8.9 8.0
(s.d) (0.2) (2.0) (1.9) (1.6) (1.5) (2.6) (1.2)
Skilled labor n.a. 6.5 7.2 5.8 8.3 5.4 5.8b
(s.d.) (2.6) (3.2) (1.8) (3.6) (1.2) (1.2)
Nonelectrical
machinery 7.1 7.1 8.3 5.8a 7.6 6.7 7.2
(s.d.) (1.9) (1.5) (1.4) (1.8) (1.9) (2.3)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; n.a. not available. Means of respective
groups (by year, industry, and size) are significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level; c= .1 level.
Sources: BdlR (central bank) deflators: Revista del Banco de la Repdblica. The figure for unskilled labor
corresponds to the CPI for blue collar workers and its standard deviation refers to the regional differences in
this CPI.
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The figures for the capital goods implicit deflator correspond to the disaggregated
capital measure derived from Mohr's vintage rental price of capital formula. We do not
present the deflator corresponding to the aggregate measure of capital. This deflator varies
little since it does not reflect the differences in appreciation of different equipment; for all
firms the mean was 7.3 with a standard deviation of only 0.33. As shown in Table A.3,
our implicit deflators are higher than those estimated by the Central Bank for this broad
class of goods. In terms of capital goods excluding buildings, the national deflator is
closest to the implicit deflator for small firms. The lower rate of appreciation for these
firms (although not statistically significant) reflects that their equipment was more heavily
represented by the most simple cutting and welding tools. Our comparison of the value of
assets in 1977 and 1986 showed lower rates of appreciation for the more simple machinery
in contrast to more complex equipment i.e., lathes, milling and grinding equipment.
Our estimates of implicit deflators assume that from 1977 to 1986 there was little
quality change in the capital equipment used by our sample of firms. This does not seem
an unwarranted assumption given that with few exceptions, firms continued to use capital
embodying a technology perhaps as much as 30 years old. Excluding a small firm which
made significant additions to its capital stock by purchasing used Italian numerically
controlled equipment, most firms continued to rely on basic universal metalworking
equipment.
Table A.4 shows the pattern and magnitude of net changes in the capital stock by
industry and size of firm. Although the average for all firms in the sample shows that net
capital changes represented about one-quarter of their total capital stock in 1986, the high
standard deviation shows wide variation across firms. For two thirds of surviving firms,
one-third of their 1986 capital stock was acquired after 1977. Net changes in the capital
stock in terms of 1986 replacement costs ranged from a reduction of $13.2 million by a
large firm to $104.2 million in acquisitions of the small firm cited above. Accordingly, as a
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percentage of 1986 total capital stock, these net changes represented a reduction of 13%
and an increase of 92%, respectively.
TABLE A.4
NET CHANGES TO CAPITAL 1977-1986
Means and Standard deviations (s.d.) in thousands of 1986 pesos
All Industry Number of Employees in 1977
Item Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 21-40 41+
Capital Flow:
-PK 828 1097 538 952 676 999(s.d.) (1284) (1636) (707) (1756) (668) (1754)
-pt 1017 1158 866 1109 752 1540
(s.d.) (1936) (2260) (1594) (2166) (739) (3570)
Capital Stock 13572 18644 8110 19714 9357 13226
(s.d.) (22473) (29371) (9868) (34942) (11154) (20149)
Stock /Total% 26 27 24 33 22 24
(s.d.) (26) (26) (28) (30) (25) (27)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; PK: aggregate measure of capital flow;
Pyt: disaggregated measure of capital flow.
LABOR INPUT CALCULATIONS
As noted earlier, we derived two estimates of the labor input from our firm data.
The first was physical measure in person day years of work for 1977 and 1986 based on
the number of employees and the days worked per month as given by the entrepreneur.
We took into account the following categories of labor: managerial (CEO and partners),
administrative (or support staff), technical (engineers and other production professionals),
skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. For our second measure with which we tried to
account for the differing productivities of labor, we weighted the number of person days in
each labor category by the ratio of that category's wage to the unskilled wage rate. For the
managerial category, we assumed the average wage for management workers for the sector
published in DANE's (Departamento Administrativo Nacional Estadistico) manufacturing
survey. In the case of smaller firms whose entrepreneurs were former production workers,
this estimate probably overestimated their wages. In the case of larger firms whose
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entrepreneurs were established industrialists, this probably underestimated their true
compensation.
We also estimated the total wage bill later used in deriving our measures of
profitability i.e., price cost margins. We made two important types of adjustments to the
figures on wages and number of workers given by the entrepreneur at the time of the
interview. The first adjustment follows the practice of Cortes, Berry and Ishaq (1985) to
account for the likely changes in nominal wages during the survey years (1977 and 1986).
Given that our yearly sales figures incorporated the price changes during the survey years
and reflected the December 1977 and 1986 price levels, our wage figures estimated from
daily or weekly wages given by the entrepreneur also had to reflect these monthly changes.
To assure that our wage figures corresponded to the December price level of the survey
year, we adjusted each firm's monthly wage bill by the rate of growth in nominal wages for
the sector. For example, for a firm interviewed during the ith month the adjustment is as
follows, beginning with December and working backwards to January of the survey year:
W12,t= Wi,t+1 (1+r12-)
W1,t = Wi,t+1(1+r12-i,t+1)(1+r11-12,t)...(1+r1-2,t)
where
t = survey year = 1977, 1986
i = month of interview during survey year
W = monthly wage bill (by skill category)
r = rate of growth of nominal wages for blue-collar workers in the non-
electrical machinery sector between months denoted by subscripts
The second adjustment involved a consistency check in which we compared the
implied (or estimated) wage bill with the actual wage bill given by the entrepreneur. The
implied monthly wage bill is the product of daily wages, number of workers, days worked
per month for each labor category, and the percentage for fringe benefits. In a few cases
we adjusted both the number of workers and their wage rate in order to make our implied
wage bill consistent with the other information provided by the entrepreneur.
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TABLE A.5
LABOR INPUT MEASURES BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in thousands of person days
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. Kitchens 1-20 I 21-40 1 41+
1977:
LPD 8.3 8.8 7.6 3.0 8.4 16.6a
(s.d.) (6.6) (7.4) (5.1) (1.2) (1.5) (6.0)
LUE 17.2 18.0 15.9 6.3 17.9 33.4a
(s.d.) (13.6) (15.0) (11.5) (2.9) (3.8) (13.6)
1986:
LPD 7.3 8.3 6.3 4.5 6.8 13.9a
(s.d.) (4.8) (6.0) (3.0) (2.8) (2.2) (6.8)
LUE 12.4b 12.3 12.5 4.8 12.3 26.5a
(s.d.) (8.8) (9.3) (8.7) (2.0) (3.6) (9.0)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; LPD: labor in unweighted person days;
LUE: labor in unskilled equivalent person days. Means of respective groups (by year, industry, and size)
are significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level.
Table A.5 illustrates the two labor input estimates by year, industry, and size of
firm. The person days physical measure yields only marginally different patterns from the
unskilled labor equivalent measure; the zero order partial correlation coefficient is 86% for
both years and significant at the .001 level.
Adjusting Labor Measures for Inflation
There was no need to adjust our physical measures of person days. However, in
order to compare profitability trends from 1977 to 1986, we deflated the total 1986 wage
bill including fringe benefits to December 1977 prices using the regional consumer price
index (CPI) for blue collar workers published by the Central Bank's Revista del Banco de
la Repdblica. By using these regional indices we hoped to more accurately capture the
inflationary pressures faced by our firms located in four major regions. Table A.3
compares our estimates of implicit deflators for the labor input for unskilled and skilled
workers with the published regional deflators which we used in our comparative analyses.
The sample averages of these implicit deflators for these two types of labor categories
suggest that the wages of unskilled workers increased faster than that of skilled workers.
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Had we used these implicit deflators we would have assumed that workers in both years
were of similar quality and productivity. Given the labor turnover in our sample of firms
(average experience of workers with the firm was about 3 years for both survey periods;
see Table 5A.4) and the improving access to education by a majority of Colombians, this
would have been a questionable assumption.
VALUE ADDED CALCULATIONS
The estimates of value added begin with the yearly sales figures provided by the
entrepreneur. We did not base our estimates of sales on the figures reported in tax
declaration forms. We were well aware that some sales are not included to avoid the value
added tax. After stressing the confidentiality of responses, we tried to get at the most
accurate estimate of total sales. We first adjusted sales figures by the change in inventories
to reflect as accurately as possible yearly gross output. For this purpose we had data on the
value of inventories of finished products at the end of the survey year. Although similar
data for the beginning of the year was not available, we estimated the likely change based
on questions about the magnitude of inventory changes throughout the year. We did not
have sufficient data about the quantities of the main products to be able to weigh each
product's physical contribution to gross output by its price. The main problem with this
unweighted procedure is that it assumes homogeneous output and thereby introduces a bias
to the 1977-1986 comparisons. Given this implicit assumption of a constant product mix,
we brought into our analysis information about the percentage of sales contributed by the
main product and how this had changed since 1977 to try to account for the effects of
changing product mix.
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TABLE A.6
VALUE ADDED (VA) BY YEAR, INDUSTRY, AND FIRM SIZE
Means and Standard Deviations (s.d.) in millions of current pesos unless otherwise noted
Year/ All Industry Number of Employees
Item Firms Agricult. I Kitchens 1-20 j 21-40 41+
1977:
Value Added 4.4 4.9 3.5 1.2 3.7 10.Oa
(s.d.) (5.7) (7.0) (2.9) (1.1) (1.9) (8.2)
VA Share (%) 52.5 50.0 56.2 51.4 58.4 48.5
(s.d.) (15.2) (13.6) (17.1) (16.5) (15.3) (11.8)
1986:
Value Added 32.5 39.3 25.2 9.1 20.2 106.8a
(s.d.) (59.9) (77.4) (34.3) (7.8) (12.1) (118.9)
VA(1977$P) 4.8 4.4 5.2 1.2 3.3 14.9c
(s.d.) (7.8) (8.2) (7.7) (0.9) (2.6) (14.5)
VA Share(%) 51.4 49.2 53.9 49.1 51.9 54.4
(s.d.) (13.0) (12.9) (13.1) (13.5) (14.4) (8.7)
Agricult.: agricultural implements; kitchens: kitchen equipment; 1977$P: 1977 constant pesos. Means of
respective groups (by year, industry, and size) are significantly different at the: a= .001 level; b= .01 level;
c= .1 level.
The second step involved estimating value added. In the initial 1977 survey, CBI
asked the entrepreneur to estimate the percentage of sales devoted to material and
intermediate purchases, to services, to wages, and to gross profits where the latter two
represented the share of value added. To derive value added we adjusted our estimates of
gross output by the value added share and compared these figures with the estimates of the
wage bill to assure the consistency across these measures. The resulting estimates are
illustrated in Table A.6 above.
Adjusting Value Added for Inflation
In Table A.3 we presented a comparison of the national output deflators with those
implicitly derived from our 1977-1986 firm data. We used our implicit deflators to adjust
our 1986 values to the 1977 price level, basing these implicit deflators on information about
the firm's principal product prices in the two survey years. After deriving the implicit
deflator we examined the responses of the entrepreneur referring to the changes they had
made in their products since 1977. If significant improvement had been made, our implicit
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deflator would overestimate the inflationary impact. However, none of the firms reported
significant quality or design changes in their products, most described improvements to
increase durability or aesthetics--the latter was relevant only to industrial kitchen producers.
The types of improvements reported by one firm were also reported by other firms in the
sample. Given that our analyses would compare firms against other firms in their industry,
we did not attempt to correct for quality improvements shared by most of the sample.
Although our failure to correct for less than major quality changes in value added raises the
question of a potential bias in comparing performance between 1977 and 1986, we believe
that this bias is small considering the nature of improvements reported by the firms.
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